17 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc.green2 sentences2017Spencer concedes in his brief that Glover filed a complaint against him, and “[i]n this state, truth is an absolute defense to an action for defamation.” Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). ¶28 Finally, Glover alleged that he was considering suing Spencer. 2005See Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 59 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 6 . | 3 | 3 |
Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.green2 sentences2025See generally id. ¶69 Appellees rely on a court of appeals case in which the court held that particular statements regarding matters of public importance could not sustain a defamation claim. 2019Rather, to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a defendant's alleged conduct "must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair," it must instead be so severe as to "evoke outrage or revulsion." Cabaness v. Thomas , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 38, 232 P.3d 486 , abrogated on other grounds by Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk , 2018 UT 36 , ¶¶ 29-32, 424 P.3d 897 . ¶57 Although "the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not ... subsumed within a defamation claim" in the same way a claim for tortious interference is when the alleged improper means is defamati | 2 | 3 |
Jensen v. Sawyersgreen2 sentences2009See generally Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81 , ¶35, 130 P.3d 325 (identifying damages as an essential element of a defamation claim); Armed Forces Ins. 2009See generally Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81 , ¶35, 130 P.3d 325 (identifying damages as an essential element of a defamation claim); Armed Forces Ins. | 2 | 3 |
Cox v. Hatchgreen2 sentences1994In Cox , the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' defamation claim on First Amendment grounds. 761 P.2d at 558 . 1992The supreme court acknowledged the preference for resolving defamation claims on the pleadings where appropriate, as indicated in Anderson , and then stated, ”[n]evertheless, it would be inappropriate to dismiss the defamation claim on the grounds discussed above.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
West v. Thomson Newspapersgreen2 sentences2025The district court ruled that Higgins’s and Nielsen’s statements were not capable of defamatory meaning based on their “content and context.” It also determined that the statements were privileged. ¶39 To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant published statements that referred to the plaintiff, that the statements were false and defamatory, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that the publication of the statements resulted in damage. 7 See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 , 1007–08 (Utah 1994); Wayment v. Clear Chann 2017Although it might portray Spencer in a negative light for being curt with a client, this type of behavior would not expose an attorney “to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” See id. ¶ 27 Third, the fact that Glover filed a complaint against Spencer cannot support a defamation claim. | 1 | 3 |
Jacob v. Bezzantgreen2 sentences2025To “accommodate the respect we accord [constitutional] protections of speech,” we do not “indulge [a plaintiff] by interpreting inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the statements in favor of a defamatory meaning.” Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 18 , 212 P.3d 535 (cleaned up). “[W]e cede no discretion to the district court’s view” of “[w]hether a statement is susceptible to a defamatory interpretation.” 8 Id. __________________________________________________________ 7 In some circumstances, to prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff may also have to show that the defamatory statem 2025To “accommodate the respect we accord [constitutional] protections of speech,” we do not “indulge [a plaintiff] by interpreting inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the statements in favor of a defamatory meaning.” Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 18 , 212 P.3d 535 (cleaned up). “[W]e cede no discretion to the district court’s view” of “[w]hether a statement is susceptible to a defamatory interpretation.” 8 Id. __________________________________________________________ 7 In some circumstances, to prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff may also have to show that the defamatory statem | 1 | 2 |
Pipkin v. Acumengreen2 sentences2025See Pipkin v. Acumen, 2020 UT App 111 , 472 P.3d 315 . 2025See Pipkin v. Acumen, 2020 UT App 111 , 472 P.3d 315 . | 1 | 1 |
Interwest Construction v. Palmergreen1 sentence2009Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶16 , 70 P.3d 35 (same for fraud claim); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (same for negligence claim); Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ¶ 10 , 145 P.3d 1157 (same for a breach of contract claim); *127 Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ¶40 , 102 P.3d 774 (same for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). | 1 | 1 |
Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2007In Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla.1962), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a single member of a football team consisting of "sixty or seventy members" could maintain a defamation claim even though he was not specifically mentioned. 2007Id. at 47, 52 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Westmont Maintenance Corp. v. Vance
green
2 sentences2014Corp. v. Vance, 2013 UT App 236 , 117 n. 4, 22, 313 P.3d 1149 (recognizing that the trial court awarded attorney fees as a sanction against Westmont for filing a defamation claim against an attorney representing former Westmont tenants and noting the trial court's observation that the defamation case was an '"'egregious and unwarranted use of legal process, a waste of judicial resources, and an undue imposition upon' "' the tenants' attorney). 2014Corp. v. Vance, 2013 UT App 236 , 117 n. 4, 22, 313 P.3d 1149 (recognizing that the trial court awarded attorney fees as a sanction against Westmont for filing a defamation claim against an attorney representing former Westmont tenants and noting the trial court's observation that the defamation case was an '"'egregious and unwarranted use of legal process, a waste of judicial resources, and an undue imposition upon' "' the tenants' attorney). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. 710 . 1983“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’— that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. 84 S.Ct. at 726 . [Emphasis added.] Thus, where a defamation claim is brought by a public official, a constitutional standard or federal rule must be applied, and not one that gives deference to varying state practices. | 2 | 1983–2009 |
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025The district court ruled that Higgins’s and Nielsen’s statements were not capable of defamatory meaning based on their “content and context.” It also determined that the statements were privileged. ¶39 To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant published statements that referred to the plaintiff, that the statements were false and defamatory, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that the publication of the statements resulted in damage. 7 See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 , 1007–08 (Utah 1994); Wayment v. Clear Chann 2025The district court ruled that Higgins’s and Nielsen’s statements were not capable of defamatory meaning based on their “content and context.” It also determined that the statements were privileged. ¶39 To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant published statements that referred to the plaintiff, that the statements were false and defamatory, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that the publication of the statements resulted in damage. 7 See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 , 1007–08 (Utah 1994); Wayment v. Clear Chann | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Phillips v. Henderson
neutral
2 sentences2025“A district court should grant a motion to dismiss only when, assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Henderson, 2024 UT 19, ¶ 13 , 552 P.3d 195 (cleaned up). ¶41 We note, however, that this general rule shifts when a court reviews a motion to dismiss a defamation claim. 2025“A district court should grant a motion to dismiss only when, assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Henderson, 2024 UT 19, ¶ 13 , 552 P.3d 195 (cleaned up). ¶41 We note, however, that this general rule shifts when a court reviews a motion to dismiss a defamation claim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Nunes v. Rushton
green
1 sentence2025The defamation claim challenged statements Rushton made on “about fifteen ‘sock puppet’ accounts” across the internet, in which she made negative reviews of Nunes and her books. 13 Id. at 1222–23. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mathews v. McCown
green
1 sentence2025One category of comments __________________________________________________________ 13 A “sock puppet” is “a false online name and profile created to hide the author’s identity, usually because of personal, political or financial ties to whatever is being discussed or reviewed.” Behind every sockpuppet is a person trying to hide, NEWS LITERACY PROJECT, https://newslit.org/tips-tools/news-lit-tip-sock-puppet/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2025). 22 Cite as: 2025 UT 34 Opinion of the Court included those “that characterize[d] Nunes’s actions as either harassment or fraud.” Id. at 1229 (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Pratt v. Nelson
green
1 sentence2025They argue instead that “[g]iven the references to pleadings and affidavits, the context and broader setting, a reasonable reader understands that Appellees directed their defamatory attacks at Appellants.” ¶152 We addressed similar arguments in Pratt, 2007 UT 41 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 8 , 104 P.3d 1226 (cleaned up). 2025LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 8 , 104 P.3d 1226 (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
RainFocus v. Cvent
green
1 sentence2023So, Cvent states, “[i]n each example, a proper evaluation of the statements and their context makes clear that Cvent is not making affirmative statements about RainFocus’s conduct; it is making truthful statements about the allegations and ongoing proceedings in the Federal Action.” 20210611-CA 8 2023 UT App 32 RainFocus v. Cvent Cvent argues that “such truthful statements about pending litigation cannot form the basis of a defamation claim.” ¶12 Cvent relies on Hinchey v. Horne, No. CV13-00260-PHX- DGC, 2013 WL 4543994 (D. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Butler v. Mediaport Entertainment
green
1 sentence2022But that statement was not included in Butler’s amended counterclaim, which superseded the original; the amended document contains no direct references to Butler being entitled to recover three times his salary as severance. 20200465-CA 3 2022 UT App 37 Butler v. Mediaport Entertainment damaged “in an amount to be determined by the fact-finder.” Fourth, Butler set forth a defamation claim, accusing Mediaport of “ma[king] and publish[ing] false statements” about him, and damaging him in an unspecified amount. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cabaness v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2019Rather, to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a defendant's alleged conduct "must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair," it must instead be so severe as to "evoke outrage or revulsion." Cabaness v. Thomas , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 38, 232 P.3d 486 , abrogated on other grounds by Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk , 2018 UT 36 , ¶¶ 29-32, 424 P.3d 897 . ¶57 Although "the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not ... subsumed within a defamation claim" in the same way a claim for tortious interference is when the alleged improper means is defamati 2019Rather, to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a defendant's alleged conduct "must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair," it must instead be so severe as to "evoke outrage or revulsion." Cabaness v. Thomas , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 38, 232 P.3d 486 , abrogated on other grounds by Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk , 2018 UT 36 , ¶¶ 29-32, 424 P.3d 897 . ¶57 Although "the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not ... subsumed within a defamation claim" in the same way a claim for tortious interference is when the alleged improper means is defamati | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk
green
2 sentences2019Rather, to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a defendant's alleged conduct "must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair," it must instead be so severe as to "evoke outrage or revulsion." Cabaness v. Thomas , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 38, 232 P.3d 486 , abrogated on other grounds by Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk , 2018 UT 36 , ¶¶ 29-32, 424 P.3d 897 . ¶57 Although "the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not ... subsumed within a defamation claim" in the same way a claim for tortious interference is when the alleged improper means is defamati 2019Rather, to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a defendant's alleged conduct "must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair," it must instead be so severe as to "evoke outrage or revulsion." Cabaness v. Thomas , 2010 UT 23 , ¶ 38, 232 P.3d 486 , abrogated on other grounds by Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk , 2018 UT 36 , ¶¶ 29-32, 424 P.3d 897 . ¶57 Although "the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not ... subsumed within a defamation claim" in the same way a claim for tortious interference is when the alleged improper means is defamati | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Heideman v. Washington City
green
2 sentences2012Finally, we see no words in the Notice commonly associated with the assertion of defamation claims such as "reputation." Thus, we conclude that the Notice would not have adequately informed Lehi City of Doyle's potential defamation claim. 7 See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, ¶ 14 , 155 P.3d 900 . ¶ 44 We likewise conclude that the district court did not err in deciding that Doyle's Amended Notice of Claim did not adequately inform Lehi City of Doyle's potential breach of contract claim. 2012Finally, we see no words in the Notice commonly associated with the assertion of defamation claims such as "reputation." Thus, we conclude that the Notice would not have adequately informed Lehi City of Doyle's potential defamation claim. 7 See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11, ¶ 14 , 155 P.3d 900 . ¶ 44 We likewise conclude that the district court did not err in deciding that Doyle's Amended Notice of Claim did not adequately inform Lehi City of Doyle's potential breach of contract claim. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Eleopulos v. McFarland and Hullinger, LLC
green
2 sentences2009Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶16 , 70 P.3d 35 (same for fraud claim); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (same for negligence claim); Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ¶ 10 , 145 P.3d 1157 (same for a breach of contract claim); *127 Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ¶40 , 102 P.3d 774 (same for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). 2009Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶16 , 70 P.3d 35 (same for fraud claim); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (same for negligence claim); Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ¶ 10 , 145 P.3d 1157 (same for a breach of contract claim); *127 Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ¶40 , 102 P.3d 774 (same for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hatch v. Davis
green
2 sentences2009Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶16 , 70 P.3d 35 (same for fraud claim); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (same for negligence claim); Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ¶ 10 , 145 P.3d 1157 (same for a breach of contract claim); *127 Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ¶40 , 102 P.3d 774 (same for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). 2009Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶16 , 70 P.3d 35 (same for fraud claim); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (same for negligence claim); Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ¶ 10 , 145 P.3d 1157 (same for a breach of contract claim); *127 Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ¶40 , 102 P.3d 774 (same for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison
green
2 sentences2009Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶16 , 70 P.3d 35 (same for fraud claim); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (same for negligence claim); Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ¶ 10 , 145 P.3d 1157 (same for a breach of contract claim); *127 Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ¶40 , 102 P.3d 774 (same for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). 2009Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶16 , 70 P.3d 35 (same for fraud claim); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (same for negligence claim); Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ¶ 10 , 145 P.3d 1157 (same for a breach of contract claim); *127 Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ¶40 , 102 P.3d 774 (same for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.