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31 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, Inc.green2 sentences2021See Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or 434, 437 , 693 P2d 35 , cert den, 474 US 826 (1985) (noting “truth” as an affirmative defense to a defamation claim). 2021See Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or 434, 437 , 693 P2d 35 , cert den, 474 US 826 (1985) (noting “truth” as an affirmative defense to a defamation claim). | 2 | 3 |
Neumann v. Lilesgreen2 sentences2016ORS 260.532 applies to statements of “fact” but does not define that term, nor does it define “opinion.” In the defamation context, a statement expresses an opinion if it “‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.’” Neumann, 261 Or App at 578 (quoting Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 110, 917 P2d 44 , rev den, 323 Or 690 (1996)); see also Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1223 (D Or 2011), aff'd, 740 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 2014) (explaining that “the ‘threshold question’ in a defamation claim is ‘whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the con 2016The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, reasoning that “the evidence submitted by plaintiffs, if credited, would permit a reasonable factfinder to rule in Neumann’s favor on the defamation claim, and the evidence submitted by [Liles] does not defeat Neumann’s claim as a matter of law.” Neumann v. Liles, 261 Or App 567, 575 , 323 P3d 521 (2014). | 2 | 3 |
Ristau v. Wescold, Inc.green2 sentences2024See Ristau v. Wescold, Inc., 318 Or 383, 387 , 868 P2d 1331 (1994) (“[W]e will enforce an unambiguous release that covers the claim at issue.”). 2024See Ristau v. Wescold, Inc., 318 Or 383, 387 , 868 P2d 1331 (1994) (“[W]e will enforce an unambiguous release that covers the claim at issue.”). | 2 | 2 |
Welcker v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021See Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or 434, 437 , 693 P2d 35 , cert den, 474 US 826 (1985) (noting “truth” as an affirmative defense to a defamation claim). 2004Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or 434, 437 , 693 P2d 35 , cert den, 474 US 826 , 106 S Ct 84 , 88 L Ed 2d 69 (1985). | 1 | 2 |
Brown v. Gattigreen2 sentences2011Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in Brown II). 2011Id. at 464 , 145 P.3d 130 (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in Brown II ). | 1 | 2 |
Lewis v. Carson Oil Co.green1 sentence2021See, e.g., Lewis, 204 Or App at 104 (affirming grant of summary judgment to the defendant, where the plaintiff argued that a jury could find that the defendant abused the qualified privilege, but the evidence was insufficient to create a triable fact issue). | 1 | 1 |
Hickey v. Settlemiergreen2 sentences2016ORS 260.532 applies to statements of “fact” but does not define that term, nor does it define “opinion.” In the defamation context, a statement expresses an opinion if it “‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.’” Neumann, 261 Or App at 578 (quoting Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 110, 917 P2d 44 , rev den, 323 Or 690 (1996)); see also Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1223 (D Or 2011), aff'd, 740 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 2014) (explaining that “the ‘threshold question’ in a defamation claim is ‘whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the con 2016ORS 260.532 applies to statements of “fact” but does not define that term, nor does it define “opinion.” In the defamation context, a statement expresses an opinion if it “‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.’” Neumann, 261 Or App at 578 (quoting Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 110, 917 P2d 44 , rev den, 323 Or 690 (1996)); see also Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1223 (D Or 2011), aff'd, 740 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 2014) (explaining that “the ‘threshold question’ in a defamation claim is ‘whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the con | 1 | 1 |
Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Crystal Coxgreen1 sentence2016ORS 260.532 applies to statements of “fact” but does not define that term, nor does it define “opinion.” In the defamation context, a statement expresses an opinion if it “‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.’” Neumann, 261 Or App at 578 (quoting Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 110, 917 P2d 44 , rev den, 323 Or 690 (1996)); see also Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1223 (D Or 2011), aff'd, 740 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 2014) (explaining that “the ‘threshold question’ in a defamation claim is ‘whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the con | 1 | 1 |
Gardner v. Martinogreen1 sentence2016ORS 260.532 applies to statements of “fact” but does not define that term, nor does it define “opinion.” In the defamation context, a statement expresses an opinion if it “‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.’” Neumann, 261 Or App at 578 (quoting Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 110, 917 P2d 44 , rev den, 323 Or 690 (1996)); see also Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1223 (D Or 2011), aff'd, 740 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 2014) (explaining that “the ‘threshold question’ in a defamation claim is ‘whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the con | 1 | 1 |
Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Coxgreen1 sentence2016ORS 260.532 applies to statements of “fact” but does not define that term, nor does it define “opinion.” In the defamation context, a statement expresses an opinion if it “‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.’” Neumann, 261 Or App at 578 (quoting Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 110, 917 P2d 44 , rev den, 323 Or 690 (1996)); see also Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1223 (D Or 2011), aff'd, 740 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 2014) (explaining that “the ‘threshold question’ in a defamation claim is ‘whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the con | 1 | 1 |
Headwaters Inc., an Oregon Nonprofit Corporation Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Servicegreen1 sentence2012As amplified below, we agree with plaintiff. 9 “As a rule, * * * a subsequent claim is barred by a prior judgment if the earlier litigation proceeded to final judgment, involved the same parties, and concerned a claim arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions.” Aguirre, 201 Or App at 47 (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. U. S. Forest Service, 399 F3d 1047, 1051-57 (9th Cir 2005); Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 140-41 , 795 P2d 531 (1990)). | 1 | 1 |
| Sheets v. Knightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGanty v. Staudenrausgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wallulis v. Dymowski
green
2 sentences2010Wallulis, 323 Or at 348 . 2004In Oregon “a defamatory communication from one corporate employee to another corporate employee concerning the job performance of a third employee is ‘published’ for the purpose of a defamation claim.” Wallulis, 323 Or at 347 . | 3 | 1996–2010 |
Neumann v. Liles
green
2 sentences2018The Supreme Court then allowed review of our decision "to determine how an actionable statement of fact is distinguished from a constitutionally protected expression of opinion in a defamation claim and whether the context in which a statement is made affects that analysis." Neumann II , 358 Or. at 710 , 369 P.3d 1117 . 2018The Supreme Court then allowed review of our decision "to determine how an actionable statement of fact is distinguished from a constitutionally protected expression of opinion in a defamation claim and whether the context in which a statement is made affects that analysis." Neumann II , 358 Or. at 710 , 369 P.3d 1117 . | 2 | 2018–2026 |
Parker v. Burnes
neutral
2 sentences2024Cite as 331 Or App 58 (2024) 63 In May 1988, plaintiff filed a defamation claim in the Multnomah County Circuit Court, naming as defen- dants John Burns,3 Miller Nash LLP, Senate President John Kitzhaber, Chevron Industries, Union Oil Company, Texaco Inc., and Exxon Mobil Corporation.4 Burns worked as a lobbyist and lawyer with defendant Miller Nash, and in that role, he represented the oil companies named as defendants. 2024Cite as 331 Or App 58 (2024) 63 In May 1988, plaintiff filed a defamation claim in the Multnomah County Circuit Court, naming as defen- dants John Burns,3 Miller Nash LLP, Senate President John Kitzhaber, Chevron Industries, Union Oil Company, Texaco Inc., and Exxon Mobil Corporation.4 Burns worked as a lobbyist and lawyer with defendant Miller Nash, and in that role, he represented the oil companies named as defendants. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State
green
2 sentences2023Relying on Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60 , 20 1 Lowell II does not implicate our decision in Hofer I affirming the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of OHSU on plaintiff’s medical negligence claim and, thus, we do not address that claim on remand other than to acknowledge and reaffirm it. 2023Relying on Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60 , 20 1 Lowell II does not implicate our decision in Hofer I affirming the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of OHSU on plaintiff’s medical negligence claim and, thus, we do not address that claim on remand other than to acknowledge and reaffirm it. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Reesman v. Highfill
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 599 . 2016Id. at 599 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Brown v. Gatti
green
2 sentences2011Brown I, 195 Or App at 715 . 2011Brown I, 195 Or.App. at 715 , 99 P.3d 299 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Hofer v. OHSU
green
1 sentence2023Multnomah County Circuit Court 18CV14839; A172328 536 P3d 989 This case, which involves a defamation claim brought against defendant, Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU), is on remand from the Oregon Supreme Court in light of that court’s decision in Lowell v. Medford School Dist. 549C, 370 Or 79 , 515 P3d 359 (2022). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Lowell v. Medford School Dist. 549C
green
2 sentences2023Multnomah County Circuit Court 18CV14839; A172328 536 P3d 989 This case, which involves a defamation claim brought against defendant, Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU), is on remand from the Oregon Supreme Court in light of that court’s decision in Lowell v. Medford School Dist. 549C, 370 Or 79 , 515 P3d 359 (2022). 2023Multnomah County Circuit Court 18CV14839; A172328 536 P3d 989 This case, which involves a defamation claim brought against defendant, Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU), is on remand from the Oregon Supreme Court in light of that court’s decision in Lowell v. Medford School Dist. 549C, 370 Or 79 , 515 P3d 359 (2022). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Allen v. Hall
green
2 sentences2022To establish a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must prove the follow- ing elements: “(1) the existence of a professional or business relationship (which could include, e.g., a contract or a pro- spective economic advantage); (2) intentional interference with that relationship or advantage; (3) by a third party; (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a causal effect between the interference and the harm to the relationship or prospective advantage; and (6) damages.” Allen v. Hall, 328 Or 276, 281 , 974 P2d 199 (1999). 1 2022To establish a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must prove the follow- ing elements: “(1) the existence of a professional or business relationship (which could include, e.g., a contract or a pro- spective economic advantage); (2) intentional interference with that relationship or advantage; (3) by a third party; (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a causal effect between the interference and the harm to the relationship or prospective advantage; and (6) damages.” Allen v. Hall, 328 Or 276, 281 , 974 P2d 199 (1999). 1 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mitchell v. the Timbers
green
1 sentence2021Schiavone, 477 US at 28-29 ; Mitchell, 163 Or at 319-20.7 Essentially, in Mitchell, we recognized that the tavern’s assumed business name was the nickname or alter ego of the registrant. 163 Or App at 319 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Ramstead v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2021The trial court dismissed Carey’s defamation claim on the ground that Siepmann’s statements on the employment verification forms (the alleged defama- tion) were protected by “absolute privilege.” See Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or 383, 387-88 , 347 P2d 594 (1959) (explain- ing that statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, so as to ensure that people may speak freely). 2021The trial court dismissed Carey’s defamation claim on the ground that Siepmann’s statements on the employment verification forms (the alleged defama- tion) were protected by “absolute privilege.” See Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or 383, 387-88 , 347 P2d 594 (1959) (explain- ing that statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, so as to ensure that people may speak freely). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Schiavone v. Fortune
red
1 sentence2021Schiavone, 477 US at 28-29 ; Mitchell, 163 Or at 319-20.7 Essentially, in Mitchell, we recognized that the tavern’s assumed business name was the nickname or alter ego of the registrant. 163 Or App at 319 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lowell v. Wright
green
1 sentence2020Jackson County Circuit Court 13CV04582; A162785 473 P3d 1094 Plaintiff brought a defamation claim against defendants after defendant Wright posted a negative Google review about plaintiff’s piano store. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Unelko Corp., an Illinois Corporation Howard G. Ohlhausen v. Andy Rooney, an Individual Cbs, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018The Supreme Court ultimately adopted the framework established by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Unelko Corp. v. Rooney , 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. den. , 499 U.S. 961 , 111 S.Ct. 1586 , 113 L.Ed.2d 650 (1991), for assessing whether a statement published online is entitled to protection under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Graff Trucking Co. v. Kelley
green
1 sentence2018The Supreme Court ultimately adopted the framework established by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Unelko Corp. v. Rooney , 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. den. , 499 U.S. 961 , 111 S.Ct. 1586 , 113 L.Ed.2d 650 (1991), for assessing whether a statement published online is entitled to protection under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Berger v. Personal Products, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018The Supreme Court ultimately adopted the framework established by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Unelko Corp. v. Rooney , 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. den. , 499 U.S. 961 , 111 S.Ct. 1586 , 113 L.Ed.2d 650 (1991), for assessing whether a statement published online is entitled to protection under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
National Union Fire Insurance v. Starplex Corp.
green
2 sentences2014That tort shares two elements in common with an ordinary defamation claim: “(1) the making of a defamatory statement” and “(2) publication of the defamatory material.” National Union, 220 Or App at 584 . 2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Young v. Davis
green
1 sentence2014Young, 259 Or App at 508-11 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Drews v. EBI Companies
green
2 sentences2012As amplified below, we agree with plaintiff. 9 “As a rule, * * * a subsequent claim is barred by a prior judgment if the earlier litigation proceeded to final judgment, involved the same parties, and concerned a claim arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions.” Aguirre, 201 Or App at 47 (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. U. S. Forest Service, 399 F3d 1047, 1051-57 (9th Cir 2005); Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 140-41 , 795 P2d 531 (1990)). 2012As amplified below, we agree with plaintiff. 9 “As a rule, * * * a subsequent claim is barred by a prior judgment if the earlier litigation proceeded to final judgment, involved the same parties, and concerned a claim arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions.” Aguirre, 201 Or App at 47 (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. U. S. Forest Service, 399 F3d 1047, 1051-57 (9th Cir 2005); Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 140-41 , 795 P2d 531 (1990)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Aguirre v. Albertson's, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Clinical Research Institute v. Kemper Insurance Companies green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Hoffman Construction Co. of Alaska v. Fred S. James & Co. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Tsai v. Li green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Gosnell green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Muresan v. Philadelphia Romanian Pentecostal Church green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Bradbury v. Teacher Standards & Practices Commission green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Downs v. Waremart, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Christensen v. Marvin neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Lee v. Paulsen green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Wattenburg v. United Medical Laboratories, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Woods v. First American Title Insurance Co. of Oregon, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.