defamation claim in Michigan

2025The elements of a defamation claim are well-established: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Mitan v Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 24 ; 706 NW2d 420 (2005).] Some of these elements have further terms of art embedded in them.

2025The elements of a defamation claim are well-established: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Mitan v Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 24 ; 706 NW2d 420 (2005).] Some of these elements have further terms of art embedded in them.

2022In Ireland, 230 Mich App at 617-624 , this Court dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim because some of the claimed statements were not actionable because they were subjective or amounted to rhetorical hyperbole, and other statements, while defamatory, were not made with actual malice.

2015DEFAMATION Where a defendant’s statements are not protected by the First Amendment, a plaintiff can establish a defamation claim by showing: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the publication (defamation per quod). [Ireland v Edwards, 230 Mich App 607, 614 ; 584 NW2d 632 (1998) (citations omitted).] Plaintiff

2025Recovery under this provision shall be limited to economic damages including attorney fees. 5 “Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.” TM v MZ, 326 Mich App 227, 242 ; 926 NW2d 900 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 We deny Bowles’s request for appellate sanctions against Repkie under MCR 7.216(C). -6- The statute indicates that recovery is “limited” to economic damages including attorney fees.

2025Recovery under this provision shall be limited to economic damages including attorney fees. 5 “Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.” TM v MZ, 326 Mich App 227, 242 ; 926 NW2d 900 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 We deny Bowles’s request for appellate sanctions against Repkie under MCR 7.216(C). -6- The statute indicates that recovery is “limited” to economic damages including attorney fees.

2025“Because truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim,” Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 486 ; 542 NW2d 905 (1995), it is factually correct that Wood had cause to expel Khaled’s children.

2025“Because truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim,” Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 486 ; 542 NW2d 905 (1995), it is factually correct that Wood had cause to expel Khaled’s children.

2010ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD As the majority explains, to prevail in a defamation action, a plaintiff who is a public official must establish that a defendant made a false and defamatory statement with “actual malice.”1 “‘Actual malice’ exists when the defendant knowingly makes a false statement or makes a false statement in reckless disregard of the truth.”2 The Legislature codified the heightened actual malice standard in MCL 600.2911(6), which mandates that a plaintiff who is a public official sustain a defamation claim “by clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published wi

2010ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD As the majority explains, to prevail in a defamation action, a plaintiff who is a public official must establish that a defendant made a false and defamatory statement with “actual malice.”1 “‘Actual malice’ exists when the defendant knowingly makes a false statement or makes a false statement in reckless disregard of the truth.”2 The Legislature codified the heightened actual malice standard in MCL 600.2911(6), which mandates that a plaintiff who is a public official sustain a defamation claim “by clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published wi

2022In order to establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Ghanam v Does, 303 Mich App 522, 544 ; 845 NW2d 128 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] “A communication is defamatory if, under all the circumstances, it tends to so harm the reput

2022In order to establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Ghanam v Does, 303 Mich App 522, 544 ; 845 NW2d 128 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] “A communication is defamatory if, under all the circumstances, it tends to so harm the reput

2018Furthermore, MCL 600.2911(3) contains what is known as the “fair reporting privilege.” Northland Wheels, 213 Mich App at 323 .

2016Northland Wheels Roller Skating Ctr, Inc v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 213 Mich App 317, 324 ; 539 NW2d 744 (1995); Couch v Schultz, 193 Mich App 292, 294 ; 483 NW2d 684 (1992). 2 Stewart and Bedford will henceforth be referred to in this opinion as “plaintiffs.” 3 Stewart served as a defense attorney in the collection action, and Bedford, who is the Van Buren County prosecutor, filed various criminal charges against an agent and an attorney for the plaintiffs in the collection action. -2- “The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2)

2016Northland Wheels Roller Skating Ctr, Inc v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 213 Mich App 317, 324 ; 539 NW2d 744 (1995); Couch v Schultz, 193 Mich App 292, 294 ; 483 NW2d 684 (1992). 2 Stewart and Bedford will henceforth be referred to in this opinion as “plaintiffs.” 3 Stewart served as a defense attorney in the collection action, and Bedford, who is the Van Buren County prosecutor, filed various criminal charges against an agent and an attorney for the plaintiffs in the collection action. -2- “The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2)

2016Northland Wheels Roller Skating Ctr, Inc v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 213 Mich App 317, 324 ; 539 NW2d 744 (1995); Couch v Schultz, 193 Mich App 292, 294 ; 483 NW2d 684 (1992). 2 Stewart and Bedford will henceforth be referred to in this opinion as “plaintiffs.” 3 Stewart served as a defense attorney in the collection action, and Bedford, who is the Van Buren County prosecutor, filed various criminal charges against an agent and an attorney for the plaintiffs in the collection action. -2- “The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2)

2017"Statements that are not protected and therefore are actionable include false statements of fact, i.e., those that state actual facts but are objectively provable as false and direct accusations or inferences of criminal conduct." Id. at 8 , 602 N.W.2d 233 .

2000Generally, a plaintiff may establish a claim of defamation by showing: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionablity of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the publication (defamation per quod). [Kevorkian, supra at 8-9 ; Ireland, supra at 614 .] When addressing a defamation claim, a reviewing court is required to make an independent examination of the record

2022See also Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 122 ; 476 NW2d 112 (1991); American Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc, 239 Mich App 695, 702 ; 609 NW2d 607 (2000). “[S]uch a cause of action might succeed even without a direct showing of any actual literally false statements.” Hawkins, 230 Mich App at 330 .

2022See also Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 122 ; 476 NW2d 112 (1991); American Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc, 239 Mich App 695, 702 ; 609 NW2d 607 (2000). “[S]uch a cause of action might succeed even without a direct showing of any actual literally false statements.” Hawkins, 230 Mich App at 330 .

2022Prysak v R L Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1, 15 ; 483 NW2d 629 (1992).

2022Prysak v R L Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1, 15 ; 483 NW2d 629 (1992).

2022First, Peake’s statements to the police about what she believed at the time was a misappropriation of the organization’s funds cannot be used to support a defamation claim because “reports of crimes or of information about crimes to the police are absolutely privileged.” Eddington v Torrez, 311 Mich App 198, 201, 202 ; 874 NW2d 394 (2015).2 A qualified privilege applies to “communications on matters of ‘shared interest’ between parties.” Rosenboom v Vanek, 182 Mich App 113, 116-117 ; 451 NW2d 520 (1989).

2022First, Peake’s statements to the police about what she believed at the time was a misappropriation of the organization’s funds cannot be used to support a defamation claim because “reports of crimes or of information about crimes to the police are absolutely privileged.” Eddington v Torrez, 311 Mich App 198, 201, 202 ; 874 NW2d 394 (2015).2 A qualified privilege applies to “communications on matters of ‘shared interest’ between parties.” Rosenboom v Vanek, 182 Mich App 113, 116-117 ; 451 NW2d 520 (1989).

1995Because truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich 157, 173-174 ; 398 NW2d 245 (1986); Cochrane v Wittbold, 359 Mich 402, 409 ; 102 NW2d 459 (1960); Postill v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 118 Mich App 608, 618 ; 325 NW2d 511 (1982), citing Restatement Torts, 2d, § 558, and plaintiff is estopped from contesting the arbitrator's final ruling that the charges against plaintiff had been sustained, Gates, supra at 154 ; Fulgum, supra at 377, the circuit court correctly dismissed count one of plaintiff's complaint.

1995Because truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich 157, 173-174 ; 398 NW2d 245 (1986); Cochrane v Wittbold, 359 Mich 402, 409 ; 102 NW2d 459 (1960); Postill v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 118 Mich App 608, 618 ; 325 NW2d 511 (1982), citing Restatement Torts, 2d, § 558, and plaintiff is estopped from contesting the arbitrator's final ruling that the charges against plaintiff had been sustained, Gates, supra at 154 ; Fulgum, supra at 377, the circuit court correctly dismissed count one of plaintiff's complaint.

2022Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260, 264 ; 725 NW2d 470 (2006). “ ‘An absolutely privileged communication is one for which no remedy is provided for damages in a defamation action because of the occasion on which the communication is made.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

2021The privilege is typically invoked in defense to a defamation claim, see e.g., id., but in Denhof, 311 Mich App at 520 , we held that the privilege applied to fraud claims brought against the Friend of the Court.

2022The following is required to establish defamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Hope-Jackson v Washington, 311 Mich App 602, 620 ; 877 NW2d 736 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] Importantly, “[t]ruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.

2022The following is required to establish defamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Hope-Jackson v Washington, 311 Mich App 602, 620 ; 877 NW2d 736 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] Importantly, “[t]ruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.

2022Because a “statement must -3- be provable as false” to be actionable, Mino v Clio Sch Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 77 ; 661 NW2d 586 (2003), “[t]ruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim,” Wilson v Sparrow Health Sys, 290 Mich App 149, 155 ; 799 NW2d 224 (2010).

2022Because a “statement must -3- be provable as false” to be actionable, Mino v Clio Sch Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 77 ; 661 NW2d 586 (2003), “[t]ruth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim,” Wilson v Sparrow Health Sys, 290 Mich App 149, 155 ; 799 NW2d 224 (2010).