defamation claim in Illinois

2026“To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts showing that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, that the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused damages.” Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 491 (2009) (citing Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill.2d 483, 490 (1988)).

2025Gatreaux v. DKW Enterprises, LLC, 2011 IL App (1st) 103482, ¶ 10 . -8- 1-24-0039 ¶ 31 Defamation and False Light Claims ¶ 32 To establish a defamation claim, “a plaintiff must present facts showing that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, that the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused damages.” Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 491 .

2026“To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts showing that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, that the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused damages.” Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 491 (2009) (citing Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill.2d 483, 490 (1988)).

2007Plaintiff nevertheless contends that employers are sufficiently protected from the foregoing concerns by the traditional defamation defense of "truth," (see American International Hospital v. Chicago Tribune Co., 136 Ill.App.3d 1019, 1022 , 91 Ill.Dec. 479 , 483 N.E.2d 965, 968 (1985) ("[t]ruth is a defense to a defamation action")) and the doctrine of qualified privilege (see Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill.2d 483, 490 , 125 Ill.Dec. 310 , 530 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1988) ("[i]f defamation arises out of an employer-employee relationship, the plaintiff may be confronted with a qual

2023However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 583 (2006) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). ¶ 31 That is not to say that all statements of fact, if phrased as an opinion, can avoid a defamation claim; to be sure, “a false assertion of fact can be libelous even though couched in terms of an opinion.” Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 99-100 ; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)); see Solai

2023However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 583 (2006) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). ¶ 31 That is not to say that all statements of fact, if phrased as an opinion, can avoid a defamation claim; to be sure, “a false assertion of fact can be libelous even though couched in terms of an opinion.” Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 99-100 ; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)); see Solai

2026“A defamatory statement is a statement that harms a person’s reputation to the extent it lowers the person in the eyes of the community or deters the community from associating with her or him.” Id. (citing Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1992)).

2023However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 583 (2006) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). ¶ 31 That is not to say that all statements of fact, if phrased as an opinion, can avoid a defamation claim; to be sure, “a false assertion of fact can be libelous even though couched in terms of an opinion.” Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 99-100 ; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)); see Solai

2016“When this court accepts an appeal involving a question of law identified under Rule 308, interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result oblige us to go beyond the question of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that gave rise to the appeal. [Citations.]” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 (1995), and Schrock v. Shoemaker, 159 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1994)). ¶ 24 We can answer the certified question as written without addressing the motion to strike, but in terms of the order giving

2016“When this court accepts an appeal involving a question of law identified under Rule 308, interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result oblige us to go beyond the question of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that gave rise to the appeal. [Citations.]” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 (1995); Schrock v. Shoemaker, 159 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1994)). ¶ 24 We can answer the certified question as written without addressing the motion to strike; but in terms of the order giving rise

2016“When this court accepts an appeal involving a question of law identified under Rule 308, interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result oblige us to go beyond the question of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that gave rise to the appeal. [Citations.]” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 (1995), and Schrock v. Shoemaker, 159 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1994)). ¶ 24 We can answer the certified question as written without addressing the motion to strike, but in terms of the order giving

2016“When this court accepts an appeal involving a question of law identified under Rule 308, interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result oblige us to go beyond the question of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that gave rise to the appeal. [Citations.]” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 (1995); Schrock v. Shoemaker, 159 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1994)). ¶ 24 We can answer the certified question as written without addressing the motion to strike; but in terms of the order giving rise

2014Id. at 50 . ¶ 39 Fuboy’s reliance on Hustler is problematic for the obvious reason that the Court did not address the defamation claim.

2014Id. at 50 . ¶ 39 Fuboy’s reliance on Hustler is problematic for the obvious reason that the Court did not address the defamation claim.

2008"To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts that a defendant made a false statement about a plaintiff, [that] the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused damages." Seith v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 371 Ill.

2008“To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts that a defendant made a false statement about a plaintiff, [that] the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, and that this publication caused damages.” Seith v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 371 Ill.

2023However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 583 (2006) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). ¶ 31 That is not to say that all statements of fact, if phrased as an opinion, can avoid a defamation claim; to be sure, “a false assertion of fact can be libelous even though couched in terms of an opinion.” Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 99-100 ; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)); see Solai

2021The story allegedly contained numerous similarities between the plaintiff and the physical attributes, locations, and events attributed to the character Bryson, such that the plaintiff “should be allowed the opportunity to prove that, despite the fictional label, the character ‘Bryson’ bears such a close resemblance to the plaintiff that reasonable persons would understand that the character was actually intended to portray the plaintiff.” Id. at 98 . ¶ 37 Bryson is inapposite because it involved a defamation claim in which the plaintiff was named.

2022In fact, the Stone court expressly stated that, “[w]hile the Maxon court correctly found that this standard protects an anonymous individual’s constitutional rights in the context of a defamation claim, we add that the appropriateness of this standard is not limited to speech-based claims.” (Emphasis added.) 2011 IL App (1st) 093386 , ¶ 18. - 14 - Hadley found the reasoning of the Maxon and Stone courts to be persuasive and thus held that, to “ascertain whether a petitioner has satisfied Rule 224’s necessity requirement, the court must evaluate a defamation complaint to determine whether it wi

2019Stone v. Paddock Publications, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 093386, ¶ 24 .

2015Davis v. Keystone Printing Service, Inc., 111 Ill.

2015See id. (exhibits could not form sole basis for finding the plaintiff was a public figure when considering dismissal under prior section 48 of the Code (Ill.

2015"An affirmative defense is properly asserted in a section 2-615 motion only if the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint." R & B Kapital Development, LLC v. North Shore Community Bank & Trust Co., 358 Ill.

2015“An affirmative defense is properly asserted in a section 2-615 motion only if the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint.” R&B Kapital Development, LLC v. North Shore Community Bank & Trust Co., 358 Ill.

2010Naleway v. Agnich, 386 Ill.

2010Naleway v. Agnich, 386 Ill.

2025Id. ¶ 28; see Wright Development Group, LLC v. Walsh, 238 Ill. 2d 620, 638 (2010) (complaint dismissed under the Act where defendant presented evidence that his allegedly defamatory statement was true).

2012Unlike substantial truth, which is an affirmative defense, falsity is an essential element in a defamation claim (see Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184 (1975)), and the dispositive fact in Wright was that the defendant’s allegedly defamatory statements were proven to be true both in appearance and in fact, rendering the plaintiff’s claim meritless (see Wright, 238 Ill. 2d at 638 ).

2016“When this court accepts an appeal involving a question of law identified under Rule 308, interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result oblige us to go beyond the question of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that gave rise to the appeal. [Citations.]” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 (1995), and Schrock v. Shoemaker, 159 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1994)). ¶ 24 We can answer the certified question as written without addressing the motion to strike, but in terms of the order giving

2016“When this court accepts an appeal involving a question of law identified under Rule 308, interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an equitable result oblige us to go beyond the question of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that gave rise to the appeal. [Citations.]” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 (1995); Schrock v. Shoemaker, 159 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1994)). ¶ 24 We can answer the certified question as written without addressing the motion to strike; but in terms of the order giving rise

2026See Dent, 2022 IL 126795, ¶¶ 35, 46 .

2024Dent v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc., 2022 IL 126795, ¶ 26 .

2023However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Pub Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 583 (2006) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). ¶ 31 That is not to say that all statements of fact, if phrased as an opinion, can avoid a defamation claim; to be sure, “a false assertion of fact can be libelous even though couched in terms of an opinion.” Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 99-100 ; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)); see Solai

1988(Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 349 , 41 L.

2018App. 3d 1034 , 1045-46, 296 Ill.Dec. 377 , 835 N.E.2d 411 , 421-22 (2005) (evaluating a defamation claim under neutral principles of law when a pastor alleged that his former church sent false and misleading letters throughout the local community). ¶ 78 Plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendants published Tamara's statements to anyone outside of the internal disciplinary procedures of the AME Church.

2018App. 3d 1034 , 1045-46, 296 Ill.Dec. 377 , 835 N.E.2d 411 , 421-22 (2005) (evaluating a defamation claim under neutral principles of law when a pastor alleged that his former church sent false and misleading letters throughout the local community). ¶ 78 Plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendants published Tamara's statements to anyone outside of the internal disciplinary procedures of the AME Church.