66 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mohr v. Grantgreen2 sentences2026“Washington does not require a defamation defendant to ‘prove the literal truth of every claimed defamatory statement.’” Mohr, 153 Wn.2d at 825 (citing Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 494 , 635 P.2d 1081 (1981)). 2020See Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 822 , 108 P.3d 768 (2005) (plurality opinion); see also N.Y. | 2 | 8 |
Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc.green2 sentences2025A. FALSITY “A defamation claim must be based on a statement that is provably false.” Schmalenberg, 87 Wn. 2011Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wash.2d 529, 538 , 716 P.2d 842 (1986); see also Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 87 Wash.App. 579, 590 , 943 P.2d 350 (1997) ("A defamation claim must be based on a statement that is provably false"). | 2 | 7 |
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.green2 sentences2011Dunlap, 105 Wash.2d at 538 , 716 P.2d 842 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (there is not a wholesale exception to defamation for anything that might be labeled an opinion). 2011Dunlap, 105 Wash.2d at 538 , 716 P.2d 842 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (there is not a wholesale exception to defamation for anything that might be labeled an opinion). | 2 | 4 |
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.green2 sentences2011Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 55 , 59 P.3d 611 (2002); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) ("However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."). ¶ 24 An opinion can support a defamation claim if it implies that undisclosed defamatory facts form the basis of the opinion. 2011Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 55 , 59 P.3d 611 (2002); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) ("However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."). ¶ 24 An opinion can support a defamation claim if it implies that undisclosed defamatory facts form the basis of the opinion. | 2 | 2 |
Capitol Records v. Rita Carmichaelgreen2 sentences2010Elektra, 618 F.Supp.2d at 92 ; see, e.g., Capitol Records, 508 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 ; Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Herrin Illinois Cafe, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Mo.1984). ¶ 18 We note that, in another case, the trial court refused to enter a default judgment because it believed that the defamation claim at issue was subject to a claim of absolute governmental privilege. 2010Elektra, 618 F.Supp.2d at 92 ; see, e.g., Capitol Records, 508 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 ; Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Herrin Illinois Cafe, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Mo.1984). ¶ 18 We note that, in another case, the trial court refused to enter a default judgment because it believed that the defamation claim at issue was subject to a claim of absolute governmental privilege. | 2 | 2 |
PEERLESS INDUSTRIES v. Herrin Illinois Cafe, Inc.green2 sentences2010Elektra, 618 F.Supp.2d at 92 ; see, e.g., Capitol Records, 508 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 ; Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Herrin Illinois Cafe, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Mo.1984). ¶ 18 We note that, in another case, the trial court refused to enter a default judgment because it believed that the defamation claim at issue was subject to a claim of absolute governmental privilege. 2010Elektra, 618 F.Supp.2d at 92 ; see, e.g., Capitol Records, 508 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 ; Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Herrin Illinois Cafe, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Mo.1984). ¶ 18 We note that, in another case, the trial court refused to enter a default judgment because it believed that the defamation claim at issue was subject to a claim of absolute governmental privilege. | 2 | 2 |
Julian Toney v. Wcco Television, Midwest Cable and Satellite, Inc., Also Known as Wcco Tv, Channel 4, Also Known as Iowcco Tv, Channel 411green2 sentences2005See Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 394 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for defendant, remanding for a new trial, and stating “Milkovich made clear that implications, like plain statements, may give rise to a defamation claim. 2005See Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 394 (8th Cir.1996) (reversing summary judgment for defendant, remanding for a new trial, and stating " Milkovich made clear that implications, like plain statements, may give rise to a defamation claim. | 2 | 2 |
Mohr v. Grantgreen2 sentences2020See Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 822 , 108 P.3d 768 (2005) (plurality opinion); see also N.Y. 2015Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 823 , 108 P.3d 768 (2005) (plurality opinion). | 1 | 4 |
| Pasqualini v. MortgageIT, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Krepps v. Reinergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Amsbury v. Cowles Publishing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Caruso v. Local Union No. 690green | 1 | 1 |
| Kilgore v. Youngergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mark v. Seattle Times
green
2 sentences2019To defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a defamation claim, the plaintiff “must establish a prima facie case by evidence of convincing clarity.” Mark, 96 Wn.2d at 487 . 2008To defeat a defamation claim, “[a] defendant need only show that the statement is substantially true or that the gist of the story, the portion that carries the ‘sting’, is true.” Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 494 , 635 P.2d 1081 (1981). | 16 | 1995–2026 |
Dunlap v. Wayne
green
2 sentences2026Therefore, a defamation claim can arise from “an expression of opinion that is not based on disclosed or assumed facts and therefore implies that there are undisclosed facts on which the opinion is based.” Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wn.2d 529, 540 , 716 P.2d 842 (1986) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 566 cmt. c). 2026Therefore, a defamation claim can arise from “an expression of opinion that is not based on disclosed or assumed facts and therefore implies that there are undisclosed facts on which the opinion is based.” Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wn.2d 529, 540 , 716 P.2d 842 (1986) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 566 cmt. c). | 3 | 2011–2026 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2025New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. 2025New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. | 3 | 1987–2025 |
J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Routsen
green
2 sentences2010J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc. v. Routsen, 69 Wash.App. 148, 150 , 848 P.2d 733 (1993). 2010J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc. v. Routsen, 69 Wash.App. 148, 150 , 848 P.2d 733 (1993). | 3 | 2010–2010 |
Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co.
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 469 . 2016A defamation claim for either libel or slander requires (a) “a false and defamatory statement concerning another”; (b) “an unprivileged communication to a third party”; (c) “fault amounting at *640 least to negligence on the publisher’s part”; and (d) “either actionability of the statement or special harm caused by the publication.” Eastwood, 106 Wn.2d at 470 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel
green
2 sentences2015The chairman told a local newspaper that Jennifer Wood’s performance as a communications coordinator was “lacking.” The court characterized the quotation as defamatory per se. ¶55 In Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 42 Wn. 1997Obviously, there may be others as well. 61 Caruso, 100 Wn.2d at 353 ; Amsbury, 76 Wn.2d at 737, 739 ; Purvis, 54 Wn.2d at 751 ; Vern Sims Ford, Inc., 42 Wn. | 2 | 1997–2015 |
Slayton v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2012Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 486 , 635 P.2d 1081 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982). 1995App. 229, 237 , 580 P.2d 642 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 945 (1979)), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982). | 2 | 1995–2012 |
Lee v. the Columbian, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010Lee v. Columbian, Inc., 64 Wash.App. 534, 538 , 826 P.2d 217 (1991). 2010Lee v. Columbian, Inc., 64 Wn. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP INC. v. Carter
green
2 sentences2010Elektra, 618 F.Supp.2d at 92 ; see, e.g., Capitol Records, 508 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 ; Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Herrin Illinois Cafe, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Mo.1984). ¶ 18 We note that, in another case, the trial court refused to enter a default judgment because it believed that the defamation claim at issue was subject to a claim of absolute governmental privilege. 2010Elektra, 618 F.Supp.2d at 92 ; see, e.g., Capitol Records, 508 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 ; Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Herrin Illinois Cafe, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Mo.1984). ¶ 18 We note that, in another case, the trial court refused to enter a default judgment because it believed that the defamation claim at issue was subject to a claim of absolute governmental privilege. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
MacH v. Allison
green
2 sentences2005Indeed, Milkovich ultimately held that ‘a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the statements [at issue] imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich peijured himself. . . [and that] th[is] connotation is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 )); Mach v. Allison, 259 Wis.2d 686, 698-99 , 656 N.W.2d 766 (2002) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant in part, remanding for a new trial in part, and citing Milkovich for the proposition that “[t]he ‘statement’ that is the subject of a defamati 2005Indeed, Milkovich ultimately held that ‘a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the statements [at issue] imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich peijured himself. . . [and that] th[is] connotation is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 )); Mach v. Allison, 259 Wis.2d 686, 698-99 , 656 N.W.2d 766 (2002) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant in part, remanding for a new trial in part, and citing Milkovich for the proposition that “[t]he ‘statement’ that is the subject of a defamati | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Sims v. Kiro, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Truth or Falsity and Defamatory Meaning To prevail on a defamation claim in Washington, the plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) falsity, (2) an unprivileged communication, (3) fault, and (4) damages. 8 Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 486 , 635 P.2d 1081 (1981) (citing Sims v. KIRO, Inc., 20 Wn. 1995App. 229, 237 , 580 P.2d 642 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 945 (1979)), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982). | 2 | 1982–1995 |
LaMon v. Butler
green
1 sentence2025LaMon v. Butler, 44 Wn. 20 No. 60121-4-II App. 654, 659, 722 P.2d 1373 (1986), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 193 (1989). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston County
green
1 sentence2025The trial court also rejected Thurman’s constitutional challenge to the UPEPA, finding that the application of the CR 12 and 56 standards were constitutional pursuant to Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn.2d 269 , 351 P.3d 862 (2015), abrogated on other grounds by Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston County, 191 Wn.2d 392 , 440 n. 15, 423 P.3d 223 (2018). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
1000 Virginia Ltd. Partnership v. Vertecs Corp.
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Davis v. Cox
green
2 sentences2025The trial court also rejected Thurman’s constitutional challenge to the UPEPA, finding that the application of the CR 12 and 56 standards were constitutional pursuant to Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn.2d 269 , 351 P.3d 862 (2015), abrogated on other grounds by Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston County, 191 Wn.2d 392 , 440 n. 15, 423 P.3d 223 (2018). 2025The trial court also rejected Thurman’s constitutional challenge to the UPEPA, finding that the application of the CR 12 and 56 standards were constitutional pursuant to Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn.2d 269 , 351 P.3d 862 (2015), abrogated on other grounds by Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston County, 191 Wn.2d 392 , 440 n. 15, 423 P.3d 223 (2018). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
LaMon v. Butler
neutral
1 sentence2025LaMon v. Butler, 44 Wn. 20 No. 60121-4-II App. 654, 659, 722 P.2d 1373 (1986), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 193 (1989). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Benjamin v. Cowles Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence2025Benjamin v. Cowles Publ’n Co., 37 Wn. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Maison de France, 126 Wn. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rice v. Offshore Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Rice v. Offshore Sys., Inc., 167 Wn. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Herzog Aluminum, Inc. v. General American Window Corp.
green
1 sentence2021Herzog, 39 Wn. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. O'Neill
green
1 sentence2021State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571 , 62 P.3d 489 (2003). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. O'NEILL
green
1 sentence2021State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571 , 62 P.3d 489 (2003). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Stidham v. Department of Licensing green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Lowe v. Rowe green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Krepps v. Reiner green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Total Call International, Inc. v. Perless Insurance green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Wood v. Battle Ground School Dist. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Doe v. Cahill green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Bender v. City of Seattle green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders With Ethics & Accountability Now green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Buss v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| North Coast Elec. Co. v. Selig green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Robel v. Roundup Corp. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Robel v. Roundup Corp. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Clawson v. Longview Publishing Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Northwest Prosthetic v. Centennial Ins. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Northwest Prosthetic & Orthotic Clinic, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Caruso v. LOCAL 690 INTERNL. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.