defamation claim in Ohio

2020Stated differently, the elements of a defamation claim are “(1) a false and defamatory statement, (2) about plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) that was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.” Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App.3d 195, 206 (9th Dist.1996). {¶10} Defamation per se consists of a false statement that is defamatory on its face, without the need for interpretation or innuendo.

2020Elements of a defamation claim. {¶32} “Defamation is a false publication that injures a person’s reputation.” Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App.3d 195, 206 (9th Dist.1996).

2019Nevertheless, because the complaint did not plead all the necessary elements of a defamation per quod claim, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. {¶9} This court, in Thomas v. Cohr, Inc., 197 Ohio App.3d 145 , 2011-Ohio- 5916, 966 N.E.2d 915, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), delineated the elements of a defamation claim under Ohio law.

2019Nevertheless, because the complaint did not plead all the necessary elements of a defamation per quod claim, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. {¶9} This court, in Thomas v. Cohr, Inc., 197 Ohio App.3d 145 , 2011-Ohio- 5916, 966 N.E.2d 915, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), delineated the elements of a defamation claim under Ohio law.

2026Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 (1995). “‘Slander’ refers to spoken defamatory words, while ‘libel’ refers to written or printed defamatory words.” Schmidt v. Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare, 2011-Ohio-777 , ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). {¶7} “To succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.” Watley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 200

2026Id. 3 Hilty has not asked this court to determine the impact of the trial court’s finding regarding the tortious-interference claims in light of his success on the defamation claim.

2024Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179 , 183 (1984). {¶ 27} Both parties agree that because the substance of the IIED claim and the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim are virtually identical to the defamation claim, the statute of limitations associated with the defamation claim controls.

2024Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1984). {¶ 27} Both parties agree that because the substance of the IIED claim and the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim are virtually identical to the defamation claim, the statute of limitations associated with the defamation claim controls.

2026Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 (1995). “‘Slander’ refers to spoken defamatory words, while ‘libel’ refers to written or printed defamatory words.” Schmidt v. Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare, 2011-Ohio-777 , ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). {¶7} “To succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.” Watley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 200

2025“To succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.” Watley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2008-Ohio-3691, ¶ 26 (10th Case No. 2024-00030JD -4- DECISION Dist.). “‘Slander’ refers to spoken defamatory words, while ‘libel’ refers to written or printed defamatory words.” Schmidt v. Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare, 2011-Ohio- 777,

2013In effect, this order still does not determine the action or prevent a judgment. {¶21} Stovall argues summary judgment as to the defamation claim was appropriate as a matter of law because her complaint to the school enjoyed a qualified privilege. {¶22} This court has previously cited the elements a defendant must prove to invoke the qualified privilege defense as follows: “[A] defendant must establish that (1) he acted in good faith; (2) there was an interest to be upheld; (3) the statement was limited in its scope to the purpose of upholding that interest; (4) the occasion was proper; and (5

1991In order to successfully assert a defamation claim against one whose statements are entitled to a qualified privilege, a plaintiff must show that in making the statements the “defendant was moved by actual malice, such as ill will, spite, grudge or some ulterior motive.” Hahn v. Kotten (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 248 , 72 O.O.2d 134, 141 , 331 N.E.2d 713, 721 .

2026Leadscope at ¶ 78, quoting Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Welling v. Weinfeld, 2007-Ohio-2451 . {¶28} “[E]ven where each of the essential elements of a defamation claim are established, the defendant can assert privilege to defend against liability for a defamatory statement.” Fisher at ¶ 36 .

2021E.g., Welling, 113 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2007-Ohio-2451 , 866 N.E.2d 1051, at ¶ 61 (recognizing false light as a tort and establishing required elements); Dale, 57 Ohio St.3d at 114 , 567 N.E.2d 253 (discussing injured party’s burden of proof in defamation actions). {¶ 145} As a final matter in this context, the trial court applied a legally incorrect standard by finding that Appellees proved all the elements of a defamation claim “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Judgment at p. 20.

2026Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation.” Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2021-Ohio-1198 , ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445 , 662 N.E.2d 1074 (1996); see also Swoope v. Osagie, 2016-Ohio-8046, ¶ 33 , 76 N.E.3d 686 (8th Dist.) (noting that while a plaintiff must prove falsity as an element of a defamation claim, a publisher may also “completely defend” a defamation action by showing substantial truth). “ ‘It is sufficient [in defending against a defamation action] to show that the imputation

2026Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation.” Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2021-Ohio-1198 , ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445 (1996); see also Swoope v. Osagie, 2016-Ohio-8046, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.) (noting that while a plaintiff must prove falsity as an element of a defamation claim, a publisher may also “completely defend” a defamation action by showing substantial truth). “‘It is sufficient [in defending against a defamation action] to show that the imputation is substantially true, or as it is

2024See Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017-Ohio-1526 , ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (holding that “a false light invasion of privacy claim[] involving allegations that would also support a defamation claim has the same statute of limitations applied to it as the defamation claim”); Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio-1394 , ¶ 51 (2d Dist.) (holding that “where defamation is the basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the applicable one-year statute of limitations for defamation also applies to the emotional distress claim”).

2024See Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017-Ohio-1526, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (holding that “a false light invasion of privacy claim[] involving allegations that would also support a defamation claim has the same statute of limitations applied to it as the defamation claim”); Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio-1394 , ¶ 51 (2d Dist.) (holding that “where defamation is the basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the applicable one-year statute of limitations for defamation also applies to the emotional distress claim”).

2022After all, as noted in the court's opinion, even a public official like Betzko may win a defamation claim if the official can show that the defendant acted with "actual malice," as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").

2022After all, as noted in the court's opinion, even a public official like Betzko may win a defamation claim if the official can show that the defendant acted with "actual malice," as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").

2023Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation.” Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109559, 2021-Ohio-1198 , ¶ 30, citing Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445 , 662 N.E.2d 1074 (1996); Swoope v. Osagie, 2016-Ohio-8046 , 76 N.E.3d 686 , ¶ 33 (8th Dist.) (noting that while a plaintiff must prove falsity as an element of a defamation claim, a publisher may also “completely defend” a defamation action by showing substantial truth). “‘It is sufficient [in defending against a defamation action] to show that the

2023Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation.” Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109559, 2021-Ohio-1198 , ¶ 30, citing Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445 , 662 N.E.2d 1074 (1996); Swoope v. Osagie, 2016-Ohio-8046 , 76 N.E.3d 686 , ¶ 33 (8th Dist.) (noting that while a plaintiff must prove falsity as an element of a defamation claim, a publisher may also “completely defend” a defamation action by showing substantial truth). “‘It is sufficient [in defending against a defamation action] to show that the

2024Soc., 2012-Ohio-4193, at ¶ 77 . {¶ 30} The degree of fault required to prevail on a defamation claim depends, in part, on the plaintiff’s status, i.e., whether the subject of the allegedly defamatory statement is a public or private figure.

2019The essential elements of a defamation claim do not turn on the relative financial condition of the plaintiff and defendant. {¶ 76} Because this case can and should be resolved by addressing WBNS’s fifth proposition of law, which requires a straightforward application of Am. Chem. 31 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Soc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366 , 2012-Ohio-4193 , 978 N.E.2d 832 , to the publications at issue here, I would decline to address the remaining propositions of law.

2023See Cogent Solutions Group, LLC v. Brown, S.D.Ohio No. 2:12-CV-665, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165265 , ¶ 40 (Nov. 20, 2013) (noting that defamation claim was nearly frivolous but declining to award sanctions because “Ohio law does allow for a defamation claim based on implication, or ‘innuendo’ ”); Osborne, 183 Ohio App.3d 104 , 2009-Ohio-2612 , 916 N.E.2d 484, at ¶ 10 (discussing defamation per quod and per se distinction and noting “that both parties fail to support a substantial portion of their respective arguments with citations to case law”); Mucci v. Dayton Newspapers, 71 Ohio Misc.2d 71 ,

2023See Cogent Solutions Group, LLC v. Brown, S.D.Ohio No. 2:12-CV-665, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165265 , ¶ 40 (Nov. 20, 2013) (noting that defamation claim was nearly frivolous but declining to award sanctions because “Ohio law does allow for a defamation claim based on implication, or ‘innuendo’ ”); Osborne, 183 Ohio App.3d 104 , 2009-Ohio-2612 , 916 N.E.2d 484, at ¶ 10 (discussing defamation per quod and per se distinction and noting “that both parties fail to support a substantial portion of their respective arguments with citations to case law”); Mucci v. Dayton Newspapers, 71 Ohio Misc.2d 71 ,

2026Leadscope at ¶ 78, quoting Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Welling v. Weinfeld, 2007-Ohio-2451 . {¶28} “[E]ven where each of the essential elements of a defamation claim are established, the defendant can assert privilege to defend against liability for a defamatory statement.” Fisher at ¶ 36 .

1992The record contains substantial evidence upon which reasonable minds could have reached differing conclusions regarding the false-imprisonment claim, see Feliciano v. Kreiger (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 69 , 4 O.O.3d 158 , 362 N.E.2d 646 , the emotional-distress claim, see Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369 , 6 OBR 421, 453 N.E.2d 666 , and the defamation claim, see Baby Tenda of Greater Cincinnati v. Taft Broadcasting (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 550, 552 , 579 N.E.2d 522, 523 .

2026Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation.” Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2021-Ohio-1198 , ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445 , 662 N.E.2d 1074 (1996); see also Swoope v. Osagie, 2016-Ohio-8046, ¶ 33 , 76 N.E.3d 686 (8th Dist.) (noting that while a plaintiff must prove falsity as an element of a defamation claim, a publisher may also “completely defend” a defamation action by showing substantial truth). “ ‘It is sufficient [in defending against a defamation action] to show that the imputation

2026Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation.” Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2021-Ohio-1198 , ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445 (1996); see also Swoope v. Osagie, 2016-Ohio-8046, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.) (noting that while a plaintiff must prove falsity as an element of a defamation claim, a publisher may also “completely defend” a defamation action by showing substantial truth). “‘It is sufficient [in defending against a defamation action] to show that the imputation is substantially true, or as it is

2026Brown v. Lawson, 2006-Ohio-5897, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.); Dundee v. Philpot, 2019-Ohio-3939, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).

2026In this regard, courts have indicated that a complaint in a defamation case is sufficient when it “identifies the substance of the defamatory remarks.” Martin v. Wegman, 2019-Ohio-2935, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). {¶68} Considering a similar issue in Dudee v. Philpot, 2019-Ohio-3939 , ¶ 46- 50 (1st Dist.), we held that the trial court did not err in excluding a statement that had not been plead in the complaint from its consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s defamation claim.

2024See Spingola v. Stonewall Columbus, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 06AP- 403, 2007-Ohio-381, ¶ 10 , citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

2004New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254 , 279-280 ; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), 388 U.S. 130 ; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323 , 342 .

2022The term " '[s]lander' refers to spoken defamatory words, while 'libel' refers to written or printed defamatory words." Id., citing Matikas v. Univ. of Dayton, 152 Ohio App.3d 514 , 2003-Ohio-1852 , ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). {¶ 43} In order to "prevail on a defamation claim, whether libel or slander, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) was published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault or at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff

2014Matikas v. Univ. of Dayton, 152 Ohio App.3d 514 , 2003-Ohio-1852 , ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). {¶ 18} To prevail on a defamation claim, whether libel or slander, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) was published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault or at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.

2022The term " '[s]lander' refers to spoken defamatory words, while 'libel' refers to written or printed defamatory words." Id., citing Matikas v. Univ. of Dayton, 152 Ohio App.3d 514 , 2003-Ohio-1852 , ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). {¶ 43} In order to "prevail on a defamation claim, whether libel or slander, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) was published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault or at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff

2022The term " '[s]lander' refers to spoken defamatory words, while 'libel' refers to written or printed defamatory words." Id., citing Matikas v. Univ. of Dayton, 152 Ohio App.3d 514 , 2003-Ohio-1852 , ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). {¶ 43} In order to "prevail on a defamation claim, whether libel or slander, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) was published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault or at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff

2014Wilson, at ¶19. {¶21} “[I]n Ohio, any analysis of a defamation claim must begin with the court providing a definitive interpretation as to whether the defendant has stated an opinion or has made a factual assertion.” Rothschild v. Humility of Mary Health Partners, 163 Ohio App.3d 751 , 2005-Ohio-5481 , 840 N.E.2d 258, ¶9 (7th Dist.).

2014Wilson, at ¶19. {¶21} “[I]n Ohio, any analysis of a defamation claim must begin with the court providing a definitive interpretation as to whether the defendant has stated an opinion or has made a factual assertion.” Rothschild v. Humility of Mary Health Partners, 163 Ohio App.3d 751 , 2005-Ohio-5481 , 840 N.E.2d 258, ¶9 (7th Dist.).

2026Ibanez v. Hutchins, 2012-Ohio-5040 , ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), quoting Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 536 (1994) (“the true nature or subject matter of the acts giving rise to the complaint” determines the applicable statute of limitations); Cleavenger v. B.O., 2022-Ohio-454, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.) (“When a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based upon conduct actionable as a claim for defamation, the one-year statute of limitations applies.”); Weidman v. Hildebrant, 2024-Ohio-2931 , ¶ 27 (where the alleged conduct underlying an intentional infliction of emot

2026“To hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff to repackage a defamation claim as a separate cause of action to avail a longer statute of limitations.” Weidman at ¶ 27. {¶17} In this case, Clark’s IIED claim relies on the same allegations as her defamation claim.