defamation claim in District of Columbia

2021Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 597 (D.C. 2000) (“[I]f it is plain that a speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.”) (internal quotations omitted). 12 are important considerations in evaluating a defamation claim, “[a]n allegedly defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive; the language must make [appellants] appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous.” 18 It is therefore certainly the case that, if Nadel had simply as

2021Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 597 (D.C. 2000) (“[I]f it is plain that a speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.”) (internal quotations omitted). 12 are important considerations in evaluating a defamation claim, “[a]n allegedly defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive; the language must make [appellants] appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous.”18 It is therefore certainly the case that, if Nadel had simply ass

2021Louis Post-Dispatch, L.L.C., 906 A.2d 308, 313-14 (D.C. 2006) (“[A] statement . . . may not be isolated and then pronounced defamatory, or deemed capable of defamatory meaning.

2021Louis Post-Dispatch, L.L.C., 906 A.2d 308, 313-14 (D.C. 2006) (“[A] statement . . . may not be isolated and then pronounced defamatory, or deemed capable of defamatory meaning.

2021Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 597 (D.C. 2000) (“[I]f it is plain that a speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.”) (internal quotations omitted). 12 are important considerations in evaluating a defamation claim, “[a]n allegedly defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive; the language must make [appellants] appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous.” 18 It is therefore certainly the case that, if Nadel had simply as

2021Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 597 (D.C. 2000) (“[I]f it is plain that a speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.”) (internal quotations omitted). 12 are important considerations in evaluating a defamation claim, “[a]n allegedly defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive; the language must make [appellants] appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous.”18 It is therefore certainly the case that, if Nadel had simply ass

2013Blodgett v. University Club, 930 A.2d 210, 222 (D.C.2007) (citing Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C.2005)); Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”) § 558 (1977).

2011Blodgett v. The University Club, 930 A.2d 210, 222 (D.C.2007) (citation omitted).

2026See Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78, 80 (D.C. 1980); Mann, 150 A.3d at 1251-52 .

2022See Mann, 150 A.3d at 1251 (there is a “heightened showing of fault—actual malice—that must be proved in defamation cases that rely on statements made about public figures concerning matters of public concern”) (citing N.Y.

2016The point, and the reason we align ourselves with the decisions just cited, is that “a plaintiff may not use related causes of action to avoid the constitutional requisites of a defamation claim.” Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 319-20 (D.C.Cir.1994).

2013These elements are similar to those involved in analysis of a defamation claim, and “a plaintiff may not avoid the strictures of the burdens of proof associated with defamation by resorting to a claim of false light invasion.” Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 319 (citing Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 1151 ); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 , 111 S.Ct. 2513 , 115 L.Ed.2d 586 (1991); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876 , 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988).

2005Heard, supra, 810 A.2d at 882-85 .

2005Lipscombe has demonstrated — below or in this court — how the present suit might “implicate[ ] a core religious activity.” West, 711 A.2d at 1272 ; see also Heard, 810 A.2d at 882-88 (applying heightened pleading standard to a defamation claim “aris[ing] entirely out of a church’s relationship with its pastor” (emphasis added)).

2026See Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78, 80 (D.C. 1980); Mann, 150 A.3d at 1251-52 .

2023In sum, where the Awans have not raised the foregoing concerns, we cannot say that Salem’s publication of non-threatening public speech 98 Cf. Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends Sch., 128 A.3d 1023, 1042 (D.C. 2015) (concluding that an ex-husband’s publication of a civil complaint against his ex- wife’s romantic partner could be extreme and outrageous given the “particularly sexually explicit language of the complaint” and its goal to trigger an investigation by the plaintiff’s professional governing bodies and to “brand” the plaintiff with “scarlet letter”). 52 crossed the threshold to meet the eleme

2023Section 16-5504(a) authorizes fee awards to defendants only when the court has determined, in granting a special motion to dismiss, that the plaintiff is unable to show the claim is likely to succeed on the merits. 30 The standard applied to evaluate the likelihood of success is designed to “weed[] out meritless litigation” and effectively requires a finding of objective baselessness, inasmuch as the court may grant the special motion only if it concludes that the claimant could not prevail as a matter of law. 31 In the present case, the court dismissed appellants’ defamation claim because the

2023Section 16-5504(a) authorizes fee awards to defendants only when the court has determined, in granting a special motion to dismiss, that the plaintiff is unable to show the claim is likely to succeed on the merits. 30 The standard applied to evaluate the likelihood of success is designed to “weed[] out meritless litigation” and effectively requires a finding of objective baselessness, inasmuch as the court may grant the special motion only if it concludes that the claimant could not prevail as a matter of law. 31 In the present case, the court dismissed appellants’ defamation claim because the

2016With particular focus on the defamation claim, the court analyzed in detail Ms. Thompson’s letters to the USDA and concluded that “no reasonable juror could deny the substantial truth of each of the statements [of fact] to which Mr. Armstrong objects,” and that the rest of the statements “were assertions of opinion that were unverifiable and therefore not actionable as defamation.” Id. at 185, 187 . 3 This court reversed, however, as to Mr. Armstrong’s claim of intentional interference with contractual relations.

2016As a defense to that tort, we recognized, the defendant may seek “to prove that her interference was not wrongful,” id. at 190 , and in determining whether that burden has been met courts, “following settled law in the District of Columbia,” must weigh seven factors as spelled out in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 767 (1977).

2013These elements are similar to those involved in analysis of a defamation claim, and “a plaintiff may not avoid the strictures of the burdens of proof associated with defamation by resorting to a claim of false light invasion.” Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 319 (citing Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 1151 ); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 , 111 S.Ct. 2513 , 115 L.Ed.2d 586 (1991); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876 , 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988).

2013These elements are similar to those involved in analysis of a defamation claim, and “a plaintiff may not avoid the strictures of the burdens of proof associated with defamation by resorting to a claim of false light invasion.” Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 319 (citing Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 1151 ); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 , 111 S.Ct. 2513 , 115 L.Ed.2d 586 (1991); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876 , 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988).

2013Blodgett v. University Club, 930 A.2d 210, 222 (D.C.2007) (citing Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C.2005)); Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”) § 558 (1977).

2012See Maupin v. Haylock, 931 A.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C.2007) (upholding summary judgment where a defamation claim was one day outside of the statute of limitations period); Sayyad v. Fawzi, 674 A.2d 905, 906 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (rejecting equitable tolling because it was “bound by th[e] strict adherence to statutes of limitations”); DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 986 (D.C.1980) (dismissing a claim as untimely when it was filed one day late).

2012See Maupin v. Haylock, 931 A.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C.2007) (upholding summary judgment where a defamation claim was one day outside of the statute of limitations period); Sayyad v. Fawzi, 674 A.2d 905, 906 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (rejecting equitable tolling because it was “bound by th[e] strict adherence to statutes of limitations”); DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 986 (D.C.1980) (dismissing a claim as untimely when it was filed one day late).

2012See Maupin v. Haylock, 931 A.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C.2007) (upholding summary judgment where a defamation claim was one day outside of the statute of limitations period); Sayyad v. Fawzi, 674 A.2d 905, 906 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (rejecting equitable tolling because it was “bound by th[e] strict adherence to statutes of limitations”); DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 986 (D.C.1980) (dismissing a claim as untimely when it was filed one day late).

2010Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 877 (D.C.1998).

2009The good faith test and the similarly lax motion to dismiss test may needlessly strip defendants of anonymity in situations where there is no substantial evidence of wrongdoing, effectively giving little or no First Amendment protection to that anonymity. 9 Toward the other end of the spectrum is the test articulated by the New Jersey Superior Court in Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J.Super. 134 , 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (2001), which requires plaintiffs to “produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis,” after which the court

2009The good faith test and the similarly lax motion to dismiss test may needlessly strip defendants of anonymity in situations where there is no substantial evidence of wrongdoing, effectively giving little or no First Amendment protection to that anonymity. 9 Toward the other end of the spectrum is the test articulated by the New Jersey Superior Court in Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J.Super. 134 , 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (2001), which requires plaintiffs to “produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis,” after which the court

2009In our view, the “good faith test” insufficiently protects a defendant’s anonymity: “Plaintiffs can often initially plead suffi-dent facts to meet the good faith test ... even if the defamation claim is not very strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation action to a final decision.” Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 .

2009“In other words,” and this is an important qualification, “the defamation plaintiff, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, must introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for all elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiffs control.” Id. at 463 (emphasis in original).

2008But because this is *43 a case in which the trial court dismissed the defamation claim without findings of record and thus where “there are so few findings of fact pertaining to [the factors that bear on Clampitt’s status],” we think it better to “defer here to the trial court to address the matter in the first instance.” Concord Enters., Inc. v. Binder, 710 A.2d 219 , 223 n. 6 (D.C.1998); see also Connelly, 749 A.2d at 1269 (“bearing in mind the way this case has evolved, prudence suggests that the trial judge consider it first”).

2008See 799 A.2d 381 , 383 n. 1.