defamation claim in Massachusetts

2023Because the claim of retaliation arises from the adverse action letter and the coding, the undisputed fact that they are accurate in the eyes of the Secretary means that Padmanabhan will not be able to prove his claim of retaliation.5 Cf. Reilly v. Associated Press, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 764, 770 (2003) ("when a 5 Accordingly, we need not address CHA's alternative privilege arguments. 10 statement is substantially true, a minor inaccuracy will not support a defamation claim"). b.

2012However, “when a statement is substantially true, a minor inaccuracy will not support a defamation claim.” Reilly v. The Associated Press, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 764, 770 (2003); see also Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 50 (2007).

2018As set forth supra , Butcher must prove each element of the defamation claim, including fault, which "varies between negligence (for statements concerning private persons) and actual malice (for statements concerning public officials and public figures)." Ravnikar , 438 Mass. at 630 , 782 N.E.2d 508 . 10 For purposes of summary judgment, Butcher provides sufficient evidence that the campus environment and conditions of his employment became so hostile that he felt compelled to leave.

2018As set forth supra , Butcher must prove each element of the defamation claim, including fault, which "varies between negligence (for statements concerning private persons) and actual malice (for statements concerning public officials and public figures)." Ravnikar , 438 Mass. at 630 , 782 N.E.2d 508 . 10 For purposes of summary judgment, Butcher provides sufficient evidence that the campus environment and conditions of his employment became so hostile that he felt compelled to leave.

2011See also Correlias v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 324 (1991) (where the SJC dismissed intentional infliction of emotional distress claims along with a defamation claim and observed that: “A privilege which protected an individual from liability for defamation would be of little value if the individual were subject to liability under a different theory of tort”).

2008Correllas, 410 Mass. at 319 (testimony during criminal trial is absolutely privileged and insufficient to support a defamation claim); Aborn v. Lxpson, 357 Mass. 71, 72 (1970) (defendant’s statements while testifying at probate court hearing “were pertinent to the judicial proceeding in which they were made and hence were absolutely privileged”).

2013See Eyal v. Helen Broadcasting Corp., 411 Mass. 426, 429 (1991) (to succeed in defamation action, plaintiff must establish that alleged defamatory statement published by defendant was “of and concerning” plaintiff); New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 474 (1985); Driscoll v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 298 (2007).

2012New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Connecticut, Inc., 395 Mass. at 479 .

2024Cf. King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 714 (1987) (defamation claim based on their that defendant falsely attributed discrediting statements to plaintiff failed as a matter of law because any such reading “would have been unreasonable”).

2013King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 718 (1987).

2012However, “when a statement is substantially true, a minor inaccuracy will not support a defamation claim.” Reilly v. The Associated Press, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 764, 770 (2003); see also Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 50 (2007).

2008See Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42 , 51 n.10 (2007). “[A]n objective test — i.e., inquiry into a reasonable recipient’s understanding of the words rather than the speaker’s intent — has been used over the years to prove that words are defamatory.” New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 479-480 (1985).

2011An opinion can support a defamation claim, however, if it “implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 415 Mass. 258, 262 (1993), quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §566 (1977).

1997As to the former contention, an expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed facts is not actionable, no matter how unjustified, unreasonable, or unflattering the opinion, Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 415 Mass. 258, 262 (1993).

2006Id. at 429 , citing Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

2006As the defamation claim in Eyal was pled with particularity, the footnote cited by MHC discussing the Federal standard was dicta. 7 The SJC explicitly held that the Eyal plaintiffs’ amended complaint was “to be analyzed under the traditional standard governing rule 12(b)(6) motions set forth in Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), leaving fatal defects in the potential proof to be more properly decided under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56 . . . after the completion of a more expanded record.” Eyal, 411 Mass. 433 n.7 .

2004See Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 137, 140 (1996); Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass, at 319; Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 Mass, at 634, citing Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 385 (1978); Sullivan v. Birmingham, 11 Mass.App.Ct. at 362 .

2000See Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., Inc., 374 Mass. 382, 385 (1978).

1999King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 708 (1987); Aldoupolis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 398 Mass. 731, 733-34 (1986); Fleming v. Benzaquin, 390 Mass. 175, 180-86 (1983); Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 386 Mass. 303, 308-13 (1982); Meyers v. Boston Magazine Co., Inc., 380 Mass. 336, 341 (1980).

1985Also, in determining whether an allegedly defamatory statement is fact or opinion, “the test is whether the challenged language can reasonably be read as stating a fact.” Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 340 (1980).

1999“The elements of a defamation claim include (1) a false and defamatory communication (2) of and concerning the plaintiff which is (3) published or shown to a third party.” Dorn v. Astra USA, 975 F.Sup. 388, 396 (D.Mass. 1997), citing McAvoy v. Shufrin, 401 Mass. 593, 597 (1988).

1996McAvoy v. Shufrin, 401 Mass. 593, 597 (1988) (libel requires ttiat plaintiff show a false and defamatory written communication of and concerning the plaintiff).

2018The portion of the reporting that was inaccurate relative to the police records -- that it was a student, rather than a bus driver, who reported him, and that he took pictures on the campus as opposed to a shuttle bus -- "did not create a substantially greater defamatory sting than [the] accurate report." Jones v. Taibbi , 400 Mass. 786 , 795, 512 N.E.2d 260 (1987). ii.

2018The portion of the reporting that was inaccurate relative to the police records -- that it was a student, rather than a bus driver, who reported him, and that he took pictures on the campus as opposed to a shuttle bus -- "did not create a substantially greater defamatory sting than [the] accurate report." Jones v. Taibbi , 400 Mass. 786 , 795, 512 N.E.2d 260 (1987). ii.

2023To prove defamation, the plaintiffs must allege "first, the defendant made a statement, of and 'concerning the plaintiff, to a third party'; second, the 'statement could damage the plaintiff's reputation in the community'; third, the defendant was at fault for making the statement; and fourth, the statement caused economic loss or, in four specific circumstances, is actionable without economic loss." Scholz v. Delp, 473 Mass. 242, 249 (2015), quoting Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627 , 629–630 (2003).

2018To prevail on a defamation claim, Sarvis had to prove among other things that Tucker's "statement caused economic loss or ... is actionable without economic loss." Scholz v. Delp , 473 Mass. 242 , 249 (2015).

2023For purposes of the defamation claim, the issue is not whether the town was correct in its assessment of the plaintiff's performance, but whether it acted within the scope of its qualified privilege. 4 Id.

2002See Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 94 (1987).

2017Although we have said that a complaint should be evaluated count by count for anti-SLAPP purposes, see Wenger v. Aceto, 451 Mass. 1, 9 (2008) (granting special motion to dismiss with respect to two specific counts in nonmoving party’s complaint), we have not had occasion to consider whether, at the threshold burden stage, the special movant can meet its burden by showing that a portion of the nonmoving party’s claim is based on petitioning activity.

2016In Wenger, 451 Mass. at 9 , the Supreme Judicial Court, without discussion, parsed a complaint, count by count, dismissing some counts under the anti-SLAPP statute and preserving others.

2013See Eyal v. Helen Broadcasting Corp., 411 Mass. 426, 429 (1991) (to succeed in defamation action, plaintiff must establish that alleged defamatory statement published by defendant was “of and concerning” plaintiff); New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 474 (1985); Driscoll v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 298 (2007).

2006Id. at 429 , citing Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

2011See Tech Plus, Inc. v. Ansel, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 12, 22 (2003), citing Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 538 (1994) (accusation of bigotry may be actionable where it is made “in such manner or under such circumstances as would fairly lead a reasonable listener to conclude that [the person making the accusation] had knowledge of specific facts supporting the conclusory accusation”).

1999Cf., generally, Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d at 980 .

2024See Aarco, Inc. v. Baynes, 391 Mass. 560 , 562–563 (1984).

2023See Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton, 374 Mass. 475, 482 (1978) ("truth is an absolute defense").

2019See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin , 476 Mass. 479 , 484, 68 N.E.3d 1180 (2017).

2019See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin , 476 Mass. 479 , 484, 68 N.E.3d 1180 (2017).

2019They also contend that the judge erred in determining that the plaintiffs' defamation claim is colorable and that it was "not primarily brought to chill [the hospital defendants'] legitimate petitioning activities." Blanchard I , 477 Mass. at 160, 75 N.E.3d 21 .

2019At the threshold stage, the moving party -- the party alleging it has been the target of a SLAPP suit (here, the hospital defendants) -- bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the putative SLAPP suit (i.e., the nurses' defamation claim) was "solely based on [the moving party's] own petitioning activities." Blanchard I , 477 Mass. at 159, 75 N.E.3d 21 .

2017Because, Patrick maintained, the amended complaint contained only bare conclusory assertions of actual malice without allegations of facts sufficient to support those assertions beyond the level of mere speculation, the complaint did not meet the pleading requirements for a defamation claim under Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).

2017In Vigoda, supra at 481, 483 , a social worker brought a defamation claim against the superintendent of Boston State Hospital, in connection with written evaluations, and the superintendent claimed that his official statements should be protected by an absolute privilege.

2014Cf. id. at 210 (fact that plaintiff did not believe her cancer was caused by defendant’s drug within limitations period “does not aid her because we test the accrual of her cause of action by what a reasonable person in her position would have known or on inquiry would have discovered at the various relevant times” [emphasis added]); Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 486 (1976) (as of time of sale, plaintiff buyers bringing action for deceit in connection with sale of real estate could have taken steps to discover misrepresentations concerning right of way and therefore cause of action occ