defamation claim in Tennessee

2020To prevail on a defamation claim where the actual malice standard applies, the plaintiff “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the] defendant acted with actual malice.” See Jones v. State, 426 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Tenn. 2013) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 ).

2017Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 ; Verran, 569 S.W.2d at 441 .

2019In affirming the Texas Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, the Texas Court of Appeals determined that the Texas Attorney General “ha[d] an absolute privilege to publish defamatory statements in communications made in the performance of his 11 official duties.” Id. at 932 .

2013In affirming the Texas Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, the Texas Court of Appeals determined that the Texas Attorney General “ha[d] an absolute privilege to publish defamatory statements in communications made in the performance of his official duties.” Id. at 932 .

2010Appellees rely on the holding in Parrish v. Marquis, 172 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn.2005), for the proposition that a dismissal of the underlying action on procedural grounds that does not reflect on the merits of the underlying action is not a favorable termination.

2009Appellees rely on the holding in Parrish v. Marquis, 172 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn. 2005), for the proposition that a dismissal of the underlying action on procedural grounds that does not reflect on the merits of the underlying action is not a favorable termination.

2025The tort of false light was recognized as a separate tort by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of West v. Media General Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn. 2001).

2025Drevlow, 991 F.2d at 472 .

2025For example, [in] Drevlow v. Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, [ 991 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1993)], the court found that a minister’s defamation claim based on allegations the church circulated a personal information file about him that contained false information about his wife was not precluded by the First Amendment because the church had not offered any religious reason for its actions regarding the file and, consequently, the court would not become entangled in religious controversy.

2024See Nandigam Neurology, 639 S.W.3d at 668 (holding that “the communication at issue was an exercise of Defendant’s right of free speech as that right is defined for purposes of the TPPA[,]” despite the plaintiff alleging that it was defamatory); Doe v. Roe, 638 S.W.3d 614 , 620 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that the defendant’s filing of a Title IX complaint was “an exercise of free speech that comes within the purview of the TPPA[,]” despite the plaintiff’s allegation that it was defamatory).24 Indeed, it would be fairly absurd to construe the TPPA as inapplicable to claims of defamation, as

2024See Nandigam Neurology, 639 S.W.3d at 668 (holding that “the communication at issue was an exercise of Defendant’s right of free speech as that right is defined for purposes of the TPPA[,]” despite the plaintiff alleging that it was defamatory); Doe v. Roe, 638 S.W.3d 614 , 620 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that the defendant’s filing of a Title IX complaint was “an exercise of free speech that comes within the purview of the TPPA[,]” despite the plaintiff’s allegation that it was defamatory).24 Indeed, it would be fairly absurd to construe the TPPA as inapplicable to claims of defamation, as

2019Id. at 682 .

2017Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 625 ). 2 The Lewis court recognized that actual malice is a component of a defamation claim asserted by a public figure, Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 289-96 , but the court did not conflate the elements of a defamation claim with the elements of the fair report privilege defense, as the Grant court appears to have done. -8- B.

2017Id.; Woods, 758 S.W.2d at 223 ; Evans v. Amcash Mtg.

2017As this Court stated in Revis, Opinions are not automatically protected by the United States Constitution, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), but some states still hold that statements of opinion alone are not actionable.

2017As this Court stated in Revis, Opinions are not automatically protected by the United States Constitution, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), but some states still hold that statements of opinion alone are not actionable.

2017Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 625 ). 2 The Lewis court recognized that actual malice is a component of a defamation claim asserted by a public figure, Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 289-96 , but the court did not conflate the elements of a defamation claim with the elements of the fair report privilege defense, as the Grant court appears to have done. -8- B.

2017Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 625 ). 2 The Lewis court recognized that actual malice is a component of a defamation claim asserted by a public figure, Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 289-96 , but the court did not conflate the elements of a defamation claim with the elements of the fair report privilege defense, as the Grant court appears to have done. -8- B.

2017Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 ; Verran, 569 S.W.2d at 441 .

2013See Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893 (Colo.2002); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 , (Tex.1994); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 310 N.C. 312 , 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).

2013See Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893 (Colo.2002); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 , (Tex.1994); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 310 N.C. 312 , 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).

2013The question is whether [the defendant] made ‘discrete presentations of information in a fashion which rendered the publication susceptible to inferences casting [the plaintiff] in a false light.’ ” Santillo v. Reedel, 430 Pa.Super. 290 , 634 A.2d 264, 267 (1993)(citing *318 Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 375 Pa. Super. 66 , 543 A.2d 1181 (1988) (emphasis added)). 3 With specific reference to the “highly offensive to a reasonable person” language, comment c to § 652E states in pertinent part: The rule stated in this Section applies only when the publicity given to the plaintiff has p

2013The question is whether [the defendant] made ‘discrete presentations of information in a fashion which rendered the publication susceptible to inferences casting [the plaintiff] in a false light.’ ” Santillo v. Reedel, 430 Pa.Super. 290 , 634 A.2d 264, 267 (1993)(citing *318 Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 375 Pa. Super. 66 , 543 A.2d 1181 (1988) (emphasis added)). 3 With specific reference to the “highly offensive to a reasonable person” language, comment c to § 652E states in pertinent part: The rule stated in this Section applies only when the publicity given to the plaintiff has p

2013See Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893 (Colo.2002); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 , (Tex.1994); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 310 N.C. 312 , 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).