defamation claim (North Dakota) · Go Syfert
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defamation claim in North Dakota

14 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1993–2024 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Krile v. Lawyergreen
· 2020 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See Krile, 2020 ND 176, ¶¶ 38-40 (remanding to consider qualified immunity). [¶24] We reverse the dismissal of the defamation claim and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

2022See Krile, 2020 ND 176, ¶¶ 38-40 (remanding to consider qualified immunity). [¶24] We reverse the dismissal of the defamation claim and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

23
Carole Lieberman, Dr. v. Geoffrey N. Fieger Fieger, Fieger & Schwartzgreen
ca9 · 2003 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022Id. at ¶ 37 (cleaned up). [¶22] The Rob Port article quotes Sandstrom as saying Bolinske’s press release was “bizarre and rather sad” and that “[a]lthough I’ve been aware of his mental health problems for years, I don’t recall ever having seen anything in his email before.” The State Defendants argue this case is similar to Lieberman v. Fieger, 338 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003), which concluded that an attorney referring to a psychiatrist as “Looney Tunes,” “crazy,” “nuts,” and “mentally imbalanced” was protected speech under the First Amendment as statements of opinion and could not form th

2022Id. at ¶ 37 (cleaned up). [¶22] The Rob Port article quotes Sandstrom as saying Bolinske’s press release was “bizarre and rather sad” and that “[a]lthough I’ve been aware of his mental health problems for years, I don’t recall ever having seen anything in his email before.” The State Defendants argue this case is similar to Lieberman v. Fieger, 338 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003), which concluded that an attorney referring to a psychiatrist as “Looney Tunes,” “crazy,” “nuts,” and “mentally imbalanced” was protected speech under the First Amendment as statements of opinion and could not form th

22
Bol v. Colegreen
minn · 1997 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010“For absolute privilege to apply, the public interest served must be one of paramount importance, such that it is entitled to protection even at the expense of failing to compensate harm to the defamed person’s reputation.” Bol , at 149. [¶ 14] In Bol , the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a defamation claim by an alleged child abuser against a psychologist after the psychologist sent child abuse reports identifying the alleged abuser to the child’s mother. 561 N.W.2d at 145.

2010“For absolute privilege to apply, the public interest served must be one of paramount importance, such that it is entitled to protection even at the expense of failing to compensate harm to the defamed person’s reputation.” Bol , at 149. [¶14] In Bol , the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a defamation claim by an alleged child abuser against a psychologist after the psychologist sent child abuse reports identifying the alleged abuser to the child’s mother. 561 N.W.2d at 145.

22
Carradine v. Stategreen
minn · 1994 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010Carradine , at 736-37 (footnote omitted). [¶ 16] In Erickson , the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a city manager’s defamation claim against a county attorney, an assistant county attorney, and an investigator in the county sheriffs office for alleged false and defamatory statements to the press and to private individuals. 451 N.W.2d at 671 .

2010Id. at 149-51. [¶ 15] In Carradine , the Minnesota Supreme Court considered an arrestee’s defamation claim against an arresting officer for statements made in a police report and for statements made to the news media. 511 N.W.2d at 734 .

22
Rykowsky v. Dickinson Public School District 1green
nd · 1993 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003Id. at 349, 351 .

2003Id. at 349, 351.

22
Riemers v. Mahargreen
nd · 2008 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See Riemers v. Mahar, 2008 ND 95, ¶ 19 , 748 N.W.2d 714 .

2022See Riemers v. Mahar, 2008 ND 95, ¶ 19 , 748 N.W.2d 714 .

11
Schmitt v. MeritCare Health Systemgreen
nd · 2013 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See, e.g., Schmitt, 2013 ND 136, ¶ 19 (stating “It would be an odd use of the defamation doctrine to hold that silence constitutes actionable speech.”).

11
Fridovich v. Fridovichgreen
fla · 1992 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993See also Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 70 (Fla.1992) [“the successful invocation of a defamation privilege will preclude a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the sole basis for the latter cause of action is the defamatory publication”]; Kirschstein v. Haynes, supra, 788 P.2d at 954 [a “claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ... based on the same factual underpinnings as a defamation claim for which the privilege applies, ... is also barred by the reach of the absolute privilege”]; Brody v. Montalbano, supra, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 215 [“Califo

1993See also Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 70 (Fla.1992) [“the successful invocation of a defamation privilege will preclude a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the sole basis for the latter cause of action is the defamatory publication”]; Kirschstein v. Haynes, supra, 788 P.2d at 954 [a “claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ... based on the same factual underpinnings as a defamation claim for which the privilege applies, ... is also barred by the reach of the absolute privilege”]; Brody v. Montalbano, supra, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 215 [“Califo

11
Brody v. Montalbanogreen
calctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993See also Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 70 (Fla.1992) [“the successful invocation of a defamation privilege will preclude a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the sole basis for the latter cause of action is the defamatory publication”]; Kirschstein v. Haynes, supra, 788 P.2d at 954 [a “claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ... based on the same factual underpinnings as a defamation claim for which the privilege applies, ... is also barred by the reach of the absolute privilege”]; Brody v. Montalbano, supra, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 215 [“Califo

1993See also Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 70 (Fla.1992) [“the successful invocation of a defamation privilege will preclude a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the sole basis for the latter cause of action is the defamatory publication”]; Kirschstein v. Haynes, supra, 788 P.2d at 954 [a “claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ... based on the same factual underpinnings as a defamation claim for which the privilege applies, ... is also barred by the reach of the absolute privilege”]; Brody v. Montalbano, supra, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 215 [“Califo

11
Kirschstein v. Haynesgreen
okla · 1990 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993See also Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 70 (Fla.1992) [“the successful invocation of a defamation privilege will preclude a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the sole basis for the latter cause of action is the defamatory publication”]; Kirschstein v. Haynes, supra, 788 P.2d at 954 [a “claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ... based on the same factual underpinnings as a defamation claim for which the privilege applies, ... is also barred by the reach of the absolute privilege”]; Brody v. Montalbano, supra, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 215 [“Califo

1993See also Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 70 (Fla.1992) [“the successful invocation of a defamation privilege will preclude a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the sole basis for the latter cause of action is the defamatory publication”]; Kirschstein v. Haynes, supra, 788 P.2d at 954 [a “claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ... based on the same factual underpinnings as a defamation claim for which the privilege applies, ... is also barred by the reach of the absolute privilege”]; Brody v. Montalbano, supra, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 215 [“Califo

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Arthaud v. Fuglie green
nd · 2023
2 sentences

2024“A cause of action accrues on a defamation claim when the publication of the false statement is made to a third party.” Arthaud v. Fuglie, 2023 ND 36, ¶ 5 , 987 N.W.2d 379 .

2024“A cause of action accrues on a defamation claim when the publication of the false statement is made to a third party.” Arthaud v. Fuglie, 2023 ND 36, ¶ 5 , 987 N.W.2d 379 .

22024–2024
Erickson v. County of Clay green
minnctapp · 1990
2 sentences

2010Carradine , at 736-37 (footnote omitted). [¶ 16] In Erickson , the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a city manager’s defamation claim against a county attorney, an assistant county attorney, and an investigator in the county sheriffs office for alleged false and defamatory statements to the press and to private individuals. 451 N.W.2d at 671 .

2010Carradine , at 736-37 (footnote omitted). [¶16] In Erickson , the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a city manager’s defamation claim against a county attorney, an assistant county attorney, and an investigator in the county sheriff’s office for alleged false and defamatory statements to the press and to private individuals. 451 N.W.2d at 671 .

22010–2010
Schultze v. Continental Insurance Co. green
nd · 2000
1 sentence

2023Schultze, 2000 ND 209, ¶ 12 .

12023–2023
Krile v. Lawyer green
nd · 2022
2 sentences

2023The constitutional standard requires “knowledge that the statements are false or that the statements were made with reckless disregard for whether they were false.” Id.

2023Actual malice in this context “is not the same as the constitutional standard of actual malice that a plaintiff must prove when the person is a public figure bringing a defamation claim.” Krile, 2022 ND 28, ¶ 22 .

12023–2023
Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Americas, Inc. green
nd · 2001
2 sentences

2013The court concluded, however, there were no issues of material fact on Dr. Schmitt’s defamation claim against MeritCare, because MeritCare’s responses to the questionnaire that it “[wjould recommend with reservation” with the explanation for those reservations were based on truthful, nondefamatory facts disclosed in the questionnaire and were not fairly susceptible of a defamatory meaning in view of his admission the statements were “technically true.” The court decided there were no issues of material fact on Dr. Schmitt’s claim against MeritCare for tortious interference with a prospective b

2013The court concluded, however, there were no issues of material fact on Dr. Schmitt’s defamation claim against MeritCare, because MeritCare’s responses to the questionnaire that it “[wjould recommend with reservation” with the explanation for those reservations were based on truthful, nondefamatory facts disclosed in the questionnaire and were not fairly susceptible of a defamatory meaning in view of his admission the statements were “technically true.” The court decided there were no issues of material fact on Dr. Schmitt’s claim against MeritCare for tortious interference with a prospective b

12013–2013
Eddie Trail and Katrinka Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Indiana green
ind · 2006
1 sentence

2013The court said, “It would be an odd use of the defamation doctrine to hold that silence constitutes actionable speech.” Id. at 137 . [¶ 20] Here Dr. Schmitt’s claim hinges on an alleged delay in responding to the questionnaire, and he has made only con-clusory assertions that the alleged delay was interpreted as a false assertion of his medical competence.

12013–2013

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-03 (5) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-02 (4) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-04 (4) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-39 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 331 (1985–2026) CA 209 (1970–2026) NY 154 (1983–2026) OH 135 (1990–2026) IL 106 (1988–2026) MI 93 (1987–2025) WA 66 (1980–2026) LA 65 (1985–2023) MN 57 (1985–2026) NJ 56 (1960–2026) MA 54 (1980–2026) PA 51 (1986–2026) ME 42 (1984–2024) FL 41 (1981–2025) GA 34 (1998–2025) AZ 34 (1976–2026) IN 33 (1982–2026) DE 32 (1988–2026) OR 31 (1990–2026) DC 27 (1991–2026) CO 26 (1985–2026) VA 26 (2002–2026) KY 25 (2005–2025) NC 25 (1994–2026) NV 23 (1993–2026) WI 21 (1983–2024) AL 20 (1988–2023) TN 19 (1999–2024) UT 17 (1983–2025) NM 17 (1989–2024) SC 17 (1997–2026) MO 16 (1996–2025) MS 16 (1986–2018) MD 16 (1985–2026) AK 15 (1982–2022) CT 15 (1993–2024) IA 15 (1982–2026) ND 14 (1993–2024) OK 13 (1987–2014) HI 10 (1996–2025) ID 10 (1992–2024) VT 9 (2005–2025) MT 9 (1993–2025) WV 9 (1984–2022) VI 8 (1998–2026) NE 7 (2015–2024) RI 7 (1998–2012) KS 7 (2010–2026) SD 6 (1994–2025) AR 3 (1979–2017) NH 2 (2015–2019) WY 2 (1999–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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