defamation claim in West Virginia

2022Va. 278 , 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994).[16] Zsigray also concerned the qualified-privilege defense. 17 There, plaintiff alleged that defendant made defamatory statements about him to a state trooper during a criminal investigation. 18 The circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), on the grounds that the alleged defamatory statements were privileged because they were made to law enforcement at the beginning of a judicial proceeding. 19 We reversed the dismissal of the defamation claim.

2020Pt. 4, Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278 , 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994).”) Petitioner contends that he was not aware that Respondent Peck’s defamatory statements to law enforcement were “nonprivileged” until he received a copy of the final investigation report on March 8, 2016, which revealed that the county respondents had put Respondent Peck up to filing the criminal complaint against him and that Respondent Peck had thus made the statements with a “bad motive,” defeating the “qualified privilege.” As a result, petitioner argues, because he was not aware that the elements of a defamat

2018Pt. 3, Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 214 W.Va. 208 , 588 S.E.2d 197 (2003). 6 As explained infra, while we affirm the circuit court’s determination that petitioner rested his case at the September 28, 2016, bench trial without putting on any evidence of damages, he may still be entitled to recover certain types of damages. 4 who is a three[-]time convicted felon of being a five[-]time convicted felon would require some evidence to sustain the element of actual harm.” For this proposition, the circuit court relied on this Court’s decision in Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W.Va. 427 , 2

2018Pt. 3, Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 214 W.Va. 208 , 588 S.E.2d 197 (2003). 6 As explained infra, while we affirm the circuit court’s determination that petitioner rested his case at the September 28, 2016, bench trial without putting on any evidence of damages, he may still be entitled to recover certain types of damages. 4 who is a three[-]time convicted felon of being a five[-]time convicted felon would require some evidence to sustain the element of actual harm.” For this proposition, the circuit court relied on this Court’s decision in Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W.Va. 427 , 2

2018Pt. 3, Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 214 W.Va. 208 , 588 S.E.2d 197 (2003). 6 As explained infra, while we affirm the circuit court’s determination that petitioner rested his case at the September 28, 2016, bench trial without putting on any evidence of damages, he may still be entitled to recover certain types of damages. 4 who is a three[-]time convicted felon of being a five[-]time convicted felon would require some evidence to sustain the element of actual harm.” For this proposition, the circuit court relied on this Court’s decision in Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W.Va. 427 , 2

2018Pt. 3, Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 214 W.Va. 208 , 588 S.E.2d 197 (2003). 6 As explained infra, while we affirm the circuit court’s determination that petitioner rested his case at the September 28, 2016, bench trial without putting on any evidence of damages, he may still be entitled to recover certain types of damages. 4 who is a three[-]time convicted felon of being a five[-]time convicted felon would require some evidence to sustain the element of actual harm.” For this proposition, the circuit court relied on this Court’s decision in Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W.Va. 427 , 2

2013Pt. 3, Clark v. Druckman, 218 W.Va. 427 , 624 S.E.2d 864 (2005) (“The litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant’s claim for civil damages against an opposing party’s attorney if the alleged act of the attorney occurs in the course of the attorney’s representation of an opposing party and is conduct related to the civil action.”). 5 The circuit court also found that petitioner did not have standing to bring claims on behalf of Greg Givens. 3 as a matter of law.

2013Pt. 3, Clark v. Druckman, 218 W.Va. 427 , 624 S.E.2d 864 (2005) (“The litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant’s claim for civil damages against an opposing party’s attorney if the alleged act of the attorney occurs in the course of the attorney’s representation of an opposing party and is conduct related to the civil action.”). 5 The circuit court also found that petitioner did not have standing to bring claims on behalf of Greg Givens. 3 as a matter of law.

2002This communication “is an essential element of a cause of action for the tort of defamation because the essence of the tort is diminution of one’s reputation in the eyes of others, and unless the defamatory matter is communicated to a third person there has been no diminution of reputation.” Crain v. Lightner, 178 W.Va. 765, 772 , 364 S.E.2d 778, 785 (1987).

2002This communication "is an essential element of a cause of action for the tort of defamation because the essence of the tort is diminution of one's reputation in the eyes of others, and unless the defamatory matter is communicated to a third person there has been no diminution of reputation." Crain v. Lightner, 178 W.Va. 765, 772 , 364 S.E.2d 778, 785 (1987).

2001In Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699 , 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983), this Court explained that to have a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show that false and defamatory statements were made against him, or relating to him, to a third party who did not have a reasonable right to know, and that the statements were made at least negligently on the part of the party making the statements, and resulted in injury to the plaintiff.

2001In Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699 , 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983), this Court explained that to have a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show that false and defamatory statements were made against him, or relating to him, to a third party who did not have a reasonable right to know, and that the statements were made at least negligently on the part of the party making the statements, and resulted in injury to the plaintiff.

1994This meant that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and its progeny, Maynard could not prevail on a defamation claim unless he proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Gazette made false and defamatory statements about him and did so with actual malice.

1994This meant that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and its progeny, Maynard could not prevail on a defamation claim unless he proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Gazette made false and defamatory statements about him and did so with actual malice.