knock and announce rule in Florida

1994The State in the present case urges us to expand this exception to embrace the "blanket approach" adopted by the district courts in Armenteros v. State, 554 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989), and State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), which excuses forcible entry any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing — regardless of immediacy of destruction.

1992Neither Bell, Armenteros v. State, 554 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), nor Berryman v. State, 368 So.2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) require "that a household present an unusual risk concerning the destruction of evidence" in order to justify the exception. [3] If the concern about the destruction of evidence is a valid exception to the knock and announce rule, it must be interpreted reasonably or, rather than the exception overshadowing the rule, the exception will *1279 be rendered meaningless.

2026These include “the protection of human life and limb,” “the protection of property,” and the protection of “those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance.” Cable, 51 So. 3d at 440 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 ); see Times, 383 So. 3d at 559 (listing the policies underlying the knock-and-announce requirements as: “(1) decreasing the risk of violence when executing a warrant, (2) protecting the privacy of the occupants of the home, and (3) preventing physical destruction of property” (citation omitted)).

2024In discussing the knock-and-announce requirement of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, the Court emphasized that section 933.09, Florida Statutes, “parallels this language for search warrants.” Cable, 51 So. 3d at 438 .

1994The State in the present case urges us to expand this exception to embrace the "blanket approach" adopted by the district courts in Armenteros v. State, 554 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989), and State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), which excuses forcible entry any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing — regardless of immediacy of destruction.

1992While I agree that the lapse of time between the last controlled buy at 7:56 P.M. and the execution of the search warrant at 9:30 P.M. would not justify granting Thomas's motion to suppress, I cannot accept the view that this court's opinion in State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), provides an exception to the knock and announce requirement of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1991), in all instances where the subject of the search warrant consists of small quantities of drugs.

2024The State points to language in Rodriguez, 187 So. 3d at 849 , where the Florida Supreme Court said it would apply the inevitable discovery doctrine if officers illegally entered a home but were in the process of obtaining a warrant when entry was made. 4 But Rodriguez, like Hudson, was a Fourth Amendment case.

2013Then, in 2009, the United States Supreme Court, in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), extended the holding in Evans to other “recordkeeping errors by the police” and further discussed the limits of the exclusionary rule.

2013Then, in 2009, the United States Supreme Court, in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), extended the holding in Evans to other “recordkeeping errors by the police” and further discussed the limits of the exclusionary rule.

2010We have rejected “[indiscriminate application” of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs,' ” Scott, supra, at 363 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quoting Leon, supra, at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). [[Image here]] The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different— and do not include the shielding of pot

2010We have rejected “[indiscriminate application” of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs,' ” Scott, supra, at 363 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quoting Leon, supra, at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). [[Image here]] The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different— and do not include the shielding of pot

2010We have rejected “[indiscriminate application” of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs,' ” Scott, supra, at 363 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quoting Leon, supra, at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). [[Image here]] The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different— and do not include the shielding of pot

2010Contra Walker v. State, 895 So.2d 366 (Ala.Crim.App.2004).

2010We have rejected “[indiscriminate application” of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs,' ” Scott, supra, at 363 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quoting Leon, supra, at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). [[Image here]] The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different— and do not include the shielding of pot

2010We have rejected “[indiscriminate application” of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs,' ” Scott, supra, at 363 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 (quoting Leon, supra, at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). [[Image here]] The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different— and do not include the shielding of pot

2007Noting that the District of Columbia statute fully incorporated § 3109 (as does the Florida statute), the Court stated: Before Hudson the Supreme Court began treating § 3109 and the knock-and-announce rule of the Fourth Amendment as identical, see Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 73 , 118 S.Ct. 992 , which is why "the result should be the same under the Fourth Amendment and § 3109," United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003).

2007Noting that the District of Columbia statute fully incorporated § 3109 (as does the Florida statute), the Court stated: Before Hudson the Supreme Court began treating § 3109 and the knock-and-announce rule of the Fourth Amendment as identical, see Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 73 , 118 S.Ct. 992 , which is why "the result should be the same under the Fourth Amendment and § 3109," United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003).

2007In Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308-09 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958), the Court stated: The requirement was pronounced in 1603 in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Co.Rep. 91a, 11 E.R.C. 629, 77 Eng.Repr. 194, at 195: "In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K(ing)'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter.

2007In Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308-09 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958), the Court stated: The requirement was pronounced in 1603 in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Co.Rep. 91a, 11 E.R.C. 629, 77 Eng.Repr. 194, at 195: "In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K(ing)'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter.

2007In addition to the grave adverse consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into society), imposing that massive remedy for a knock-and-announce violation would generate a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule, and claims that any asserted Richards [v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997)] justification for a no-knock entry, see 520 U.S., at 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , had inadequate support.

2007In addition to the grave adverse consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into society), imposing that massive remedy for a knock-and-announce violation would generate a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule, and claims that any asserted Richards [v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997)] justification for a no-knock entry, see 520 U.S., at 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , had inadequate support.

2007Noting that the District of Columbia statute fully incorporated § 3109 (as does the Florida statute), the Court stated: Before Hudson the Supreme Court began treating § 3109 and the knock-and-announce rule of the Fourth Amendment as identical, see Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 73 , 118 S.Ct. 992 , which is why "the result should be the same under the Fourth Amendment and § 3109," United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003).

2007Noting that the District of Columbia statute fully incorporated § 3109 (as does the Florida statute), the Court stated: Before Hudson the Supreme Court began treating § 3109 and the knock-and-announce rule of the Fourth Amendment as identical, see Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 73 , 118 S.Ct. 992 , which is why "the result should be the same under the Fourth Amendment and § 3109," United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2003).

2006The statute does not state that evidence must be suppressed when the police violate its terms, but the United States Supreme Court has treated this knock-and-announce rule as an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), and courts have regularly enforced this statute by invoking the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Richardson, 787 So.2d 906 ; State v. Robinson, 565 So.2d 730, 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).