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11 North Dakota opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richards v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2004State v. Van Beek, 1999 ND 53, ¶ 15 , 591 N.W.2d 112 . “[I]t is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). [¶ 24] Deputy Bitz’s affidavit failed to provide any evidence that knocking and announcing may have placed the officers or others in danger. 2004State v. Van Beek, 1999 ND 53, ¶ 15 , 591 N.W.2d 112 . “[I]t is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). [¶ 24] Deputy Bitz’s affidavit failed to provide any evidence that knocking and announcing may have placed the officers or others in danger. | 4 | 10 |
State v. Sakellsongreen2 sentences1999State v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472, 475 (N.D. 1979) (citations omitted and emphasis added.) Also in Sakellson , our Court stated "[t]he primary policies underlying the knock-and-announce rule are the protection of privacy in the home and the prevention of violent confrontations." 379 N.W.2d at 782 (emphasis added). 1998See also State v. Sakellson , 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985) (unannounced entry through open door constituted “breaking” under N.D.C.C. § 28-29-08, which authorizes officer executing search warrant to break open door of house if refused admittance after notice of authority and purpose). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Herrickgreen2 sentences2004Id.; see State v. Herrick, 1997 ND 155, ¶ 21 , 567 N.W.2d 336 (overruling our per-se rule in drug cases justifying the issuance of no-knock search warrants). 2004Id.; see State v. Herrick, 1997 ND 155, ¶ 21 , 567 N.W.2d 336 (overruling our per-se rule in drug cases justifying the issuance of no-knock search warrants). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Steven Lester Marts Pamela Sue Martsgreen2 sentences2004“A reasonable belief that firearms may be within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to justify excusing the knock and announce requirement.” State v. Hughes, 1999 ND 24, ¶ 7 , 589 N.W.2d 912 - (relying on United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.1993)). 1999See, e.g., United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.1993) (stating a reasonable belief that firearms may have been within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to justify excusing the knock and announce requirement). [¶ 8.] Our analysis does not end here. | 2 | 2 |
Gooding v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Richards, 520 U.S. at 388 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 . [¶ 27] In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has said that magistrate approval of a nighttime search warrant in a drug case “requires no special showing for a night-time search, other than a showing that the contraband is likely to be on the property or person to be searched at that time.” Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 458 , 94 S.Ct. 1780 , 40 L.Ed.2d 250 (1974). 2014Richards , 520 U.S. at 388 . [¶27] In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has said that magistrate approval of a nighttime search warrant in a drug case “requires no special showing for a night- time search, other than a showing that the contraband is likely to be on the property or person to be searched at that time.” Gooding v. United States , 416 U.S. 430, 458 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Phelpsgreen1 sentence1999State v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472, 475 (N.D. 1979) (citations omitted and emphasis added.) Also in Sakellson , our Court stated "[t]he primary policies underlying the knock-and-announce rule are the protection of privacy in the home and the prevention of violent confrontations." 379 N.W.2d at 782 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Knudsongreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., State v. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d 872, 876 (N.D. 1993); but see Herrick I, at ¶ 21 (overruling prior North Dakota case law approving a per-se rule in drug cases justifying the issuance of no-knock warrants); see also Richards, 520 U.S. at 396 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 (holding Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule in drug cases). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wolgemuthgreen2 sentences1985See also, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 Ill.2d 154 , 13 Ill.Dec. 40 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 (1977) (a careful reading of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) reveals that the knock and announce rule is not, in the view of the Supreme Court of Illinois, constitutionally mandated); and People v. Boykin, 65 Ill.App.3d 738 , 22 Ill.Dec. 614 , 382 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill.App.1978). 1985See also, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 Ill.2d 154 , 13 Ill.Dec. 40 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 (1977) (a careful reading of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) reveals that the knock and announce rule is not, in the view of the Supreme Court of Illinois, constitutionally mandated); and People v. Boykin, 65 Ill.App.3d 738 , 22 Ill.Dec. 614 , 382 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Sabbath v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. at 589 , 88 S.Ct. at 1758 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 833 (1968). 1985Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. at 589 , 88 S.Ct. at 1758 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 833 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Ker v. Californiagreen2 sentences1985See also, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 Ill.2d 154 , 13 Ill.Dec. 40 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 (1977) (a careful reading of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) reveals that the knock and announce rule is not, in the view of the Supreme Court of Illinois, constitutionally mandated); and People v. Boykin, 65 Ill.App.3d 738 , 22 Ill.Dec. 614 , 382 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill.App.1978). 1985See also, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 Ill.2d 154 , 13 Ill.Dec. 40 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 (1977) (a careful reading of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) reveals that the knock and announce rule is not, in the view of the Supreme Court of Illinois, constitutionally mandated); and People v. Boykin, 65 Ill.App.3d 738 , 22 Ill.Dec. 614 , 382 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2004Id. [¶ 16] Before the knock and announce requirement may be dispensed, exigent circumstances must exist to justify the unannounced entry. 2004Id. [¶ 16] Before the knock and announce requirement may be dispensed, exigent circumstances must exist to justify the unannounced entry. | 3 | 1997–2004 |
State v. Van Beek
green
2 sentences2004State v. Van Beek, 1999 ND 53, ¶ 15 , 591 N.W.2d 112 . “[I]t is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). [¶ 24] Deputy Bitz’s affidavit failed to provide any evidence that knocking and announcing may have placed the officers or others in danger. 2004State v. Van Beek, 1999 ND 53, ¶ 15 , 591 N.W.2d 112 . “[I]t is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). [¶ 24] Deputy Bitz’s affidavit failed to provide any evidence that knocking and announcing may have placed the officers or others in danger. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Hughes
green
2 sentences2004“A reasonable belief that firearms may be within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to justify excusing the knock and announce requirement.” State v. Hughes, 1999 ND 24, ¶ 7 , 589 N.W.2d 912 - (relying on United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.1993)). 2004“A reasonable belief that firearms may be within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to justify excusing the knock and announce requirement.” State v. Hughes, 1999 ND 24, ¶ 7 , 589 N.W.2d 912 - (relying on United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.1993)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Michael D. Murphy
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Loucks
green
2 sentences1997Meschke NOTES [1] The Court in Richards v. Wisconsin , ___ U.S. ___, ___, n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1420, n. 1 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) cites several cases, including State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D.1973) that predate Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) and "have adopted similar rules, concluding that simple probable cause to search a home for narcotics always allows the police to forego the knock-and-announce requirement." 1997The Court in Richards v. Wisconsin , — U.S. -,-, n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1420, n. 1 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) cites several cases, including State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D.1973) that predate Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) and “have adopted similar rules, concluding that simple probable cause to search a home for narcotics always allows the police to forego the knock-and-announce requirement.” | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. LaPonsie
green
2 sentences1985State v. LaPonsie, 136 Ariz. 73 , 664 P.2d 223 (1982); State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d 615 , 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984); see generally LaFave, supra. The State initially argues that NDCC § 29-29-08 did not require the officers to announce their presence before entering through the main door because the landing and stairway immediately inside the main door were not an "integral" part of the defendants' residence. 1985State v. LaPonsie, 136 Ariz. 73 , 664 P.2d 223 (1982); State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d 615 , 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984); see generally LaFave, supra. The State initially argues that NDCC § 29-29-08 did not require the officers to announce their presence before entering through the main door because the landing and stairway immediately inside the main door were not an "integral" part of the defendants' residence. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Boykin
neutral
2 sentences1985See also, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 Ill.2d 154 , 13 Ill.Dec. 40 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 (1977) (a careful reading of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) reveals that the knock and announce rule is not, in the view of the Supreme Court of Illinois, constitutionally mandated); and People v. Boykin, 65 Ill.App.3d 738 , 22 Ill.Dec. 614 , 382 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill.App.1978). 1985See also, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 Ill.2d 154 , 13 Ill.Dec. 40 , 370 N.E.2d 1067 (1977) (a careful reading of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) reveals that the knock and announce rule is not, in the view of the Supreme Court of Illinois, constitutionally mandated); and People v. Boykin, 65 Ill.App.3d 738 , 22 Ill.Dec. 614 , 382 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill.App.1978). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Cleveland
green
2 sentences1985State v. LaPonsie, 136 Ariz. 73 , 664 P.2d 223 (1982); State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d 615 , 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984); see generally LaFave, supra. The State initially argues that NDCC § 29-29-08 did not require the officers to announce their presence before entering through the main door because the landing and stairway immediately inside the main door were not an "integral" part of the defendants' residence. 1985State v. LaPonsie, 136 Ariz. 73 , 664 P.2d 223 (1982); State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d 615 , 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984); see generally LaFave, supra. The State initially argues that NDCC § 29-29-08 did not require the officers to announce their presence before entering through the main door because the landing and stairway immediately inside the main door were not an "integral" part of the defendants' residence. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.