knock and announce rule in Michigan

2003See also People v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526 ; 638 NW2d 92 (2002) (holding that an absence of statutory authority did not warrant application of the exclusionary rule where the statute was meant to protect the rights of autonomous local governments); People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999) (holding that failure to comply with the knock-and-announce rule did not warrant application of the exclusionary rule).

2003See also People v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526 ; 638 NW2d 92 (2002) (holding that an absence of statutory authority did not warrant application of the exclusionary rule where the statute was meant to protect the rights of autonomous local governments); People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999) (holding that failure to comply with the knock-and-announce rule did not warrant application of the exclusionary rule).

2003In People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687 ; 625 NW2d 764 (2001), the majority distinguished the Moten-Bules-Galnt trilogy because each analyzed substantive warrant requirements, i.e., the sufficiency of a warrant’s “form,” whereas the statute at issue in Sobczak- Obetts concerned procedures relevant to warrant execution. 8 See also People v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526 ; 638 NW2d 92 (2002)(holding that an absence of statutory authority did not warrant application of the exclusionary rule where the statute was meant to protect the rights of autonomous local governments); People v Stevens (After Remand

2003In People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687 ; 625 NW2d 764 (2001), the majority distinguished the Moten-Bules-Galnt trilogy because each analyzed substantive warrant requirements, i.e., the sufficiency of a warrant’s “form,” whereas the statute at issue in Sobczak- Obetts concerned procedures relevant to warrant execution. 8 See also People v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526 ; 638 NW2d 92 (2002)(holding that an absence of statutory authority did not warrant application of the exclusionary rule where the statute was meant to protect the rights of autonomous local governments); People v Stevens (After Remand

1999Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit favorably quoted Jones in holding: [T]he exception that is most pertinent to this case goes by the name of “inevitable discovery” and refuses to suppress evidence seized in an unconstitutional search if it is shown that the evidence would ultimately have been seized legally if the constitutional violation had not occurred. [United States v Stefonek, 179 F3d 1030, 1035 (CA 7, 1999), citing Nix v Williams, supra; United States v Jones, supra; United States v Cabassa, 62 F3d 470, 472-473 (CA 2, 1995).] Given that the federal

1999In Wynn v State, 117 Md App 133, 163; 699 A2d 512 (1997), the court held that a reasonable belief that firearms may have been within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to justify excusing the knock-and-announce requirement.

1999In Wynn v. State, 117 Md.App. 133, 163 , 699 A.2d 512 (1997), the court held that a reasonable belief that firearms may have been within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to justify excusing the knock-and-announce requirement. [13] See United States v. Beck, 662 F.2d 527, 530 (C.A.8, 1981).

1999While some federal courts have found that the appropriate remedy for a knock-and-announce violation is suppression, see United States v Bates, 84 F3d 790, 795 (CA 6, 1996) (“unless exigent circumstances exist, the failure of state law enforcement officials to knock and announce their presence will render the evidence procured during the ensuing execution of a warrant inadmissible”); United States v Moore, 91 F3d 96 (CA 10, 1996) (affirming the trial court’s suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the “knock and announce” rule); United States v Marts, 986 F2d 1216 (CA 8, 1993) (in reje

1999While some federal courts have found that the appropriate remedy for a knock-and-announce violation is suppression, see United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (C.A.6, 1996)("unless exigent circumstances exist, the failure of state law enforcement officials to knock and announce their presence will render the evidence procured during the ensuing execution of a warrant inadmissible"); United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96 (C.A.10, 1996)(affirming the trial court's suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the "knock and announce" rule); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (C.A.8, 1993)(i

1999Bd. of Trustees, 460 Mich. 75 , 594 N.W.2d 491 (1999) (Cavanagh, J., concurring). [2] The prosecutor has conceded the absence of exigent circumstances that might excuse a violation of the normal knock and announce requirement. [3] See, e.g., People v. Sherbine, 421 Mich. 502, 512 , 364 N.W.2d 658 (1984), dealing with the requirements for an affidavit in support of a search warrant.

1999Bd. of Trustees, 460 Mich. 75 , 594 N.W.2d 491 (1999) (Cavanagh, J., concurring). [2] The prosecutor has conceded the absence of exigent circumstances that might excuse a violation of the normal knock and announce requirement. [3] See, e.g., People v. Sherbine, 421 Mich. 502, 512 , 364 N.W.2d 658 (1984), dealing with the requirements for an affidavit in support of a search warrant.

1999The Court of Appeals reversed, essentially holding that the knock-and-announce violation did not rise to the level of "unreasonable police conduct." 233 Mich.App. at 61 , 595 N.W.2d 497 . *248 Only four years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced that the knock-and-announce principle is "`embedded in Anglo-American Law.'" Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958).

1999The Court of Appeals reversed, essentially holding that the knock-and-announce violation did not rise to the level of "unreasonable police conduct." 233 Mich.App. at 61 , 595 N.W.2d 497 . *248 Only four years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced that the knock-and-announce principle is "`embedded in Anglo-American Law.'" Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958).

1999Clearly, the fact that an occupant of a residence owns or carries a gun cannot eliminate the knock-and-announce requirement in all cases. [ 227 Mich.App. at 110-111 , 575 N.W.2d 294 .] The prosecutor has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.

1999Clearly, the fact that an occupant of a residence owns or carries a gun cannot eliminate the knock-and-announce requirement in all cases. [ 227 Mich.App. at 110-111 , 575 N.W.2d 294 .] The prosecutor has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.

1999The Court of Appeals reversed, essentially holding that the knock-and-announce violation did not rise to the level of "unreasonable police conduct." 233 Mich.App. at 61 , 595 N.W.2d 497 . *248 Only four years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced that the knock-and-announce principle is "`embedded in Anglo-American Law.'" Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958).

1999The Court of Appeals reversed, essentially holding that the knock-and-announce violation did not rise to the level of "unreasonable police conduct." 233 Mich.App. at 61 , 595 N.W.2d 497 . *248 Only four years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced that the knock-and-announce principle is "`embedded in Anglo-American Law.'" Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958).

1999People v Young, 212 Mich App 630, 639 ; 538 NW2d 456 (1995), remanded on other grounds 453 Mich 976 (1996). 5 The Court also rejected the argument presented here, that application of the exclusionary rule is too harsh a remedy, because the prosecutor relied on Wilson, supra, and this Court “decline[d] to view the [United States Supreme] Court’s refusal to address the application of the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce principle as an indication of support for the prosecutor’s argument.” Ortiz, supra at 483-484. 6 In the case at bar, the trial court declared that the po

1999People v Young, 212 Mich App 630, 639 ; 538 NW2d 456 (1995), remanded on other grounds 453 Mich 976 (1996). 5 The Court also rejected the argument presented here, that application of the exclusionary rule is too harsh a remedy, because the prosecutor relied on Wilson, supra, and this Court “decline[d] to view the [United States Supreme] Court’s refusal to address the application of the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce principle as an indication of support for the prosecutor’s argument.” Ortiz, supra at 483-484. 6 In the case at bar, the trial court declared that the po

1999Given that the decision in Polidori actually preceded the Supreme Court’s recognition of a Fourth Amendment basis for the knock- and-announce principle, and thus came to rest on the appropriate, Fourth Amendment based remedy, I see no reason to turn back the clock to encompass what has previously been a minority view below (and a nonexistent view above). 6 Because the majority, how ever, decides the case on the basis of the constitutional issue, I proceed onward. n The majority offers us what is seemingly cast as a view offered by some of our federal circuits, albeit apparently a minority one.

1999Given that the decision in Polidori actually preceded the Supreme Court’s recognition of a Fourth Amendment basis for the knock- and-announce principle, and thus came to rest on the appropriate, Fourth Amendment based remedy, I see no reason to turn back the clock to encompass what has previously been a minority view below (and a nonexistent view above). 6 Because the majority, how ever, decides the case on the basis of the constitutional issue, I proceed onward. n The majority offers us what is seemingly cast as a view offered by some of our federal circuits, albeit apparently a minority one.

1999While some federal courts have found that the appropriate remedy for a knock-and-announce violation is suppression, see United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (C.A.6, 1996)("unless exigent circumstances exist, the failure of state law enforcement officials to knock and announce their presence will render the evidence procured during the ensuing execution of a warrant inadmissible"); United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96 (C.A.10, 1996)(affirming the trial court's suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the "knock and announce" rule); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (C.A.8, 1993)(i

1999That case concerns the same issue that we here address. 2 FoEowing this Court’s decision in Asher , this Court, in People v Tanner, 222 Mich App 626 ; 564 NW2d 197 (1997), recognized Polidori’s holding that “[t]he exclusionary rule may come into play where the poEce faE to comply with the knock and announce rule and their entrance otherwise violates the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness,” id. at 635 , but did not have occasion to address it further because the trial court had improperly denied the defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of the officers’ comp

1999That case concerns the same issue that we here address. 2 FoEowing this Court’s decision in Asher , this Court, in People v Tanner, 222 Mich App 626 ; 564 NW2d 197 (1997), recognized Polidori’s holding that “[t]he exclusionary rule may come into play where the poEce faE to comply with the knock and announce rule and their entrance otherwise violates the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness,” id. at 635 , but did not have occasion to address it further because the trial court had improperly denied the defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of the officers’ comp

1999Thus, I am rather puzzled by the majority's parsing of the various cases regarding the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusion of any careful examination of the Court's Fourth Amendment knock and announce cases, which would seem to be necessary to determine whether the exception (when both the existence of it and the general rationale behind it are not at issue) is at all consistent with what the Court has told us regarding the place of the knock and announce principle in our constitutional jurisprudence. [11] Id., 149 F.3d 717 . [12] The actual statement quoted by the majority address

1999Thus, I am rather puzzled by the majority's parsing of the various cases regarding the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusion of any careful examination of the Court's Fourth Amendment knock and announce cases, which would seem to be necessary to determine whether the exception (when both the existence of it and the general rationale behind it are not at issue) is at all consistent with what the Court has told us regarding the place of the knock and announce principle in our constitutional jurisprudence. [11] Id., 149 F.3d 717 . [12] The actual statement quoted by the majority address

1999While some federal courts have found that the appropriate remedy for a knock-and-announce violation is suppression, see United States v Bates, 84 F3d 790, 795 (CA 6, 1996) (“unless exigent circumstances exist, the failure of state law enforcement officials to knock and announce their presence will render the evidence procured during the ensuing execution of a warrant inadmissible”); United States v Moore, 91 F3d 96 (CA 10, 1996) (affirming the trial court’s suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the “knock and announce” rule); United States v Marts, 986 F2d 1216 (CA 8, 1993) (in reje

1999While some federal courts have found that the appropriate remedy for a knock-and-announce violation is suppression, see United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (C.A.6, 1996)("unless exigent circumstances exist, the failure of state law enforcement officials to knock and announce their presence will render the evidence procured during the ensuing execution of a warrant inadmissible"); United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96 (C.A.10, 1996)(affirming the trial court's suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the "knock and announce" rule); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (C.A.8, 1993)(i

1999In that case, the fact that an officer saw a face in the window that disappeared from sight was an "essentially neutral" observation and did not constitute exigent circumstances. [14] See United States v. Hidalgo, 747 F.Supp. 818, 831 (D.Mass., 1990), where drugs were not immediately accessible to any occupant of the apartment and were not easily destroyable; thus, there was no exigency. [15] Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

1999In that case, the fact that an officer saw a face in the window that disappeared from sight was an "essentially neutral" observation and did not constitute exigent circumstances. [14] See United States v. Hidalgo, 747 F.Supp. 818, 831 (D.Mass., 1990), where drugs were not immediately accessible to any occupant of the apartment and were not easily destroyable; thus, there was no exigency. [15] Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).