knock and announce requirement in Maryland

2004See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) for a detailed discussion of the knock and announce rule, its vintage and importance.

2004See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) for a detailed discussion of the knock and announce rule, its vintage and importance.

2003In Davis v. State, 144 Md.App. at 156 , 797 A.2d 84 , Chief Judge Murphy explained: If at the time he or she is applying for a search warrant, a law enforcement officer believes that the circumstances under which the warrant will be executed justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement, the officer should seek no-knock authorization from the warrant issuing judge.

2003In Davis v. State, 144 Md.App. at 156 , 797 A.2d 84 , Chief Judge Murphy explained: If at the time he or she is applying for a search warrant, a law enforcement officer believes that the circumstances under which the warrant will be executed justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement, the officer should seek no-knock authorization from the warrant issuing judge.

1997While acknowledging that a “reasonable belief that firearms may have been within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient” to justify excusing the knock and announce requirement, id. (quoting United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.1993)), the court held that exigent circumstances existed to excuse the requirement when the law enforcement officers feared for their safety.

1997While we recognize that a reasonable belief that firearms may be within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to excuse a knock and announce requirement, see Murphy, 69 F.3d at 243 (quoting Marts, 986 F.2d at 1218 ), additional facts created exigent circumstances in the instant case.

2003There, the Supreme Court of Michigan, having determined that the police violated the knock and announce rule by their method of entry into the defendant’s home to execute the validly issued search warrant-knocking and waiting only a few seconds before forcibly entering-and thus violated the Fourth amendment, addressed whether that violation required exclusion of the evidence seized. 597 N.W.2d at 55 .

2003As to the latter holding, the court reasoned, consistent with the Nix statement of the purpose of the exclusionary rule in the inevitable discovery context, id. at 61: “Given that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, allowing the evidence in does not put the prosecution in any better position than it would be in had the police adhered to the knock-and-announce requirement.

2009Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 , 72 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 992 , 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (application of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a “sufficient causal relationship” between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence).

2009Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 , 72 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 992 , 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (application of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a “sufficient causal relationship” between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence).

2003In light of two rulings from the nation’s highest court, finding this requirement to exist in both our common law and the Constitution, it would be wrong and utterly inconsistent for Maryland, in effect, to expunge this requirement and establish such an exception as was created in Michigan, 5 by attaching the doctrine of inevitable discovery to violations of the well established knock-and-announce requirement.” Id. at 94 , 774 A.2d at 1192 .

2003In light of two rulings from the nation’s highest court, finding this requirement to exist in both our common law and the Constitution, it would be wrong and utterly inconsistent for Maryland, in effect, to expunge this requirement and establish such an exception as was created in Michigan, 5 by attaching the doctrine of inevitable discovery to violations of the well established knock-and-announce requirement.” Id. at 94 , 774 A.2d at 1192 .

2005To the extent Henson created a per se rule dispensing with the knock and announce rule in drug cases, "it is no longer good law.” State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275 , 289 n. 9, 821 A.2d 922 (2003).

2005To the extent Henson created a per se rule dispensing with the knock and announce rule in drug cases, "it is no longer good law.” State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275 , 289 n. 9, 821 A.2d 922 (2003).

2004State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 283-86 , 821 A.2d 922, 926-28 (2003) (detailing the history of the knock and announce doctrine in Maryland); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22 , 204 A.2d 516, 518-19 (1964) (holding that police officer “must give *411 proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to enter the premises to be searched”); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 558, 561 , 16 A.2d 98 , 97 (1940) (recognizing that “an officer in executing a warrant to enter a house, which warrant is valid on its face, may break open the doors if denied admittance, but a

2004State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 283-86 , 821 A.2d 922, 926-28 (2003) (detailing the history of the knock and announce doctrine in Maryland); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22 , 204 A.2d 516, 518-19 (1964) (holding that police officer “must give *411 proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to enter the premises to be searched”); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 558, 561 , 16 A.2d 98 , 97 (1940) (recognizing that “an officer in executing a warrant to enter a house, which warrant is valid on its face, may break open the doors if denied admittance, but a

2001In his dissenting opinion in People v. Stevens, 460 Mich. 626 , 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999), Justice Cavanagh explained the precursor opinion to Vasquez that announced the application of this doctrine to knock-and-announce cases in Michigan, that the United States Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) and in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968).

2001In his dissenting opinion in People v. Stevens, 460 Mich. 626 , 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999), Justice Cavanagh explained the precursor opinion to Vasquez that announced the application of this doctrine to knock-and-announce cases in Michigan, that the United States Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) and in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968).

2004The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Its clear and unequivocal purpose is to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and, because it recognizes “ ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our

2004The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Its clear and unequivocal purpose is to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and, because it recognizes “ ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our

2004Referencing the test of objective good faith set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 3420 n. 23, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 698 (1984), “whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization,” the State argues that the applicants “relied in good faith on the warrant’s authorization to conduct a no-knock entry, and thus, the evidence seized is admissible pursuant to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” Finally, the State submits that, assuming a violation of the knock-and-announce ru

2004Referencing the test of objective good faith set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 3420 n. 23, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 698 (1984), “whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization,” the State argues that the applicants “relied in good faith on the warrant’s authorization to conduct a no-knock entry, and thus, the evidence seized is admissible pursuant to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” Finally, the State submits that, assuming a violation of the knock-and-announce ru

2004State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 283-86 , 821 A.2d 922, 926-28 (2003) (detailing the history of the knock and announce doctrine in Maryland); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22 , 204 A.2d 516, 518-19 (1964) (holding that police officer “must give *411 proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to enter the premises to be searched”); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 558, 561 , 16 A.2d 98 , 97 (1940) (recognizing that “an officer in executing a warrant to enter a house, which warrant is valid on its face, may break open the doors if denied admittance, but a

2004State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 283-86 , 821 A.2d 922, 926-28 (2003) (detailing the history of the knock and announce doctrine in Maryland); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22 , 204 A.2d 516, 518-19 (1964) (holding that police officer “must give *411 proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to enter the premises to be searched”); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 558, 561 , 16 A.2d 98 , 97 (1940) (recognizing that “an officer in executing a warrant to enter a house, which warrant is valid on its face, may break open the doors if denied admittance, but a

2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977),

2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977),

2004In addition, we have stated before ‘that a reasonable belief that firearms may be within the residence, standing alone, is *460 clearly insufficient to excuse a knock and announce requirement.’ Wynn, supra, 117 Md.App. at 167 , 699 A.2d 512 .” 149 Md.App. at 611 , 817 A.2d at 934-35 (footnote omitted).

2004In addition, we have stated before ‘that a reasonable belief that firearms may be within the residence, standing alone, is *460 clearly insufficient to excuse a knock and announce requirement.’ Wynn, supra, 117 Md.App. at 167 , 699 A.2d 512 .” 149 Md.App. at 611 , 817 A.2d at 934-35 (footnote omitted).

2004To remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift move gut the constitution’s regulation of how officers execute such warrants.’ ” Id. at 303, 821 A.2d at 938 (quoting U.S. v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 986 (6th Cir.2000)).

2004IV A. As a threshold matter, the intermediate appellate court addressed an issue that was not directly raised by either party 17 and which, although discussed in Dashiell v. State, 143 *418 Md.App. 134, 152-53, 792 A.2d 1185, 1195-96 (2002), 18 has never been decided by a Maryland court, whether “no-knock” warrants-warrants that determine the propriety of a “no-knock” entry-the existence of exigency excusing compliance with the knock and announce requirement — at the time they are issued — are authorized by Maryland law.

2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977),

2004It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 , 115 S.Ct. at 1915 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 979 , the touchstone of which is the “ ‘reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security; reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” 12 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 *413 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 335 (1977),

2004The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Its clear and unequivocal purpose is to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and, because it recognizes “ ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our

2004The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Its clear and unequivocal purpose is to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and, because it recognizes “ ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our

2003See United States v. Espinoza, 105 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1019-21 (E.D.Wis.2000)("... the government’s position that the inevitable discoveiy doctrine trumps the exclusionary rule in cases of knock and announce violations must be rejected .... ”); see also United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 976-77 (E.D.Tex.1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 976 , 118 S.Ct. 433 , 139 L.Ed.2d 333 (". .. it must be noted that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence seized after a clear violation of the [federal] ‘knock and announce' statute would completely [e]

2003See United States v. Espinoza, 105 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1019-21 (E.D.Wis.2000)("... the government’s position that the inevitable discoveiy doctrine trumps the exclusionary rule in cases of knock and announce violations must be rejected .... ”); see also United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 976-77 (E.D.Tex.1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 976 , 118 S.Ct. 433 , 139 L.Ed.2d 333 (". .. it must be noted that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence seized after a clear violation of the [federal] ‘knock and announce' statute would completely [e]