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6 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Buckgreen2 sentences1994STATE’S ARGUMENT The State argues that, despite the violation of section 77-23-10, suppression is not an appropriate remedy because the conduct was not an egregious violation and none of the basic interests that support the knock-and-announce requirement were appreciably compromised. 6 Specifically, the State asserts that in State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), the seminal case on section 77-23-10, the knock-and-announce requirements were clearly violated. 1994The interests 7 supporting the knock-and-announce requirement were stated to be “(1) the protection of an individual’s private activities within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and physical injury to both police and occupants which may result from an unannounced police entry, and (3) the prevention of property damage resulting from forced entry.” Buck, 756 P.2d at 701 . | 2 | 2 |
Hudson v. Michigangreen2 sentences2015See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently attenuated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (stating that the police misconduct and the evidence of crime "may be sufficiently attenuated" to be admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine in general attenuation terms). 5 . 2015See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently attenuated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (stating that the police misconduct and the evidence of crime "may be sufficiently attenuated" to be admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine in general attenuation terms). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Hardy v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2015See United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir.2006) (adopting Green's "compelling case" language); State v. Hill, 725 So.2d 1282, 1287 (La.1998) (stating that the discovery of outstanding warrants was a "significant intervening event"); Hardy v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Ky.App.2004) (holding that the intervening circumstance of the outstanding warrant "outweighed any possible [police] misconduct"). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bryan Lee Simpsongreen1 sentence2015See United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir.2006) (adopting Green's "compelling case" language); State v. Hill, 725 So.2d 1282, 1287 (La.1998) (stating that the discovery of outstanding warrants was a "significant intervening event"); Hardy v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Ky.App.2004) (holding that the intervening circumstance of the outstanding warrant "outweighed any possible [police] misconduct"). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hillgreen1 sentence2015See United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir.2006) (adopting Green's "compelling case" language); State v. Hill, 725 So.2d 1282, 1287 (La.1998) (stating that the discovery of outstanding warrants was a "significant intervening event"); Hardy v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Ky.App.2004) (holding that the intervening circumstance of the outstanding warrant "outweighed any possible [police] misconduct"). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maysgreen2 sentences2003See People v. Mays, 67 Cal.App.4th 969 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the officer's compliance with the knock-notice requirements at the front door of the residence was sufficient to enter the defendant's closed bedroom door and, therefore, a second knock-notice was unnecessary); People v. Livermore, 30 Cal.App.3d 1073 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 822 (Cal.Ct.App.1973) (holding that, having complied with the knock-and-announce rule before entering a house, officers did not need to knock again before entering a bedroom); People v. Woods, 308 Ill.App.3d 930 , 242 Ill.Dec. 507 , 721 N.E. 2003See People v. Mays, 67 Cal.App.4th 969 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the officer's compliance with the knock-notice requirements at the front door of the residence was sufficient to enter the defendant's closed bedroom door and, therefore, a second knock-notice was unnecessary); People v. Livermore, 30 Cal.App.3d 1073 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 822 (Cal.Ct.App.1973) (holding that, having complied with the knock-and-announce rule before entering a house, officers did not need to knock again before entering a bedroom); People v. Woods, 308 Ill.App.3d 930 , 242 Ill.Dec. 507 , 721 N.E. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Nancy Baker and William James Reedergreen1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Richard J. Manduchi v. Jack Tracy, Warden, Lancaster County Prisongreen1 sentence1994Manduchi v. Tracy, 350 F.2d 658, 660-61 (3d Cir.) (forcible entry incident to execution of search warrant, after knocking and waiting "a few seconds,” not unreasonable in circumstances; § 3109 held inapplicable), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 943 , 86 S.Ct. 390 , 15 L.Ed.2d 353 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Ernest Manninggreen1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Edward Mapp, A/K/A Sonny Woodsgreen1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Francisco Bustamante-Gamez, United States of America v. Abelardo Garcia-Ramirezgreen1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Tommie Murrie, Jr.green1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1 |
cluster 365589green1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Iversongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Farbergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Charles Edward Payne v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2015See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently attenuated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (stating that the police misconduct and the evidence of crime "may be sufficiently attenuated" to be admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine in general attenuation terms). 5 . 2015See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently attenuated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (stating that the police misconduct and the evidence of crime "may be sufficiently attenuated" to be admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine in general attenuation terms). 5 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Segura v. United States
green
2 sentences2015See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently attenuated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (stating that the police misconduct and the evidence of crime "may be sufficiently attenuated" to be admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine in general attenuation terms). 5 . 2015See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently attenuated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (stating that the police misconduct and the evidence of crime "may be sufficiently attenuated" to be admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine in general attenuation terms). 5 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
cluster 19576
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 2163 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). . 203 F.3d 356 , 357 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam). . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Livermore
green
2 sentences2003See People v. Mays, 67 Cal.App.4th 969 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the officer's compliance with the knock-notice requirements at the front door of the residence was sufficient to enter the defendant's closed bedroom door and, therefore, a second knock-notice was unnecessary); People v. Livermore, 30 Cal.App.3d 1073 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 822 (Cal.Ct.App.1973) (holding that, having complied with the knock-and-announce rule before entering a house, officers did not need to knock again before entering a bedroom); People v. Woods, 308 Ill.App.3d 930 , 242 Ill.Dec. 507 , 721 N.E. 2003See People v. Mays, 67 Cal.App.4th 969 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the officer's compliance with the knock-notice requirements at the front door of the residence was sufficient to enter the defendant's closed bedroom door and, therefore, a second knock-notice was unnecessary); People v. Livermore, 30 Cal.App.3d 1073 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 822 (Cal.Ct.App.1973) (holding that, having complied with the knock-and-announce rule before entering a house, officers did not need to knock again before entering a bedroom); People v. Woods, 308 Ill.App.3d 930 , 242 Ill.Dec. 507 , 721 N.E. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Woods
neutral
2 sentences2003See People v. Mays, 67 Cal.App.4th 969 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the officer's compliance with the knock-notice requirements at the front door of the residence was sufficient to enter the defendant's closed bedroom door and, therefore, a second knock-notice was unnecessary); People v. Livermore, 30 Cal.App.3d 1073 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 822 (Cal.Ct.App.1973) (holding that, having complied with the knock-and-announce rule before entering a house, officers did not need to knock again before entering a bedroom); People v. Woods, 308 Ill.App.3d 930 , 242 Ill.Dec. 507 , 721 N.E. 2003See People v. Mays, 67 Cal.App.4th 969 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the officer's compliance with the knock-notice requirements at the front door of the residence was sufficient to enter the defendant's closed bedroom door and, therefore, a second knock-notice was unnecessary); People v. Livermore, 30 Cal.App.3d 1073 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 822 (Cal.Ct.App.1973) (holding that, having complied with the knock-and-announce rule before entering a house, officers did not need to knock again before entering a bedroom); People v. Woods, 308 Ill.App.3d 930 , 242 Ill.Dec. 507 , 721 N.E. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Gilbert Moreno
green
1 sentence1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Nolan
green
1 sentence1994United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589 , 600 n. 21 (3d Cir.1983) (citations omitted). .Footnote 28 appears at this point in the quotation taken from Nolan . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Chatsworth Cooperative Marketing Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Commission
green
1 sentence1994Manduchi v. Tracy, 350 F.2d 658, 660-61 (3d Cir.) (forcible entry incident to execution of search warrant, after knocking and waiting "a few seconds,” not unreasonable in circumstances; § 3109 held inapplicable), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 943 , 86 S.Ct. 390 , 15 L.Ed.2d 353 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Rhodes v. Edwards
green
1 sentence1994Manduchi v. Tracy, 350 F.2d 658, 660-61 (3d Cir.) (forcible entry incident to execution of search warrant, after knocking and waiting "a few seconds,” not unreasonable in circumstances; § 3109 held inapplicable), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 943 , 86 S.Ct. 390 , 15 L.Ed.2d 353 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Chambers
green
2 sentences1994Id. ■ However, despite the violation, the Commonwealth argued that the misconduct should not result in suppression because the issue was whether the police conduct reasonably worked to prevent mistaken resistance by Mr. Chambers, i.e., whether it worked to prevent the breach of one of the statute’s three purposes, namely the prevention of violence.- Id. at 541 . 1994Id. ■ However, despite the violation, the Commonwealth argued that the misconduct should not result in suppression because the issue was whether the police conduct reasonably worked to prevent mistaken resistance by Mr. Chambers, i.e., whether it worked to prevent the breach of one of the statute’s three purposes, namely the prevention of violence.- Id. at 541 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Balc v. Ardelean
green
1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Delome v. Union Barge Line Co.
green
1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Blevins v. United States
green
1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cooke County Electric Cooperative Ass'n v. Town of Lindsay
green
1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Buxton v. United States
green
1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1994–1994 |
National Cash Register Co. v. NCR Employees' Independent Union
green
1 sentence1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Boggs v. United States
green
2 sentences1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States 1994Because of its importance in identifying courts which have discerned a knock-and-announce requirement, especially the Tenth Circuit, we quote it verbatim: See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198 , 202 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980) ("knock-and-announce” rule incorporated "to some extent” in fourth amendment) (dictum); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir.) (same) (dictum), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 965 , 99 S.Ct. 2415 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir.1976) (fourth amendment incorporates all elements of § 3109) (dictum); United States | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Bartlett v. United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.