21 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Coylegreen2 sentences2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule 2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule | 2 | 8 |
State v. Carsongreen2 sentences2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318 , 584 P.2d 990 (1978) (presence or absence of exigent circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the knock and wait rule is factual determination to be made by trial court); State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969); State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.App. 648 , 581 P.2d 154 (1978); State v. Woodall 32 Wash.App. 407 , 647 P.2d 1051 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash.2d 74 , 666 P.2d 364 (1983). 2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Richardsgreen2 sentences2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule 2011Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (“the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression” (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington’s knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998)). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Richardsgreen2 sentences2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule 2011Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (“the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression” (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington’s knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998)). | 1 | 4 |
United States v. Francisco Bustamante-Gamez, United States of America v. Abelardo Garcia-Ramirezgreen2 sentences1994We say this having in mind three interests that are advanced by the knock and announce requirement of § 3109 [the federal equivalent of RCW 10.31.040]: (1) reducing the potential for a violent confrontation between the police and an occupant startled by an unannounced intrusion, Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 313 n. 12, 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 1198 n. 12, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958); (2) preventing needless destruction of private property, United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973); and (3) showing respect for the individual’s privacy interest in his home. 1978United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir.1973); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir.1964). | 1 | 3 |
Hudson v. Michigangreen2 sentences2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule 2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'BREMSKIgreen2 sentences2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule 2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Maurice Kempgreen1 sentence1997United States v. Kemp, 12 F.3d 1140, 1142 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nedergardgreen1 sentence1992See State v. Nedergard, 51 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Batesgreen2 sentences1987State v. Bates, 120 Ariz. 561 , 587 P.2d 747, 749 (1978) (forcible entry to execute a search warrant after 3 to 5 seconds from announcement of purpose and authority was not "lengthy inaction" sufficient to constitute constructive refusal of admittance, therefore was unreasonable in the absence of information the occupants were armed or dangerous). 1987State v. Bates, 120 Ariz. 561 , 587 P.2d 747, 749 (1978) (forcible entry to execute a search warrant after 3 to 5 seconds from announcement of purpose and authority was not "lengthy inaction" sufficient to constitute constructive refusal of admittance, therefore was unreasonable in the absence of information the occupants were armed or dangerous). | 1 | 1 |
Sandland v. Stategreen1 sentence1987Sandland , at 1198. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Young
green
2 sentences1974We next consider whether compliance with the knock and announce rule in this case was excused because of “exigent and necessitous circumstances,” State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969). 1974We next consider whether compliance with the knock and announce rule in this case was excused because of “exigent and necessitous circumstances,” State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969). | 4 | 1974–2016 |
State of Washington v. Jude Joseph Ortiz
neutral
2 sentences2020State v. Ortiz, 196 Wn. 2019We evaluate the reasonableness of the waiting period by looking to the underlying purposes of the knock and announce rule, including “‘(1) reduction of potential violence to both occupants and police arising from an unannounced entry, (2) prevention of unnecessary property damage, and (3) protection of an occupant’s right to privacy.’” Ortiz, 196 Wn. | 2 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Garcia-Hernandez
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 496 . 1997Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 5 ; State v. Garcia-Hernandez, 67 Wn. | 2 | 1997–2016 |
Richards v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2002Strict compliance with the knock and announce rule is required unless the State can demonstrate that the police had “a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S. Ct. 1416 , 137 L. 2002Strict compliance with the knock and announce rule is required unless the State can demonstrate that the police had “a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S. Ct. 1416 , 137 L. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Woodall
green
2 sentences2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318 , 584 P.2d 990 (1978) (presence or absence of exigent circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the knock and wait rule is factual determination to be made by trial court); State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969); State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.App. 648 , 581 P.2d 154 (1978); State v. Woodall 32 Wash.App. 407 , 647 P.2d 1051 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash.2d 74 , 666 P.2d 364 (1983). 2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318 , 584 P.2d 990 (1978) (presence or absence of exigent circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the knock and wait rule is factual determination to be made by trial court); State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969); State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.App. 648 , 581 P.2d 154 (1978); State v. Woodall 32 Wash.App. 407 , 647 P.2d 1051 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash.2d 74 , 666 P.2d 364 (1983). | 2 | 1987–2002 |
Miller v. United States
green
2 sentences1994We say this having in mind three interests that are advanced by the knock and announce requirement of § 3109 [the federal equivalent of RCW 10.31.040]: (1) reducing the potential for a violent confrontation between the police and an occupant startled by an unannounced intrusion, Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 313 n. 12, 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 1198 n. 12, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958); (2) preventing needless destruction of private property, United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973); and (3) showing respect for the individual’s privacy interest in his home. 1994We say this having in mind three interests that are advanced by the knock and announce requirement of § 3109 [the federal equivalent of RCW 10.31.040]: (1) reducing the potential for a violent confrontation between the police and an occupant startled by an unannounced intrusion, Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 313 n. 12, 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 1198 n. 12, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958); (2) preventing needless destruction of private property, United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973); and (3) showing respect for the individual’s privacy interest in his home. | 2 | 1974–1994 |
State v. Myers
green
2 sentences1990State v. Myers, 102 Wn.2d 548, 552 , 689 P.2d 38 (1984). 1990State v. Myers, 102 Wn.2d 548, 552 , 689 P.2d 38 (1984). | 2 | 1987–1990 |
State v. Hatcher
green
2 sentences1974In State v. Hatcher, 3 Wn. 1972Hatcher, 3 Wn. | 2 | 1972–1974 |
State v. Cardenas
green
1 sentence2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2016Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L. 2016Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Richardson v. State
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 908 . ¶26 This case is nearly identical to these two cases. ¶27 Because the police violated the knock and announce rule, and there is no legitimate strategic or tactical reason for failing to challenge the search, counsel was deficient for not moving to suppress the evidence. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 543-44 . ¶18 Likewise, in State v. Johnson, 94 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Lomax
neutral
2 sentences2016Each case is distinguishable from the facts present here. ¶17 In State v. Lomax, 24 Wn. 2016Id. at 543-44 . ¶18 Likewise, in State v. Johnson, 94 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Vangen
green
2 sentences2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule 2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Rothenberger
green
2 sentences2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule 2011Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ("the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression" (Kennedy, J., concurring)), with State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 14 , 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) (stating that suppression is the proper remedy for violations of Washington's knock-and-wait rule), and State v. Richards, 136 Wash.2d 361 , 962 P.2d 118 (1998). [8] E.g., State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428 , 423 P.2d 530 (1967) ("We have consistently adhered to the exclusionary rule | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Woodall
green
2 sentences2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318 , 584 P.2d 990 (1978) (presence or absence of exigent circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the knock and wait rule is factual determination to be made by trial court); State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969); State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.App. 648 , 581 P.2d 154 (1978); State v. Woodall 32 Wash.App. 407 , 647 P.2d 1051 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash.2d 74 , 666 P.2d 364 (1983). 2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318 , 584 P.2d 990 (1978) (presence or absence of exigent circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the knock and wait rule is factual determination to be made by trial court); State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969); State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.App. 648 , 581 P.2d 154 (1978); State v. Woodall 32 Wash.App. 407 , 647 P.2d 1051 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash.2d 74 , 666 P.2d 364 (1983). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Edwards
neutral
2 sentences2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318 , 584 P.2d 990 (1978) (presence or absence of exigent circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the knock and wait rule is factual determination to be made by trial court); State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969); State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.App. 648 , 581 P.2d 154 (1978); State v. Woodall 32 Wash.App. 407 , 647 P.2d 1051 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash.2d 74 , 666 P.2d 364 (1983). 2002See also State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318 , 584 P.2d 990 (1978) (presence or absence of exigent circumstances sufficient to constitute an exception to the knock and wait rule is factual determination to be made by trial court); State v. Young, 76 Wash.2d 212, 217 , 455 P.2d 595 (1969); State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.App. 648 , 581 P.2d 154 (1978); State v. Woodall 32 Wash.App. 407 , 647 P.2d 1051 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash.2d 74 , 666 P.2d 364 (1983). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Ellis
green
1 sentence1997Because the uniformed officers were not immediately visible, and because the lead detectives were not readily identifiable by their clothing as legitimate law enforcement officers, Richards argues that this case is similar to State v. Ellis, 21 Wn. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Lehman
green
2 sentences1990The Lehman court held that the officers sufficiently complied with the knock and announce rule because "[t]o wait for a grant or denial of admission . . . would serve no purpose." State v. Lehman, 40 Wn. 1990The Lehman court held that the officers sufficiently complied with the knock and announce rule because "[t]o wait for a grant or denial of admission ... would serve no purpose." State v. Lehman, 40 Wn. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. McIntyre green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Berlin green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Jeter green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Dalia v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Wilson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Hilliard green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Campbell green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| United States v. Grover Lee Mullin and Stephen Parker Perry green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Gallmon green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.