knock and announce rule in Minnesota

2002The United States Supreme Court, however, “has rejected a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule * * * for all felony drug cases.” Barnes, 618 N.W.2d at 811 (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1421 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997)).

2002The United States Supreme Court, however, “has rejected a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule * * * for all felony drug cases.” Barnes, 618 N.W.2d at 811 (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1421 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997)).

2015As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hudson, “[w]hen the knock-and-announce rule does apply, it is not easy to determine precisely what officers must do.” 547 U.S. at 590 , 126 S. Ct. at 2163 .

2015As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hudson, “[w]hen the knock-and-announce rule does apply, it is not easy to determine precisely what officers must do.” 547 U.S. at 590 , 126 S. Ct. at 2163 .

2000See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 ; see also Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 (holding that the knock and announce rule can yield to “a threat of physical violence” and citing cases with specific facts indicating dangerous — resident had "resolved * * ⅜ to resist even to the shedding of blood” and inhabitant was "firing pistols at [the officers]”). .

2000See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 ; see also Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 (holding that the knock and announce rule can yield to “a threat of physical violence” and citing cases with specific facts indicating dangerous — resident had "resolved * * ⅜ to resist even to the shedding of blood” and inhabitant was "firing pistols at [the officers]”). .

2002Our supreme court has also rejected a blanket exception for felony-drug cases: “[P]olice must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 320 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).

2001Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 319-20 .

2015Prudhomme, 287 N.W.2d at 389 . 8 Consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach in Prudhomme, we evaluate the alleged knock-and-announce violation in this case in the context of the interests served by the knock-and-announce requirement.

2015Prudhomme, 287 N.W.2d at 389 . 8 Consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach in Prudhomme, we evaluate the alleged knock-and-announce violation in this case in the context of the interests served by the knock-and-announce requirement.

2015Jacobson notes that “[t]here are four components to the knock-and-announce requirement: (1) knock; (2) identification as law enforcement officer; (3) express the purpose of the officer’s presence and the authority for the search or seizure; and (4) wait a reasonable time for the occupant to allow or refuse entry.” See Garza v. State, 619 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. App. 2000) (describing the four components of the knock-and- 5 announce rule), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001).

2015Although this court has described the knock-and-announce rule as having four components, see id., we are not aware of any precedent requiring strict compliance with every component.

2015“The State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a statement was voluntary. [Appellate courts] review the totality of circumstances to determine whether the State met its burden to establish that a statement was voluntary.” State v. Morrow, 834 N.W.2d 715, 725 (Minn. 2013) (citation and quotations omitted). 5 Because the officers did not violate the knock-and-announce requirement, it is unnecessary for us to determine what if any remedy would be appropriate if there were a violation of the requirement.

2015Jacobson notes that “[t]here are four components to the knock-and-announce requirement: (1) knock; (2) identification as law enforcement officer; (3) express the purpose of the officer’s presence and the authority for the search or seizure; and (4) wait a reasonable time for the occupant to allow or refuse entry.” See Garza v. State, 619 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. App. 2000) (describing the four components of the knock-and- 5 announce rule), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001).

2000While we need not decide in this case whether to adopt a good faith exception 3 to the knock and announce rule, we have stated, in the probable cause context, that where a search is based on the probable cause determination of a magistrate, rather than a police officer, we may “accept evidence of a less ‘judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant * * *.’ ” State v. Nolting, 312 Minn. 449, 453 , 254 N.W.2d 340, 343 (1977) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)).

2000While we need not decide in this case whether to adopt a good faith exception 3 to the knock and announce rule, we have stated, in the probable cause context, that where a search is based on the probable cause determination of a magistrate, rather than a police officer, we may “accept evidence of a less ‘judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant * * *.’ ” State v. Nolting, 312 Minn. 449, 453 , 254 N.W.2d 340, 343 (1977) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)).

2000See also State v. Walker, 584 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Minn.1998) (securing of holding that the warrant may tip scales in case of doubtful probable cause).

2000See also State v. Walker, 584 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Minn.1998) (securing of holding that the warrant may tip scales in case of doubtful probable cause).

1991Such a belief, * * * cannot be justified by a general assumption that certain classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely than others to resist arrest, attempt to escape, or destroy evidence.” State v. Whelan, 350 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn.App.1984) (quoting People v. Rosales, 68 Cal.2d 299 , 66 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 437 P.2d 489 (1968)).