knock and announce rule in New Jersey

2025"A necessary corollary to the knock-and-announce rule is that when 'the police announce[] their presence and [are] greeted with silence . . . a reasonable time must elapse between the announcement and the officers' forced entry.'" Robinson 200 N.J. at 16 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 621 (2001)).

2023"A necessary corollary of the knock-and-announce rule is A-3379-21 13 that when 'the police announce . . . their presence and [are] greeted with silence . . . a reasonable time must elapse between the announcement and the officer's forced entry.'" Id. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 168 N.J. at 621 ).

2023A-3379-21 14 "[W]hen the knock-and-announce rule does apply, it is not easy to determine what officers must do." Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590 ).

2023Quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590 (2006), the court further observed that, "in narcotics cases, reasonableness in delay is not a function of merely 'how long it would take the resident to reach the door, but how long it would take to dispose of the suspected drugs.'" The court explained it "examin[ed] the conduct of the officers in light of" what it determined was "the ambiguous record regarding the time that elapsed" and concluded "[t]he conduct of the officers in the execution of the . . . warrant did not rise to a level of being a flagrant disregard for the knock-and-announce re

2026Super. at 474 n.4 (citing State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 14 (2009)) (affirming suppression of the evidence obtained when police ignored a knock-and-announce requirement in a valid search warrant because there were no exigent circumstances or other justifications for a no-knock entry).

2025"The knock-and-announce rule renders unlawful a forcible entry to arrest or search 'where the officer failed first to state [their] authority and purpose for demanding admission.'" Robinson, 200 N.J. at 13 -14 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958)).

2025"The knock-and-announce rule renders unlawful a forcible entry to arrest or search 'where the officer failed first to state [their] authority and purpose for demanding admission.'" Robinson, 200 N.J. at 13 -14 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958)).

2021"The knock-and-announce rule renders unlawful a forcible entry to arrest or search 'where the officer failed first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission.'" State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 13-14 (2009) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958)).

2022Super. 192, 205 (App. Div. 2008), we also recognize that "[e]ven when the knock-and-announce rule governs, it is not absolute." Rockford, 213 N.J. at 442 n.1.

2021Applying New Jersey law, we hold that the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence seized following an unjustifiable entry into a dwelling in violation of a knock-and-announce requirement contained in a search warrant. (1) (i) Under our State Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, "the inquiry into the reasonableness of a residential search entails scrutiny of the steps taken by officers to enter and search a home." Rockford, 213 N.J. at 441 (citing Johnson, 168 N.J. at 616 ) (emphasis added).

2013As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the knock-and-announce rule affords residents the “opportunity to prepare themselves” for the entry of police, and the “brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 393 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 1421 n. 5, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 , 623 n. 5 (1997).

2013As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the knock-and-announce rule affords residents the “opportunity to prepare themselves” for the entry of police, and the “brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 393 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 1421 n. 5, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 , 623 n. 5 (1997).

2013In light of its ruling on the flash-bang issue, the Appellate Division majority did not address the second issue raised by this case: whether police waited a sufficient time after knocking on the door before entering the defendant’s home. 8 When officers execute warrants that are subject to the knock-and-announce rule, they may enter a home “‘only after demanding admittance and explaining their purpose.’ ” Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 14 , 974 A.2d 1057 (quoting Fair, supra, 45 N.J. at 86, 211 A.2d 359 ).

2009Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 , 932 n. 2, 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 1917 n. 2, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 , 981 n. 2 (1995). [State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 615 , 775 A.2d 1273 (2001).] Originally tethered to the execution of arrest warrants, the knock-and-announce rule derived from our common law has evolved to apply to the execution of all warrants: “peace officers may break into a dwelling house for the purpose of making an arrest [or executing a search warrant] only after demanding admittance and explaining their purpose.” State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 86 , 211 A.2d 359 (1965) (citation omitted).

2026The knock-and-announce requirement, however, is "not absolute." State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 397 (2004); see also State v. Sanchez, 179 N.J. 409, 412 (2004).

2022However, the knock-and-announce requirement is "not absolute." State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 397 (2004).

2023Id. at 495; see also Rodriguez, 399 N.J.

2008Without such a rule, . . . [the] police know that they can ignore the Constitution's requirements without risking suppression of evidence discovered after an unreasonable entry. [ Id. at 605, 609 , 126 S.Ct. at 2171, 2174 , 165 L.Ed. 2d at 73, 76 (Breyer, J., dissenting)] Fortunately for the residents of our State, we need not decide which side of this debate accurately reflects and safeguards the concerns expressed by our nation's founders when they adopted the Fourth Amendment, because, " Hudson by no means governs the application of our [S]tate [C]onstitution to a knock and announce violati

2003Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, satisfying the doctrine of reasonable suspicion "requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for [taking the police action]." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000).

2003Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, satisfying the doctrine of reasonable suspicion "requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for [taking the police action]." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000).

2021Rather, the 12 A-0580-20 majority, as it candidly admits, has simply "assumed" that, "[a]s far as [it] know[s], civil liability is an effective deterrent," a support-free assumption that Mapp and subsequent cases make clear does not embody the Court's normal approach to difficult questions of Fourth Amendment law. [Id. at 611 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).] The dissenters traced the history of the knock-and-announce rule, explained the legal purpose underlying the exclusionary rule, and concluded— like New Jersey law—that the knock-and-announce rule "forms a part of the reasona

2009Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 , 932 n. 2, 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 1917 n. 2, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 , 981 n. 2 (1995). [State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 615 , 775 A.2d 1273 (2001).] Originally tethered to the execution of arrest warrants, the knock-and-announce rule derived from our common law has evolved to apply to the execution of all warrants: “peace officers may break into a dwelling house for the purpose of making an arrest [or executing a search warrant] only after demanding admittance and explaining their purpose.” State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 86 , 211 A.2d 359 (1965) (citation omitted).

2001See State v. Goodson, 316 N.J.Super. 296, 304 , 720 A.2d 381 (App.Div.1998) (suggesting that, even in absence of no-knock provision, certain circumstances confronting police at scene may be “sufficient to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement”).

2001See State v. Goodson, 316 N.J.Super. 296, 304 , 720 A.2d 381 (App.Div.1998) (suggesting that, even in absence of no-knock provision, certain circumstances confronting police at scene may be “sufficient to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement”).

2021As noted, . . . we have described a failure to comply with the knock- and-announce rule, not as an independently unlawful event, but as a factor that renders the search "constitutionally defective." Wilson, 514 U.S.[] at 936; see also id.[] at 934 (compliance with the knock- and-announce requirement is one of the "factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure" (emphasis added)); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 53 (1963) (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("[A] lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search."). [Id. at 615 (parallel citations omitted)

2021As noted, . . . we have described a failure to comply with the knock- and-announce rule, not as an independently unlawful event, but as a factor that renders the search "constitutionally defective." Wilson, 514 U.S.[] at 936; see also id.[] at 934 (compliance with the knock- and-announce requirement is one of the "factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure" (emphasis added)); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 53 (1963) (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("[A] lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search."). [Id. at 615 (parallel citations omitted)

2026The knock-and-announce requirement, however, is "not absolute." State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 397 (2004); see also State v. Sanchez, 179 N.J. 409, 412 (2004).

2022He is the only one that can argue that he was exposed to 'severe fright and humiliation' that was the cause of this unannounced entry." In determining whether a violation of the knock-and-announce rule is actionable, courts apply the following three-step test: (1) Congress intended the statute to "benefit the plaintiff"; (2) "the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence"; and (3) "the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States." [Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 475 (2014) (quoting

2022He is the only one that can argue that he was exposed to 'severe fright and humiliation' that was the cause of this unannounced entry." In determining whether a violation of the knock-and-announce rule is actionable, courts apply the following three-step test: (1) Congress intended the statute to "benefit the plaintiff"; (2) "the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence"; and (3) "the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States." [Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 475 (2014) (quoting

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021State v. Herrera, 211 N.J. 308, 330 (2012).

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021Thus, we will affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." [Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] "While the sentence imposed must be a lawful one, the court's decision to impose a sentence in accordance with the plea

2021Thus, we will affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." [Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] "While the sentence imposed must be a lawful one, the court's decision to impose a sentence in accordance with the plea

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021Courts in five states have followed Hudson and held that their state constitutions do not mandate the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule.10 An intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania held that its state constitution required suppression of evidence for violations of the knock-and-announce requirement.11 Two other states determined that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence sought to be suppressed was purportedly not obtained "as a result of" the knock-and-announce violation. 12 And the high courts in other states have

2021Thus, the entry team did not violate the knock and announce rule, and reasonably executed the search warrant. 17 A-3017-18 In Point III, defendant argues "[he] should not have been sentenced above the statutory minimum." He argues that "[d]espite the strong mitigating evidence" of "his addiction, desire to seek treatment, and substantial family obligations [as a father of three young children], the trial judge found no mitigating factors." Defendant continues that the judge "erred in not finding mitigating factors four and eleven." We review sentences "in accordance with a deferential standard

2021Thus, we will affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." [Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] "While the sentence imposed must be a lawful one, the court's decision to impose a sentence in accordance with the plea

2021App. Ct. 2010); State v. Bremby, 90 N.E.3d 891 , 900-01 (Ohio 2017). 11 Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 757 (Pa. Super.

2021App. Ct. 2010); State v. Bremby, 90 N.E.3d 891 , 900-01 (Ohio 2017). 11 Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 757 (Pa. Super.

2021Thus, the entry team did not violate the knock and announce rule, and reasonably executed the search warrant. 17 A-3017-18 In Point III, defendant argues "[he] should not have been sentenced above the statutory minimum." He argues that "[d]espite the strong mitigating evidence" of "his addiction, desire to seek treatment, and substantial family obligations [as a father of three young children], the trial judge found no mitigating factors." Defendant continues that the judge "erred in not finding mitigating factors four and eleven." We review sentences "in accordance with a deferential standard

2021The lead detective who requested a warrant containing the knock-and-announce requirement and who was at the front door himself, testified that he knew they had to comply with the warrant mandate by knocking-and-announcing their presence. 21 E.g., Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 383 (5th Cir. 2015). 31 A-0580-20 defense of qualified immunity will be unavailable to officers because the knock-and-announce rule is a "'clearly established' right." 22 The AG asserts that compensatory damages against officers can be supplemented by punitive damages to "deter police misconduct." As to disciplinary action

2021The lead detective who requested a warrant containing the knock-and-announce requirement and who was at the front door himself, testified that he knew they had to comply with the warrant mandate by knocking-and-announcing their presence. 21 E.g., Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 383 (5th Cir. 2015). 31 A-0580-20 defense of qualified immunity will be unavailable to officers because the knock-and-announce rule is a "'clearly established' right." 22 The AG asserts that compensatory damages against officers can be supplemented by punitive damages to "deter police misconduct." As to disciplinary action

2017State v. Nunez, 333 N.J.