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13 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richards v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 US 385, 395-96 , 117 S Ct 1416 , 137 L Ed 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with knock-and-announce reasonable because of officer’s fears that evidence would be destroyed). 7 The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule include (1) “the protection of human life and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by a surprised resident”; (2) the protection of property, because breaking into a house “absent an announcement would penalize someone who” “did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to 2014See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 US 385, 395-96 , 117 S Ct 1416 , 137 L Ed 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with knock-and-announce reasonable because of officer’s fears that evidence would be destroyed). 7 The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule include (1) “the protection of human life and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by a surprised resident”; (2) the protection of property, because breaking into a house “absent an announcement would penalize someone who” “did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to | 2 | 2 |
State v. Valentinegreen2 sentences1990Even the dissenter in Valentine/Darroch, [Chief] Justice O'Connell, who believed that the basis of the rule was privacy, had difficulty `in seeing the *760 knock and announce rule as having constitutional proportions, * * *.' 264 Or at 69 [ 504 P.2d 84 ]." More recently, in State v. Davis, supra, 295 Or. 227, 236 , 666 P.2d 802 (1983) we stated: "The purpose of the `knock and announce' rule * * * is not to protect the privacy and the freedom of those within against an entry and arrest or search which the officers in fact were legally authorized to make." At common law, noncompliance with the k 1990Even the dissenter in Valentine/Darroch, [Chief] Justice O'Connell, who believed that the basis of the rule was privacy, had difficulty `in seeing the *760 knock and announce rule as having constitutional proportions, * * *.' 264 Or at 69 [ 504 P.2d 84 ]." More recently, in State v. Davis, supra, 295 Or. 227, 236 , 666 P.2d 802 (1983) we stated: "The purpose of the `knock and announce' rule * * * is not to protect the privacy and the freedom of those within against an entry and arrest or search which the officers in fact were legally authorized to make." At common law, noncompliance with the k | 1 | 3 |
State v. Bishopgreen2 sentences1990Notwithstanding our dictum in State v. Bishop, supra, 288 Or. at 354, 605 P.2d 642 , that in Ker v. California, supra , the Supreme Court of the United States "clearly indicated that the knock and announce rule is one of Fourth Amendment constitutional magnitude," our closer reading of Ker and other relevant Supreme Court cases persuades us that the Supreme Court of the United States has never expressly held that compliance with the knock and announce rule is required by the Fourth Amendment. 1990Notwithstanding our dictum in State v. Bishop, supra, 288 Or. at 354, 605 P.2d 642 , that in Ker v. California, supra , the Supreme Court of the United States "clearly indicated that the knock and announce rule is one of Fourth Amendment constitutional magnitude," our closer reading of Ker and other relevant Supreme Court cases persuades us that the Supreme Court of the United States has never expressly held that compliance with the knock and announce rule is required by the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Read v. Casegreen2 sentences1990Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 US at 591 n 8; Ker v. California, supra, 374 US at 40 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn 166, 170, 10 Am Dec 110 (1822), People v. Maddox, supra, and Restatement, Torts (1934), § 206 comment d); 15 People v. Dumas, 9 Cal 3d 871, 109 Cal Rptr 304, 512 P2d 1208 (1973); see Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused (2d ed 1985), § 2.21, at 156-61; LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.6(b), at 263-64; Wharton’s Criminal Procedure (13th ed 1989), § 77, at 338-39. 16 Several states recognize an apprehension of peril exception to their knock and announce r 1990Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1759 n. 8; Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at 40 , 83 S.Ct. at 1633 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 , 10 Am.Dec. 110 (1822), People v. Maddox, supra , and Restatement, Torts (1934), § 206 comment d); [15] People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871 , 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 (1973); see Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused (2d ed 1985), § 2.21, at 156-61; LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.6(b), at 263-64; Wharton's Criminal Procedure (13th ed 1989), § 77, at 338-39. [16] Several states recognize an a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Newmangreen2 sentences1986In State v. Newman, supra, 12 Or App at 270, we said that the method of making an announcement, when it is required, can vary with the circumstances the officers encounter. 9 Second, the entry also was lawful, because the facts here fit into one or more of the three recognized exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement, thus excusing any unannounced entry. 10 The trial court did not even address the exception regarding increased risk of harm to the officers or others. 1986App. at 270, 506 P.2d 523 , we said that the method of making an announcement, when it is required, can vary with the circumstances the officers encounter. [9] *1269 Second, the entry also was lawful, because the facts here fit into one or more of the three recognized exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement, thus excusing any unannounced entry. [10] The trial court did not even address the exception regarding increased risk of harm to the officers or others. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Larkinsgreen2 sentences1986See State v. Larkin, supra, 8 Or App at 163-64 . 1986See State v. Larkin, supra, 8 Or. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Callaghangreen2 sentences1981See State v. Callaghan, 33 Or. 1981See State v. Callaghan, 33 0r App 49, 576 P2d 14 (1978), rev den 284 Or 1 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Cota v. Fieldgreen1 sentence1970This rule is described in State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert den 394 US 951 *127 (1969), and in State v. Olson, 1 Or App 380 , 462 P2d 681 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ker v. California
green
2 sentences1980The United States Supreme Court in Ker v. California, 374 US 23 , 83 S Ct 1623 ,10 L Ed2d 726 (1973), its most recent discussion of the Fourth Amendment in relation to a violation of the knock and announce rule, clearly indicated that the knock and announce rule is one of Fourth Amendment constitutional magnitude. 1980The United States Supreme Court in Ker v. California, 374 US 23 , 83 S Ct 1623 ,10 L Ed2d 726 (1973), its most recent discussion of the Fourth Amendment in relation to a violation of the knock and announce rule, clearly indicated that the knock and announce rule is one of Fourth Amendment constitutional magnitude. | 2 | 1980–1990 |
People v. Maddox
green
2 sentences1990Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 US at 591 n 8; Ker v. California, supra, 374 US at 40 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn 166, 170, 10 Am Dec 110 (1822), People v. Maddox, supra, and Restatement, Torts (1934), § 206 comment d); 15 People v. Dumas, 9 Cal 3d 871, 109 Cal Rptr 304, 512 P2d 1208 (1973); see Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused (2d ed 1985), § 2.21, at 156-61; LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.6(b), at 263-64; Wharton’s Criminal Procedure (13th ed 1989), § 77, at 338-39. 16 Several states recognize an apprehension of peril exception to their knock and announce r 1970In People v. Maddox, 46 Cal 2d 301, 306, 294 P2d 6, 9 , cert den 352 US 858 , 1 L Ed 2d 65 , 77 S Ct 81 (1956), the California court found that strict compliance with the knock and announce rule might not always be required. | 2 | 1970–1990 |
Hudson v. Michigan
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 592 . 2014Id. at 593-94 . 7 Third, the Court held that the exclusion of evidence for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was not otherwise justified, considering the costs of excluding inculpatory evidence against the benefits of deterring knock-and-announce violations. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 592 . 2014Id. at 593-94 .7 Third, the Court held that the exclusion of evidence for a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was not otherwise justified, considering the costs of excluding inculpatory evi- dence against the benefits of deterring knock-and-announce violations. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1990State v. Mitchell, * * * [6] Or App [378], 487 P2d 1156 (1971), State v. Steeves [sic], 2 Or App 163 , 465 P2d 905 (1970) and State v. Vance, * * * [7] Or App [566], [492] P2d [493] (1972).” The colloquy that followed between Hampton, Senator Eivers and Paillette leaves no doubt that, insofar as an apprehension of peril exception to the knock and announce rule was concerned, the new statute was intended to preserve relevant existing Court of Appeals’ case law. 1990State v. Mitchell , * * * [6] Or App [378], 487 P2d 1156 (1971), State v. Steeves [ sic ], 2 Or App 163 , 465 P2d 905 (1970) and State v. Vance, * * * [7] Or App [566], [492] P2d [493] (1972)." The colloquy that followed between Hampton, Senator Eivers and Paillette leaves no doubt that, insofar as an apprehension of peril exception to the knock and announce rule was concerned, the new statute was intended to preserve relevant existing Court of Appeals' case law. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences1990Even the dissenter in Valentine/Darroch, [Chief] Justice O'Connell, who believed that the basis of the rule was privacy, had difficulty `in seeing the *760 knock and announce rule as having constitutional proportions, * * *.' 264 Or at 69 [ 504 P.2d 84 ]." More recently, in State v. Davis, supra, 295 Or. 227, 236 , 666 P.2d 802 (1983) we stated: "The purpose of the `knock and announce' rule * * * is not to protect the privacy and the freedom of those within against an entry and arrest or search which the officers in fact were legally authorized to make." At common law, noncompliance with the k 1990Even the dissenter in Valentine/Darroch, [Chief] Justice O'Connell, who believed that the basis of the rule was privacy, had difficulty `in seeing the *760 knock and announce rule as having constitutional proportions, * * *.' 264 Or at 69 [ 504 P.2d 84 ]." More recently, in State v. Davis, supra, 295 Or. 227, 236 , 666 P.2d 802 (1983) we stated: "The purpose of the `knock and announce' rule * * * is not to protect the privacy and the freedom of those within against an entry and arrest or search which the officers in fact were legally authorized to make." At common law, noncompliance with the k | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sabbath v. United States
green
2 sentences1990Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 US at 591 n 8; Ker v. California, supra, 374 US at 40 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn 166, 170, 10 Am Dec 110 (1822), People v. Maddox, supra, and Restatement, Torts (1934), § 206 comment d); 15 People v. Dumas, 9 Cal 3d 871, 109 Cal Rptr 304, 512 P2d 1208 (1973); see Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused (2d ed 1985), § 2.21, at 156-61; LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.6(b), at 263-64; Wharton’s Criminal Procedure (13th ed 1989), § 77, at 338-39. 16 Several states recognize an apprehension of peril exception to their knock and announce r 1990Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1759 n. 8; Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at 40 , 83 S.Ct. at 1633 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 , 10 Am.Dec. 110 (1822), People v. Maddox, supra , and Restatement, Torts (1934), § 206 comment d); [15] People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871 , 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 (1973); see Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused (2d ed 1985), § 2.21, at 156-61; LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.6(b), at 263-64; Wharton's Criminal Procedure (13th ed 1989), § 77, at 338-39. [16] Several states recognize an a | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Dumas
green
2 sentences1990Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1759 n. 8; Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at 40 , 83 S.Ct. at 1633 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 , 10 Am.Dec. 110 (1822), People v. Maddox, supra , and Restatement, Torts (1934), § 206 comment d); [15] People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871 , 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 (1973); see Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused (2d ed 1985), § 2.21, at 156-61; LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.6(b), at 263-64; Wharton's Criminal Procedure (13th ed 1989), § 77, at 338-39. [16] Several states recognize an a 1990Sabbath v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1759 n. 8; Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at 40 , 83 S.Ct. at 1633 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 , 10 Am.Dec. 110 (1822), People v. Maddox, supra , and Restatement, Torts (1934), § 206 comment d); [15] People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871 , 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 (1973); see Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused (2d ed 1985), § 2.21, at 156-61; LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984), § 3.6(b), at 263-64; Wharton's Criminal Procedure (13th ed 1989), § 77, at 338-39. [16] Several states recognize an a | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Steffes
green
2 sentences1990State v. Mitchell , * * * [6] Or App [378], 487 P2d 1156 (1971), State v. Steeves [ sic ], 2 Or App 163 , 465 P2d 905 (1970) and State v. Vance, * * * [7] Or App [566], [492] P2d [493] (1972)." The colloquy that followed between Hampton, Senator Eivers and Paillette leaves no doubt that, insofar as an apprehension of peril exception to the knock and announce rule was concerned, the new statute was intended to preserve relevant existing Court of Appeals' case law. 1990State v. Mitchell , * * * [6] Or App [378], 487 P2d 1156 (1971), State v. Steeves [ sic ], 2 Or App 163 , 465 P2d 905 (1970) and State v. Vance, * * * [7] Or App [566], [492] P2d [493] (1972)." The colloquy that followed between Hampton, Senator Eivers and Paillette leaves no doubt that, insofar as an apprehension of peril exception to the knock and announce rule was concerned, the new statute was intended to preserve relevant existing Court of Appeals' case law. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Tweed
neutral
2 sentences1989State v. Tweed, 62 Or. 1989State v. Tweed, 62 Or App 711, 715 , 663 P2d 38 (1983). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Miller v. United States
green
1 sentence1978In Miller the court observed that "* * * [i]t may be that without an express announcement of purpose, the facts known to officers would justify them in being virtually certain that the [suspect] already knows their purpose so that an announcement would be a useless gesture.” 357 US at 310 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Stanton
green
2 sentences1973Moreover, in State v. Stanton, 7 Or App 286 , 490 P2d 1274 (1971), we approved of the practice of eliciting, at a suppression hearing, “testimony which gives the details surrounding the ultimate facts set out in the affidavit.” 7 Or App at 290, n 1. 1973Moreover, in State v. Stanton, 7 Or App 286 , 490 P2d 1274 (1971), we approved of the practice of eliciting, at a suppression hearing, “testimony which gives the details surrounding the ultimate facts set out in the affidavit.” 7 Or App at 290, n 1. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Darroch
green
2 sentences1972The state’s thesis on appeal is that the knock and announce requirement does not apply to these facts based on State v. Darroch, 8 Or App 32 , 492 P2d 308 (1971), aff'd 96 Adv Sh 73, — Or —, 504 P2d 84 (1972). 1972The state’s thesis on appeal is that the knock and announce requirement does not apply to these facts based on State v. Darroch, 8 Or App 32 , 492 P2d 308 (1971), aff'd 96 Adv Sh 73, — Or —, 504 P2d 84 (1972). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
State v. Gassner
green
2 sentences1972We do not reach the question of whether or not the defendant, who was already apprehended outside his home, has standing to claim the benefits of the knock and announce rule, because we agree with the trial judge that here, under State v. Gassner, 6 Or App 452 , 488 P2d 822 (1971), there were exigent circumstances justifying the police entry without knocking and announcing. 1972We do not reach the question of whether or not the defendant, who was already apprehended outside his home, has standing to claim the benefits of the knock and announce rule, because we agree with the trial judge that here, under State v. Gassner, 6 Or App 452 , 488 P2d 822 (1971), there were exigent circumstances justifying the police entry without knocking and announcing. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
State v. Cortman
green
2 sentences1970This rule is described in State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert den 394 US 951 *127 (1969), and in State v. Olson, 1 Or App 380 , 462 P2d 681 (1969). 1970This rule is described in State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert den 394 US 951 *127 (1969), and in State v. Olson, 1 Or App 380 , 462 P2d 681 (1969). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State v. Olson
neutral
2 sentences1970This rule is described in State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert den 394 US 951 *127 (1969), and in State v. Olson, 1 Or App 380 , 462 P2d 681 (1969). 1970This rule is described in State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert den 394 US 951 *127 (1969), and in State v. Olson, 1 Or App 380 , 462 P2d 681 (1969). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Abel v. United States
green
2 sentences1970In Abel v. United States, 362 US 217 , 80 S Ct 683 , 4 L Ed 2d 668 (1960), the Supreme Court said at 238: “* * * When an article subject to lawful seizure properly comes into an officer’s possession in the course of a lawful search it would be entirely without reason to say that he must return it because it was not one of the things it was his business to look for. * * *” Defendant next contends that in executing the warrant the police violated the knock and announce rule. 1970In Abel v. United States, 362 US 217 , 80 S Ct 683 , 4 L Ed 2d 668 (1960), the Supreme Court said at 238: “* * * When an article subject to lawful seizure properly comes into an officer’s possession in the course of a lawful search it would be entirely without reason to say that he must return it because it was not one of the things it was his business to look for. * * *” Defendant next contends that in executing the warrant the police violated the knock and announce rule. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Jackson v. Texas
green
1 sentence1970In People v. Maddox, 46 Cal 2d 301, 306, 294 P2d 6, 9 , cert den 352 US 858 , 1 L Ed 2d 65 , 77 S Ct 81 (1956), the California court found that strict compliance with the knock and announce rule might not always be required. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Dunne v. Schneckloth
green
1 sentence1970In People v. Maddox, 46 Cal 2d 301, 306, 294 P2d 6, 9 , cert den 352 US 858 , 1 L Ed 2d 65 , 77 S Ct 81 (1956), the California court found that strict compliance with the knock and announce rule might not always be required. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp.
green
1 sentence1970In People v. Maddox, 46 Cal 2d 301, 306, 294 P2d 6, 9 , cert den 352 US 858 , 1 L Ed 2d 65 , 77 S Ct 81 (1956), the California court found that strict compliance with the knock and announce rule might not always be required. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.