knock and announce rule in California

2016The Error Was Harmless Because Even If a Knock-notice Violation Occurred, It Would Not Have Resulted in Suppression of Evidence (the Only Remedy Requested by Defendant) Defendant contends the seized evidence must be excluded because the police entered ‘“his apartment immediately after announcing their presence,” thereby giving him no time ‘“to respond when they knocked on his door [and] depriving him of his right to withhold consent to the search, which he would not have given.” He acknowledges that, in “most cases, a knock-and-announce violation does not require the application of the exclusi

2010(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [ 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 56 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 ] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend, may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim’s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a c

2016Second, he argues the court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on whether the officers violated the knock- and-announce rule, which requires police to knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable time before entering a dwelling, absent exigent circumstances. (§ 1531; see People v. Abdon (1972) 30 Cal.App.3d 972, 976-977 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 879 ].) Third, citing Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, 114 [164 F.Ed.2d 208, 126 S.Ct. 1515 ] (Randolph), defendant argues the exclusionary rule is the proper remedy here because the officers’ alleged violation of the knock-notice requi

2016Second, he argues the court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on whether the officers violated the knock- and-announce rule, which requires police to knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable time before entering a dwelling, absent exigent circumstances. (§ 1531; see People v. Abdon (1972) 30 Cal.App.3d 972, 976-977 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 879 ].) Third, citing Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, 114 [164 F.Ed.2d 208, 126 S.Ct. 1515 ] (Randolph), defendant argues the exclusionary rule is the proper remedy here because the officers’ alleged violation of the knock-notice requi

2016Second, he argues the court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on whether the officers violated the knock- and-announce rule, which requires police to knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable time before entering a dwelling, absent exigent circumstances. (§ 1531; see People v. Abdon (1972) 30 Cal.App.3d 972, 976-977 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 879 ].) Third, citing Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, 114 [164 F.Ed.2d 208, 126 S.Ct. 1515 ] (Randolph), defendant argues the exclusionary rule is the proper remedy here because the officers’ alleged violation of the knock-notice requi

2016Second, he argues the court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on whether the officers violated the knock- and-announce rule, which requires police to knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable time before entering a dwelling, absent exigent circumstances. (§ 1531; see People v. Abdon (1972) 30 Cal.App.3d 972, 976-977 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 879 ].) Third, citing Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, 114 [164 F.Ed.2d 208, 126 S.Ct. 1515 ] (Randolph), defendant argues the exclusionary rule is the proper remedy here because the officers’ alleged violation of the knock-notice requi

2016(Duke v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 314, 321-322 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 461 P.2d 628 ] (Duke) [statutory knock-notice]; People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 223, 234-235 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] (De La Plane) [statutory knock-notice], disapproved on another point in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 , 39, fn. 25 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Illegally Obtained Evidence, § 345, p. 1207 [“knock-notice rule”].) 4 *863 This rule requires the police to knock on the door, announce their identity and purpose, and wait a reasonable perio

2016(Duke v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 314, 321-322 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 461 P.2d 628 ] (Duke) [statutory knock-notice]; People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 223, 234-235 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] (De La Plane) [statutory knock-notice], disapproved on another point in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 , 39, fn. 25 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Illegally Obtained Evidence, § 345, p. 1207 [“knock-notice rule”].) 4 *863 This rule requires the police to knock on the door, announce their identity and purpose, and wait a reasonable perio

2016(Duke v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 314, 321-322 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 461 P.2d 628 ] (Duke) [statutory knock-notice]; People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 223, 234-235 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] (De La Plane) [statutory knock-notice], disapproved on another point in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 , 39, fn. 25 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Illegally Obtained Evidence, § 345, p. 1207 [“knock-notice rule”].) 4 *863 This rule requires the police to knock on the door, announce their identity and purpose, and wait a reasonable perio

2016(Duke v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 314, 321-322 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 461 P.2d 628 ] (Duke) [statutory knock-notice]; People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 223, 234-235 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] (De La Plane) [statutory knock-notice], disapproved on another point in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 , 39, fn. 25 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Illegally Obtained Evidence, § 345, p. 1207 [“knock-notice rule”].) 4 *863 This rule requires the police to knock on the door, announce their identity and purpose, and wait a reasonable perio

2016Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 639-640 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 115 ] [court’s exclusion of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion].) He argues that, “if this court believes [the] facts are insufficient to establish a knock-and-announce violation, the court should order a new suppression hearing to fill in the gaps in testimony.” The Attorney General counters the “record demonstrates substantial compliance with the knock-notice procedure” and that, even if the court’s evidentiary “ruling was erroneous, it was harmless under any standard.” At the suppression hearing, d

2016Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 639-640 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 115 ] [court’s exclusion of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion].) He argues that, “if this court believes [the] facts are insufficient to establish a knock-and-announce violation, the court should order a new suppression hearing to fill in the gaps in testimony.” The Attorney General counters the “record demonstrates substantial compliance with the knock-notice procedure” and that, even if the court’s evidentiary “ruling was erroneous, it was harmless under any standard.” At the suppression hearing, d

2010(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [ 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 56 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 ] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend, may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim’s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a c

2010(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [ 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 56 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 ] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend, may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim’s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a c

2010(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [ 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 56 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 ] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend, may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim’s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a c

2010(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [ 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 56 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 ] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend, may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim’s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a c

2010(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [ 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 56 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 ] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend, may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim’s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a c

2010(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532-534 [ 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]; accord, People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767-768 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) Such confinement is an injury, not a form of prejudice—just like an entry into the home in violation of the knock-and-announce rule (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 594-596 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 56 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 ] [a violation of the knock-and-announce rule of the 4th Amend, may support a civil action for deprivation of the victim’s civil rights but does not entitle the victim to suppression of the evidence in a c

2006I, § 28, subd. (d); In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 561-562 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 28 P.3d 239 ]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 885-890 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) In Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. _ [ 126 S.Ct. 2159 ], the United States Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in a search of the defendant’s home pursuant to a validly issued search warrant notwithstanding the officers’ violation of the knock-and-announce rule.

2006I, § 28, subd. (d); In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 561-562 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 28 P.3d 239 ]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 885-890 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) In Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. _ [ 126 S.Ct. 2159 ], the United States Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in a search of the defendant’s home pursuant to a validly issued search warrant notwithstanding the officers’ violation of the knock-and-announce rule.

2006Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable."].) [3] In People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 the Supreme Court held a police officer who stops a motorist for a traffic violation may detain the motorist for as long as is reasonably necessary for the officer to perform the duties required by the stop. ( Id. at p. 584, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 .) Investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop are permissible so long as they do

2006Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable."].) [3] In People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 the Supreme Court held a police officer who stops a motorist for a traffic violation may detain the motorist for as long as is reasonably necessary for the officer to perform the duties required by the stop. ( Id. at p. 584, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 .) Investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop are permissible so long as they do

2006Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable."].) [3] In People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 the Supreme Court held a police officer who stops a motorist for a traffic violation may detain the motorist for as long as is reasonably necessary for the officer to perform the duties required by the stop. ( Id. at p. 584, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 .) Investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop are permissible so long as they do

2006Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”].) In People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577 , the Supreme Court held a police officer who stops a motorist for a traffic violation may detain the motorist for as long as is reasonably necessary for the officer to perform the duties required by the stop.

2006I, § 28, subd. (d); In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 561-562 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 28 P.3d 239 ]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 885-890 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) In Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. _ [ 126 S.Ct. 2159 ], the United States Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in a search of the defendant’s home pursuant to a validly issued search warrant notwithstanding the officers’ violation of the knock-and-announce rule.

2006I, § 28, subd. (d); In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 561-562 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 28 P.3d 239 ]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 885-890 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) In Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. _ [ 126 S.Ct. 2159 ], the United States Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in a search of the defendant’s home pursuant to a validly issued search warrant notwithstanding the officers’ violation of the knock-and-announce rule.