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30 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hudson v. Michigangreen2 sentences2017Nichols at 794 ; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596-97 (2006) (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment's knock-and-announce rule). 2012The knock and announce rule serves the interests of protecting life and limb “because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident”; and protection of property because it “gives individuals ‘the opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible entry.’” (Citation omitted.) Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 . | 4 | 8 |
State v. Furrygreen2 sentences1995In State v. Furry (1971), 31 Ohio App.2d 107, 113 , 60 O.O.2d 196, 199 , 286 N.E.2d 301, 305 , this court held a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement under R.C. 2935.12 violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1995In State v. Furry (1971), 31 Ohio App.2d 107, 113 , 60 O.O.2d 196, 199 , 286 N.E.2d 301, 305 , this court held a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement under R.C. 2935.12 violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. | 3 | 3 |
Wilson v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2017The United States Supreme Court has explained that by virtue of its place in the common law before and during the founding era, the knock-and-announce principle “is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 934 . 2016No. 06CA3055, 2007-Ohio-2717, ¶ 24 , quoting Wilson, supra, at 936 (noting that “the knock and announce requirement has certain recognized exceptions that include the existence of exigent circumstances, which may include an officer’s fear for his physical safety or an officer’s reasonable belief that “evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given’ ”); see also, R.C. 2935.12; R.C. 2933.231(C) (Ohio’s knock and announce statute provides for judicial waiver of the knock and announce requirement if officer safety is a concern, or if such an exigency arises at the time of executio | 2 | 6 |
State v. Ropergreen2 sentences2006In this case, the facts are generally undisputed: a warrant was obtained, the officers subdued a man outside the home, and the officers entered the home without knocking. {¶ 6} The trial court relied on State v. Roper (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 212 , 213 , for the proposition that exigent circumstances, such as destruction of evidence or harm to the officers, may excuse strict adherence to the knock and announce rule. 2004The common law "knock and announce" requirement has also been codified in R.C. 2935.12 (A), which provides in pertinent part that "* * * when executing a search warrant, the peace officer * * * executing the warrant may break down an outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other building if, after notice of his intention to * * * execute the warrant, he is refused admittance * * *." {¶ 12} Nevertheless, the knock and announce requirement is not absolute, however, and may be dispensed with when law enforcement officers are confronted by exigent circumstances: "If it appears that th | 2 | 4 |
Richards v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2000In Richards , the Court determined that in felony drug investigations a no knock entry, wherein the police are justified in dispensing with the knock and announce requirement, may be done where the police have, a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing destruction of evidence. 520 U.S. at 394 , 117 S.Ct. at 1421 . 2000In Richards , the Court determined that in felony drug investigations a no knock entry, wherein the police are justified in dispensing with the knock and announce requirement, may be done where the police have, a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing destruction of evidence. 520 U.S. at 394 , 117 S.Ct. at 1421 . | 2 | 3 |
Miller v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995In Wilson , 514 U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 , the court held as follows: “Our own cases have acknowledged that the common-law principle of announcement is ‘embedded in Anglo-American law,’ Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 [ 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1198 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 1340 ] (1958), but we have never squarely held that this principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. 1995In Wilson , 514 U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 , the court held as follows: “Our own cases have acknowledged that the common-law principle of announcement is ‘embedded in Anglo-American law,’ Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 [ 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1198 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 1340 ] (1958), but we have never squarely held that this principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Defioregreen2 sentences2007Id. at 117, n. 1 . {¶ 15} In the instant case, the state asserts that under the circumstances the police were excused from strict compliance with the knock and announce rule. 2006State v. DeFiore (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 115 , 119 , 411 N.E.2d 837 . {¶ 17} It is well-settled that, "where officers hold a reasonable belief that they are in danger of bodily harm or that suspects are trying to escape or destroy evidence, compliance with the knock-and-announce principle is excused." Gaston v. Toledo (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 66 , 75 , 665 N.E.2d 264 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Vuingreen1 sentence2017See State v. Vuin, 89 Ohio Law Abs. 193, 198-199 , 185 N.E.2d 506 (C.P.1962); State v. Furry, 31 Ohio App.2d 107, 112-113, 117 , 286 N.E.2d 301 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (6th Dist.1971); State v. DeFiore, 64 Ohio App.2d 115, 119 , 411 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist.1979); State v. Valentine, 74 Ohio App.3d 110, 113, 118 , 598 N.E.2d 82 (4th Dist.1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mole (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2017Id; see also State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2016-Ohio-5124 , 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 20 (plurality opinion). {¶ 25} Bembry and Singh advance three arguments in support of more expansive constitutional protection under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment for those who suffer a knock-and- announce violation. 2017Id; see also State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215 , 2016-Ohio-5124 , 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 20 (plurality opinion). {¶ 25} Bembry and Singh advance three arguments in support of more expansive constitutional protection under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment for those who suffer a knock-and- announce violation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Valentinegreen2 sentences2017See State v. Vuin, 89 Ohio Law Abs. 193, 198-199 , 185 N.E.2d 506 (C.P.1962); State v. Furry, 31 Ohio App.2d 107, 112-113, 117 , 286 N.E.2d 301 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (6th Dist.1971); State v. DeFiore, 64 Ohio App.2d 115, 119 , 411 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist.1979); State v. Valentine, 74 Ohio App.3d 110, 113, 118 , 598 N.E.2d 82 (4th Dist.1991). 2017See State v. Vuin, 89 Ohio Law Abs. 193, 198-199 , 185 N.E.2d 506 (C.P.1962); State v. Furry, 31 Ohio App.2d 107, 112-113, 117 , 286 N.E.2d 301 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (6th Dist.1971); State v. DeFiore, 64 Ohio App.2d 115, 119 , 411 N.E.2d 837 (1st Dist.1979); State v. Valentine, 74 Ohio App.3d 110, 113, 118 , 598 N.E.2d 82 (4th Dist.1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2014Id. {¶ 3} Subsequently, on September 10, 2013, Appellant filed a motion entitled “Defendant’s Motion for Resentencing Pursuant to Criminal Rule 47.” Appellant’s motion argued that he was entitled to be re-sentenced, based upon claimed constitutional violations, namely that the search warrant was not executed in a reasonable manner, and also that officers violated the knock and announce rule in conducting a search of his residence. 2014Scioto No. 11CA3441, 2012-Ohio-3747, ¶ 33 (finding that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence based upon law enforcement's alleged violation of the knock and announce rule). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Amundsongreen2 sentences2007See State v. Amundson (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 438 , 670 N.E.2d 1083 . {¶ 24} However, the knock and announce requirement has certain recognized exceptions that include the existence of exigent circumstances, which may include an officer's fear for his physical safety or an officer's reasonable belief that "evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given." Wilson , supra, at 936. 2007See State v. Amundson (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 438 , 670 N.E.2d 1083 . {¶ 24} However, the knock and announce requirement has certain recognized exceptions that include the existence of exigent circumstances, which may include an officer's fear for his physical safety or an officer's reasonable belief that "evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given." Wilson , supra, at 936. | 1 | 1 |
| Alley v. Bettencourtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Banksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rondell Batesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ronald Finchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Drennan v. Security Pacific National Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitt v. Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conner v. Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Edward Mapp, A/K/A Sonny Woodsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Salvatore Ross Agrusagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gaston v. City of Toledo
green
2 sentences2006State v. DeFiore (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 115 , 119 , 411 N.E.2d 837 . {¶ 17} It is well-settled that, "where officers hold a reasonable belief that they are in danger of bodily harm or that suspects are trying to escape or destroy evidence, compliance with the knock-and-announce principle is excused." Gaston v. Toledo (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 66 , 75 , 665 N.E.2d 264 . 2006State v. DeFiore (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 115 , 119 , 411 N.E.2d 837 . {¶ 17} It is well-settled that, "where officers hold a reasonable belief that they are in danger of bodily harm or that suspects are trying to escape or destroy evidence, compliance with the knock-and-announce principle is excused." Gaston v. Toledo (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 66 , 75 , 665 N.E.2d 264 . | 3 | 1995–2006 |
State v. Gilbert, 06ca3055 (5-30-2007)
green
2 sentences2016No. 06CA3055, 2007-Ohio-2717, ¶ 24 , quoting Wilson, supra, at 936 (noting that “the knock and announce requirement has certain recognized exceptions that include the existence of exigent circumstances, which may include an officer’s fear for his physical safety or an officer’s reasonable belief that “evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given’ ”); see also, R.C. 2935.12; R.C. 2933.231(C) (Ohio’s knock and announce statute provides for judicial waiver of the knock and announce requirement if officer safety is a concern, or if such an exigency arises at the time of executio 2008The appellate court found that, "[b]ased on Hudson , no evidence should have been suppressed due to a violation of the knock-and-announce rule." State v. Marcum , Columbiana App. No. 04 CO 66 , 2006-Ohio-7068 , appeal not allowed, 113 Ohio St.3d 1514 , 2007-Ohio-2208 . 2 {¶ 30} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. Gilbert , Scioto App. No. 06CA3055, 2007-Ohio-2717 , concluded that the defendant's statutory and constitutional rights had been unreasonably violated by the manner in which the search warrant was executed. | 2 | 2008–2016 |
State v. Oliver
green
2 sentences2008State v. Oliver, 112 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2007-Ohio-372 , 860 N.E.2d 1002, ¶ 13 . {¶ 53} It is unnecessary for this court to decide whether under Hudson the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the knock-and-announce rule. 2008State v. Oliver, 112 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2007-Ohio-372 , 860 N.E.2d 1002, ¶ 13 . {¶ 53} It is unnecessary for this court to decide whether under Hudson the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the knock-and-announce rule. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Arvil Hall v. Jon Shipley, Don Boles, Phillip Nall, and Sgt. Jack Mansfield
green
2 sentences2006See State v. Furry (1971), 31 Ohio App.2d 107 , 113 , 286 N.E.2d 301 ; Hall v. Shipley (C.A.6, 1991), 932 F.2d 1147 , 1151 . 1995See Furry, 31 Ohio App.2d at 113 , 60 O.O.2d at 199 , 286 N.E.2d at 305 ; Hall, 932 F.2d at 1151 . | 2 | 1995–2006 |
Ker v. California
green
2 sentences1995See United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 , 1382 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 , 102 S.Ct. 133 , 70 L.Ed.2d 112 (1981) (possibility of destruction of drugs plus other significant facts); cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (upheld search when officers suspected drugs could easily be destroyed and that Ker may have been expecting police as they had chased him earlier in the day).” In the leading case of People v. Gastelo (1967), 67 Cal.2d 586, 588 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 12 , 432 P.2d 706, 708 , the court specifically rejected the “blanket rule” us 1995See United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 , 1382 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 , 102 S.Ct. 133 , 70 L.Ed.2d 112 (1981) (possibility of destruction of drugs plus other significant facts); cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (upheld search when officers suspected drugs could easily be destroyed and that Ker may have been expecting police as they had chased him earlier in the day).” In the leading case of People v. Gastelo (1967), 67 Cal.2d 586, 588 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 12 , 432 P.2d 706, 708 , the court specifically rejected the “blanket rule” us | 2 | 1983–1995 |
Payton v. New York
green
2 sentences2017Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); see also State v. Carr, 2d Dist. 2017Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); see also State v. Carr, 2d Dist. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
City of Dayton v. Erickson
green
1 sentence2017As a state court of appeals, this court is powerless to affect any change to these established principles of Fourth Amendment law. {¶ 26} Thus, relying on Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St. 3d 3 (1996), the majority accepts the idea that even if Mr. Bello could prove that Officer Bogantz stopped him because of his race, its hands would be tied under current Fourth Amendment law to correct this wrong. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Arnold v. City of Cleveland
green
2 sentences2017We are, of course, bound to treat the exclusionary rule developed in Weeks and Mapp v. Ohio and the knock- and-announce principle developed in Wilson and Hudson as “a floor below which state court decisions may not fall.” Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35 , 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus. 2017We are, of course, bound to treat the exclusionary rule developed in Weeks and Mapp v. Ohio and the knock- and-announce principle developed in Wilson and Hudson as “a floor below which state court decisions may not fall.” Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35 , 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Robinette
green
2 sentences2017For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded to “harmonize our interpretation of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment,” Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 239 , 685 N.E.2d 762 , with regard to the appropriate remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce principle as codified in R.C. 2935.12. 14 January Term, 2017 CONCLUSION {¶ 31} Accordingly, we hold that once a warrant has been issued, the exclusionary rule is not the appropriate remedy under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution for a violation of R.C. 2935.12. 2017For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded to “harmonize our interpretation of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment,” Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 239 , 685 N.E.2d 762 , with regard to the appropriate remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce principle as codified in R.C. 2935.12. 14 January Term, 2017 CONCLUSION {¶ 31} Accordingly, we hold that once a warrant has been issued, the exclusionary rule is not the appropriate remedy under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution for a violation of R.C. 2935.12. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences2013State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 . {¶32} In the case sub judice, appellant filed his pro se motion to suppress based on the knock and announce rule on June 13, 2012, well over a year after the first pre- trial in this matter. 2013State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 . {¶32} In the case sub judice, appellant filed his pro se motion to suppress based on the knock and announce rule on June 13, 2012, well over a year after the first pre- trial in this matter. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Kimble, Unpublished Decision (12-22-2006)
neutral
1 sentence2008No. 2005-T-0086, 2006-Ohio-6863 , 2006 WL 3772223 , ¶ 65. {¶ 50} The Eleventh District Court of Appeals in State v. Kimble interpreted Hudson to reject a per se exclusion of evidence from a search when the knock- and-announce rule is violated: “The knock-and-announce rule fashioned to protect human life, dignity and personal property is not so expansive that in the absence of a proper entry, the seized evidence must always be excluded. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Burnside
green
1 sentence2008Id. {¶ 46} Appellant has argued that there was an absence of evidence of a risk of serious physical harm to officers executing the search warrant at appellant’s apartment if the knock-and-announce rule were not waived. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Marcum, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2006)
green
1 sentence2008The appellate court found that, "[b]ased on Hudson , no evidence should have been suppressed due to a violation of the knock-and-announce rule." State v. Marcum , Columbiana App. No. 04 CO 66 , 2006-Ohio-7068 , appeal not allowed, 113 Ohio St.3d 1514 , 2007-Ohio-2208 . 2 {¶ 30} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. Gilbert , Scioto App. No. 06CA3055, 2007-Ohio-2717 , concluded that the defendant's statutory and constitutional rights had been unreasonably violated by the manner in which the search warrant was executed. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Lam, 21787 (10-19-2007)
neutral
1 sentence2008In May 2007, The Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of Marcum. 3 The Second District Court of Appeals found no knock and announce violation in State v. Lam , Montgomery App. No. 21787, 2007-Ohio-5664 , but stated that the assigned error concerning the decision to overrule appellant's motion to suppress for an alleged violation of the knock and announce rule is "properly rejected under the rule of Hudson v. Michigan." *Page 1 | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Nardone v. United States green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Wilmoth
green
1 sentence2007See: State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1 ; State v. Wilmoth (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 251 ; State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.3d 65 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Thompson
green
1 sentence2007See: State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1 ; State v. Wilmoth (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 251 ; State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.3d 65 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Hartke
green
1 sentence2007See: State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1 ; State v. Wilmoth (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 251 ; State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.3d 65 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Segura v. United States
green
2 sentences2007In considering whether evidence seized after a violation of the knock and announce rule occurred, the Court reasoned that "[w]hether the preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house." Id. at 2164 ; citing Segura v. United States (1984), 468 U.S. 796 , 815 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 . {¶ 37} The Hudson Court also explained the interests served by the knock and announce rule, which primarily include "protection of life and *Page 21 limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence i 2007In considering whether evidence seized after a violation of the knock and announce rule occurred, the Court reasoned that "[w]hether the preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house." Id. at 2164 ; citing Segura v. United States (1984), 468 U.S. 796 , 815 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 . {¶ 37} The Hudson Court also explained the interests served by the knock and announce rule, which primarily include "protection of life and *Page 21 limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence i | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Ornelas v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Featherstone green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Long green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Klein green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Retherford green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Taylor green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Baker green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Charles F. Leahy v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Gastelo green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Gassner green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Kane, Daniel Joseph green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| cluster 365589 green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Davis v. California green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Moore v. Florida green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Boggs v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Bartlett v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.