object requirement in Louisiana

2014The district court pretermitted consideration of these constitutional challenges after finding on remand that Act 1 violated the single object rule. 9 In oral reasons for judgment, the district court indicated it reconsidered its prior ruling declaring Act 1 unconstitutional in light of this court’s decision in Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State of Louisiana, 13-0120, 13-0232, 13-0350 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So. 3d 1033 (the “Act 2 case”), which found Act 2, relating to school choice, did not violate the single object requirement in La.

2014R.S. 17:443 violates the due process clause of Article I, § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution and 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. jinIn oral reasons for judgment, the district court indicated it reconsidered its pri- or ruling declaring Act 1 unconstitutional in light of this court’s decision in Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State of Louisiana, 13-0120, 13-0232, 13-0350 (La.5/7/13), 118 So.3d 1033 (the “Act 2 case”), which found Act 2, relating to school choice, did not violate the single object requirement in La.

1929In State v. Williams, 111 La. 179 , 35 So. 505 , this court said: "It is well settled that, where a party is surprised by the unexpected testimony of his witness, he may be permitted to interrogate as to previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony given; the object being to test the recollection of the witness, and lead him, if mistaken, to review what he has said." Bill 7.

1929In State v. Williams, 111 La. 179 , 35 So. 505 , this court said: "It is well settled that, where a party is surprised by the unexpected testimony of his witness, he may be permitted to interrogate as to previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony given; the object being to test the recollection of the witness, and lead him, if mistaken, to review what he has said." Bill 7.

2024Dillion, 23-0453, 11 “A comparator is any of various instruments for comparing a measured property of an object with a standard.” Hamdalla, 12-1413, p. 19, 126 So.3d at 629 .

2024In the excessive sentence review context, a comparator includes “factors such as eligibility for parole, probation, and suspension of sentence.” Id. 10 p. 3, 377 So.3d at 823.

2021App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 498, 501 , citing Indus.

2018Pipe, Inc., 12-1348, p. 8, 100 So.3d at 901 .

2015Boudreaux v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 454 So.2d 135, 137 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), writ denied, 462 So.2d 1245 (La.1985) for the proposition that a compromise is a defense and thus is not properly the object of an exception of no right of action.

2012Courts have established that while relevance in discovery is broader than that required for admissibility at trial, “the object of inquiry must have some evidentiary value before an order to compel disclosure of otherwise inadmissible material -will issue.” In re Marriage of Kuntz, 05-0172, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/1/06), 929 So.2d 75, 79 .

2005Fox McKeithen, 04-2477(La.), 893 So.2d 715 . [2] FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [3] During the 2004 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature, by joint resolution *717 with a two-thirds majority of both houses, passed 2004 La.

1991The court cited earlier cases indicating that the single object requirement ". . . does not mean that each and every means necessary to accomplish an object in the law must be provided for by a separate act relating to it alone." 14 So.2d at 25 .

1991The court cited earlier cases indicating that the single object requirement ". . . does not mean that each and every means necessary to accomplish an object in the law must be provided for by a separate act relating to it alone." 14 So.2d at 25 .

1989After noting that first degree murder and treason were the only capital offenses remaining after capital punishment had been declared unconstitutional for aggravated kidnapping, the court found that the primary legislative intent was to *1290 provide capital sentencing considerations for first degree murder cases and that the substantive and procedural provisions of the act were not so unrelated as to render their joinder in violation of the "one object" constitutional provision. [1] A violation of the single object requirement of an earlier constitution was found in State v. Peterman, 121 La.

1989After noting that first degree murder and treason were the only capital offenses remaining after capital punishment had been declared unconstitutional for aggravated kidnapping, the court found that the primary legislative intent was to *1290 provide capital sentencing considerations for first degree murder cases and that the substantive and procedural provisions of the act were not so unrelated as to render their joinder in violation of the "one object" constitutional provision. [1] A violation of the single object requirement of an earlier constitution was found in State v. Peterman, 121 La.

1975LeSage v. Union Producing Co., 249 La. 42 , 184 So.2d 727 ." It is immaterial that defendant may be able to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action.

1975LeSage v. Union Producing Co., 249 La. 42 , 184 So.2d 727 ." It is immaterial that defendant may be able to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action.

1966The object of such clause is to cover the liability of the operator of the car as unnamed assured, and to protect any person so injured by giving him a cause of action against the insurer for injuries deemed by law to have been caused by the operation of the car * * Casano v. Cook (La.App., 4 Cir., 1963), 157 So.2d 616 : “The cases are legion that an insurance policy, like any other contract, is subject to the general rules of the Civil Code for interpretation of agreements.

1960An employee, to be an `additional assured' within the meaning of the omnibus clause, must be one who is using his employer's automobile at the time of the accident, with permission of his employer.' Huddy Cyc. of Automobile Law, 9th Ed., vol. 13-14, p. 405 (Italics ours.)" Again in Dominguez v. American Casualty Co., 46 So.2d at page 747 , we find the Supreme Court restating its position as follows: "A study of the jurisprudence of the various states of this nation on this subject of `Omnibus Clause cases' quickly shows that the decisions are both numerous and far from uniform as to rules foll

1947An employee, to be an ‘additional assured’ within the meaning of the omnibus clause, must be one who is using his employer’s automobile at the time of the accident, with permission of his employer.” See, also, Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849 , 181 So. 191 .

1947An employee, to be an ‘additional assured’ within the meaning of the omnibus clause, must be one who is using his employer’s automobile at the time of the accident, with permission of his employer.” See, also, Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849 , 181 So. 191 .

1942The effect of the Perkins and Reid cases is that a district judge will not be allowed to sit in the trial of a cause where there is a possibility that his judgment will be affected by reason of his connection with the case prior-to his election to the bench, while the basis for the motion of recusation in the Tate case [ 185 La. 1006 , 171 So. 111 ], upon which the court rested its decision, was that “the district attorney had a personal interest adverse to that of the prosecution, in that it was his legal duty to protect the innocent as well as to prosecute the guilty, which he could not do b

1934Co., 131 La. 575 , 59 So. 994 .

1934Co., 131 La. 575 , 59 So. 994 .

1931In the case of State v. Nash, 169 La. 947 , 126 So. 434, 435 , after referring to article 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court said: “It is also well settled that, where a party is bona fide surprised at the unexpected testimony of the witness whom he has voluntarily called, he may be'permitted to interrogate him as to his previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony given, the object being to test the witness’ recollection,' and lead him, if mistaken,' to review whát he has said.

1931In the case of State v. Nash, 169 La. 947 , 126 So. 434, 435 , after referring to article 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court said: “It is also well settled that, where a party is bona fide surprised at the unexpected testimony of the witness whom he has voluntarily called, he may be'permitted to interrogate him as to his previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony given, the object being to test the witness’ recollection,' and lead him, if mistaken,' to review whát he has said.

1925See further, as to the object of the rule, Rex v. Court, 7 Car. & P. 486, per Littledale, J.; People v. Ward, 15 Wend. 231 .’ Nor from the *619 fact that in Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 621 (40:1096), mention was made of the circumstance that the statement of the accused was a mere denial of guilt accompanied with exculpatory explanations, does the decision in that case conflict with the principle we have just stated.

1917In Gaines v. Chew, 2 Howard, 619 (642, 643), the Supreme Court of the United States said: “The object of the rule against multifariousness is to protect a defendant from unnecessary expense; but it would be a great perversion of that rule, if it were to impose upon the plaintiffs and all the other defendants two suits instead of one.” Where several taxpayers joined in one suit against the assessor to compel him to reduce the assessments against the plaintiffs in conformity with an ordinance of the Police Jury, the exception was made that “their petition shows that relators are the owners of se

1917In Gaines v. Chew, 2 Howard, 619 (642, 643), the Supreme Court of the United States said: “The object of the rule against multifariousness is to protect a defendant from unnecessary expense; but it would be a great perversion of that rule, if it were to impose upon the plaintiffs and all the other defendants two suits instead of one.” Where several taxpayers joined in one suit against the assessor to compel him to reduce the assessments against the plaintiffs in conformity with an ordinance of the Police Jury, the exception was made that “their petition shows that relators are the owners of se

1917In Madere v. Alexander, 126 La., 342 , a number of persons joined as plaintiffs to sue the defendant for slander uttered on the same occasion.

1914It is no excuse that an accident was not likely to occur in the way that it did, or that the chances of eroploySs having any occasion to stand on the board were remote, “because the object of the requirement that employers shall furnish appliances and keep them safe is to protect workmen against the chance ■or risk of being injured by defects which care or prudence can remedy or avoid.” Smith v. Minden Lumber Co., 114 La. 1041 , 38 South. 821 . [2] The alternative defense that the danger was pbvious, and therefore the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury, is not well founded.

1914The rule is that; “Where a party is bona fide surprised at the unexpected testimony of his witness, he may be permitted to interrogate him as to previous declarations, inconsistent with the testimony given; _ the object being to test the witness’ recollection and lead him, if mistaken, to review what he has said.” State v. Williams, 111 La. 180 , 35 South. 505 ; State v. Stephens, 116 La. 40 , 40 South. 523 .