object standard in California

2020(See, e.g., People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620-621 [considering “the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts” in determining whether the possessor of an item commonly used for a nonviolent purpose (i.e., table leg, baseball bat) intended to “use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose”].) The instruction the court gave here, telling the jurors that in order to convict defendant they must find he possessed counterfeiting equipment with a criminal intent, while not

2018The Legislature thus decrees as criminal the possession of ordinarily harmless objects when the circumstances of possession demonstrate an immediate atmosphere of danger ." ( Id. at p. 621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 , italics added.) Included among these circumstances, the court explained, are "the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicat [ing] that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose." ( Id. at pp. 620-621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 .) 3 In Fannin , which illus

2018(Grubb, at pp. 620– 621.) While the Grubb court acknowledged the Legislature’s intent to outlaw instruments ordinarily used for unlawful purposes, it also concluded that “the Legislature sought … to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use 3 Former Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(1) prohibited possession of “any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack,

1965The terms of the statute gain content and definition by reference to this purpose. [6] Indeed, as we said in People v. McCaughan, supra, 49 Cal.2d 409, 414 , "A statute will be upheld if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to ... its legislative history or purpose." [4c] The Legislature here sought to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents; the Legislature sought likewise to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object

1964The line may be founded on a mistake. [Citation.]” (Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, at pp. 707-708.) The object of the rule confirming occupation according to an agreed line “is to secure repose, to prevent strife and disputes concerning boundaries, and make titles permanent and stable”; and the rule not only binds the parties, but also their successors by subsequent conveyances. 9 (Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 482 [ 95 P. 888 ]; Martin v. Lopes, 28 Cal.2d 618, 623 [ 170 P.2d 881 ].) It is also established by the authorities that the line so agreed upon becomes in legal effect the

1964The line may be founded on a mistake. [Citation.]” (Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, at pp. 707-708.) The object of the rule confirming occupation according to an agreed line “is to secure repose, to prevent strife and disputes concerning boundaries, and make titles permanent and stable”; and the rule not only binds the parties, but also their successors by subsequent conveyances. 9 (Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 482 [ 95 P. 888 ]; Martin v. Lopes, 28 Cal.2d 618, 623 [ 170 P.2d 881 ].) It is also established by the authorities that the line so agreed upon becomes in legal effect the

1943It has been held, however, that the principal object of the rule requiring corroboration is to prevent collusion; and where it is clear that there is no collusion, and the defendant’s testimony, though conflicting with that of plaintiff in many of its details, in the more important matters was corroborative of the plaintiff’s testimony, which was also corroborated in certain respects by other testimony, the corroboration is sufficient (Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal. 183 [ 48 P. 730 , 51 P. 183 ]; Andrews v. Andrews, 120 Cal. 184 [52 P. 298]; McMullin v. McMullin, 140 Cal. 112, 119 [ 73 P. 808 ]).

1943It has been held, however, that the principal object of the rule requiring corroboration is to prevent collusion; and where it is clear that there is no collusion, and the defendant’s testimony, though conflicting with that of plaintiff in many of its details, in the more important matters was corroborative of the plaintiff’s testimony, which was also corroborated in certain respects by other testimony, the corroboration is sufficient (Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal. 183 [ 48 P. 730 , 51 P. 183 ]; Andrews v. Andrews, 120 Cal. 184 [52 P. 298]; McMullin v. McMullin, 140 Cal. 112, 119 [ 73 P. 808 ]).

2016It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.” (CALCRIM No. 3160.) “[A]n item commonly used for a nonviolent purpose, such as a baseball bat or a table leg, could qualify as a [dangerous or deadly weapon] ... only ‘when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicate[ ] that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose.’ ” (People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 624 .) Additionally, “[w]hen an instrument is capable of being used in

2016Former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1), prohibited, in pertinent part, the possession of “any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a . . . billy.” The statute was intended to prohibit not only objects specifically designed as weapons, but also everyday objects that could be used as weapons. “[W]e have long recognized 7 that section 12020 was enacted not only ‘to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents,’ but also ‘to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the p

2018The Legislature thus decrees as criminal the possession of ordinarily harmless objects when the circumstances of possession demonstrate an immediate atmosphere of danger ." ( Id. at p. 621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 , italics added.) Included among these circumstances, the court explained, are "the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicat [ing] that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose." ( Id. at pp. 620-621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 .) 3 In Fannin , which illus

2018The Legislature thus decrees as criminal the possession of ordinarily harmless objects when the circumstances of possession demonstrate an immediate atmosphere of danger ." ( Id. at p. 621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 , italics added.) Included among these circumstances, the court explained, are "the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicat [ing] that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose." ( Id. at pp. 620-621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 .) 3 In Fannin , which illus

2019The People have provided no authority establishing that defendant's failure to testify divested him of his fundamental right to maintain innocence as the objective of his defense. 9 Authorities discussing the "reasonableness" of counsel's defense strategy given the state of the evidence miss the mark. 10 (See, e.g., People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701 , 728-729, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 [counsel not ineffective for pursuing lack of premeditation instead of innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence].) Whether defendant has been deprived of his fundamental right to maintain innoc

2019The People have provided no authority establishing that defendant's failure to testify divested him of his fundamental right to maintain innocence as the objective of his defense. 9 Authorities discussing the "reasonableness" of counsel's defense strategy given the state of the evidence miss the mark. 10 (See, e.g., People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701 , 728-729, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 [counsel not ineffective for pursuing lack of premeditation instead of innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence].) Whether defendant has been deprived of his fundamental right to maintain innoc

1964The line may be founded on a mistake. [Citation.]” (Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, at pp. 707-708.) The object of the rule confirming occupation according to an agreed line “is to secure repose, to prevent strife and disputes concerning boundaries, and make titles permanent and stable”; and the rule not only binds the parties, but also their successors by subsequent conveyances. 9 (Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 482 [ 95 P. 888 ]; Martin v. Lopes, 28 Cal.2d 618, 623 [ 170 P.2d 881 ].) It is also established by the authorities that the line so agreed upon becomes in legal effect the

1964The line may be founded on a mistake. [Citation.]” (Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, at pp. 707-708.) The object of the rule confirming occupation according to an agreed line “is to secure repose, to prevent strife and disputes concerning boundaries, and make titles permanent and stable”; and the rule not only binds the parties, but also their successors by subsequent conveyances. 9 (Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 482 [ 95 P. 888 ]; Martin v. Lopes, 28 Cal.2d 618, 623 [ 170 P.2d 881 ].) It is also established by the authorities that the line so agreed upon becomes in legal effect the

2021Consider also (the destination of the defendant[,] the alteration of the object from standard form[,]) and other facts, if any.” According to the accompanying bench notes, this instruction should be given “only if the object was not designed solely for use as a stabbing weapon but may have innocent uses.” (Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2501 (2020) p. 360.) We will refer to this below as the knowledge instruction. 4 In the absence of a specific intent requirement, section 21310 has been criticized as “stupendously broad” (People v. Hester (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 630 , 640 (Hester) (conc. opn. of Wil

2010(See People v. King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 622 ; People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 328 .) A Senate Judiciary Committee analysis includes an illuminating set of comments on the newly proposed definition: "(a) Emergence of a new type of metal knuckles "Recently a number of violent crimes have been committed in which a heretofore unknown weapon has been used.

2019The People have provided no authority establishing that defendant's failure to testify divested him of his fundamental right to maintain innocence as the objective of his defense. 9 Authorities discussing the "reasonableness" of counsel's defense strategy given the state of the evidence miss the mark. 10 (See, e.g., People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701 , 728-729, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 [counsel not ineffective for pursuing lack of premeditation instead of innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence].) Whether defendant has been deprived of his fundamental right to maintain innoc

2019The People have provided no authority establishing that defendant's failure to testify divested him of his fundamental right to maintain innocence as the objective of his defense. 9 Authorities discussing the "reasonableness" of counsel's defense strategy given the state of the evidence miss the mark. 10 (See, e.g., People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701 , 728-729, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 [counsel not ineffective for pursuing lack of premeditation instead of innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence].) Whether defendant has been deprived of his fundamental right to maintain innoc

2018(Grubb, at pp. 620– 621.) While the Grubb court acknowledged the Legislature’s intent to outlaw instruments ordinarily used for unlawful purposes, it also concluded that “the Legislature sought … to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use 3 Former Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(1) prohibited possession of “any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack,

2016Former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1), prohibited, in pertinent part, the possession of “any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a . . . billy.” The statute was intended to prohibit not only objects specifically designed as weapons, but also everyday objects that could be used as weapons. “[W]e have long recognized 7 that section 12020 was enacted not only ‘to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents,’ but also ‘to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the p

1999It is primarily designed for thrusting or stabbing. . . .’ ” {Id. at p. 719.) However, by enacting section 12020(a), the Mowatt court noted, the Legislature “ ‘sought to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents; the Legislature sought likewise to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose. . . .’ ” (Mowatt

1999While the case law definition was broad enough to include ordinary knives with stabbing capability, the Legislature’s formulation tracked the technical definition of dirks and daggers as stabbing weapons distinct from knives, which are cutting tools that may also be used as weapons.” (Id. at pp. 718-719, fns. omitted.) The Mowatt court noted that the 1993 definition of dirk or dagger is consistent with “ ‘the long-held distinction between weapons that are inherently deadly or dangerous and those that are deadly or dangerous based only on the facts of the particular occasion in question.’ [Cita

1999It is primarily designed for thrusting or stabbing. . . .’ ” {Id. at p. 719.) However, by enacting section 12020(a), the Mowatt court noted, the Legislature “ ‘sought to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents; the Legislature sought likewise to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose. . . .’ ” (Mowatt

1999It is primarily designed for thrusting or stabbing. . . .’ ” {Id. at p. 719.) However, by enacting section 12020(a), the Mowatt court noted, the Legislature “ ‘sought to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents; the Legislature sought likewise to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose. . . .’ ” (Mowatt

1928A. 1918B, 415, 167 Pac. 394 ]: “It is settled by a long line of decisions of this court that the ques *219 tion of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings cannot be considered on appeal from a judgment where the bill of exceptions relied on contains no specification of insufficiency of the evidence.” “The object of the rule requiring these specifications,” it is said in Swift v. Occidental Mining & Petroleum Co., 141 Cal. 161, 168 [ 74 Pac. 700, 702 ]; “is first to shorten the statement of the evidence by excluding everything irrelevant to the specified fact; and, second, to no

1928A. 1918B, 415, 167 Pac. 394 ]: “It is settled by a long line of decisions of this court that the ques *219 tion of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings cannot be considered on appeal from a judgment where the bill of exceptions relied on contains no specification of insufficiency of the evidence.” “The object of the rule requiring these specifications,” it is said in Swift v. Occidental Mining & Petroleum Co., 141 Cal. 161, 168 [ 74 Pac. 700, 702 ]; “is first to shorten the statement of the evidence by excluding everything irrelevant to the specified fact; and, second, to no

2021(In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165 ; see In re Andrew S. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 536, 545, 547-548 (Andrew S.) [father’s initial statement he might “have Indian ancestry on his father’s side” was sufficient to trigger further inquiry].) The parties also agree DSS made some effort to comply with these requirements, including sending notices to the identified Indian tribes and telephoning father to obtain Indian ancestry information.