object inquiry in Pennsylvania

2021Greenwood Brief at 29-30 (citing Downs Racing v. Commonwealth, 196 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2018) (declining to adopt the true object test to ascertain whether royalty [J-21-2021] - 12 payments associated with video poker games are intellectual property exempt from sales taxes); Dechert LLP v. Commonwealth, 998 A.2d 575 (Pa. 2010) (refusing to adopt the essence of the transaction test to determine if prepackaged software sold to consumers is subject to sales and use tax)).

2021Greenwood Brief at 29-30 (citing Downs Racing v. Commonwealth, 196 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2018) (declining to adopt the true object test to ascertain whether royalty [J-21-2021] - 12 payments associated with video poker games are intellectual property exempt from sales taxes); Dechert LLP v. Commonwealth, 998 A.2d 575 (Pa. 2010) (refusing to adopt the essence of the transaction test to determine if prepackaged software sold to consumers is subject to sales and use tax)).

1990We agree ... that the defendant ] should be estopped ... from proceeding in the action of ejectment against the plaintiff. 54 Pa. at 371 & 372 (Citation omitted).

1983Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 601 .

1978DISCUSSION This court recognizes the general rule that the object of the inquiry is to ascertain the intent of the testator: Duld Estate, 389 Pa. 108 , 132 A. 2d 247 (1957); Tripp Estate, 402 Pa. 211 , 166 A. 2d 619 (1961).

1978DISCUSSION This court recognizes the general rule that the object of the inquiry is to ascertain the intent of the testator: Duld Estate, 389 Pa. 108 , 132 A. 2d 247 (1957); Tripp Estate, 402 Pa. 211 , 166 A. 2d 619 (1961).

1978DISCUSSION This court recognizes the general rule that the object of the inquiry is to ascertain the intent of the testator: Duld Estate, 389 Pa. 108 , 132 A. 2d 247 (1957); Tripp Estate, 402 Pa. 211 , 166 A. 2d 619 (1961).

1978DISCUSSION This court recognizes the general rule that the object of the inquiry is to ascertain the intent of the testator: Duld Estate, 389 Pa. 108 , 132 A. 2d 247 (1957); Tripp Estate, 402 Pa. 211 , 166 A. 2d 619 (1961).

1978In doing so no canon of construction or extrinsic evidence is apposite when, from the four corners of the will, the court can feel confidence in distributing the estate: Soles Estate, 451 Pa. 568 , 304 A. 2d 97 (1973).

1978In doing so no canon of construction or extrinsic evidence is apposite when, from the four corners of the will, the court can feel confidence in distributing the estate: Soles Estate, 451 Pa. 568 , 304 A. 2d 97 (1973).

1976Id. at 320 , 85 A.2d at 844 .

1976Id. at 320 , 85 A.2d at 844 .

1971Union v. Watkins, 417 Pa. 120, 122 .

1958Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania, Public Utility Commission, supra, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 46, 66 , 112 A. 2d 826 .

1958Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania, Public Utility Commission, supra, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 46, 66 , 112 A. 2d 826 .

1952Co., 17 Pa. Superior Ct. 626, 630 .

1952He also recalled to the jury the doctor’s statement that the “future is very insecure,” and added: “you will remember his picturesque phrase that he is sitting on a keg of dynamite, he may get meningitis.....” The effect of such alarming, but legally inadmissible, testimony on the jury may well be imagined; its introduction into the case, and its repetition in the charge of the court, was unquestionably error which was extremely harmful to defendants, it being firmly established that a mere possibility of future consequences resulting from an accident is not admissible in evidence; the object

1952He also recalled to the jury the doctor’s statement that the “future is very insecure,” and added: “you will remember his picturesque phrase that he is sitting on a keg of dynamite, he may get meningitis.....” The effect of such alarming, but legally inadmissible, testimony on the jury may well be imagined; its introduction into the case, and its repetition in the charge of the court, was unquestionably error which was extremely harmful to defendants, it being firmly established that a mere possibility of future consequences resulting from an accident is not admissible in evidence; the object

1939The object of such an inquiry was relevant, but the mode of proof was objectionable, since it constituted an attempt by oral evidence to insert a clause which properly and ordinarily would have been included in the written agreement: Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320 ; Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579 ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315 ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 458 ; Hoesch v. Freedman, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 503 ; Nelly v. Diskin, 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 .

1939The object of such an inquiry was relevant, but the mode of proof was objectionable, since it constituted an attempt by oral evidence to insert a clause which properly and ordinarily would have been included in the written agreement: Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320 ; Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579 ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315 ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 458 ; Hoesch v. Freedman, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 503 ; Nelly v. Diskin, 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 .

1939The object of such an inquiry was relevant, but the mode of proof was objectionable, since it constituted an attempt by oral evidence to insert a clause which properly and ordinarily would have been included in the written agreement: Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320 ; Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579 ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315 ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 458 ; Hoesch v. Freedman, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 503 ; Nelly v. Diskin, 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 .

1939The object of such an inquiry was relevant, but the mode of proof was objectionable, since it constituted an attempt by oral evidence to insert a clause which properly and ordinarily would have been included in the written agreement: Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320 ; Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579 ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315 ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 458 ; Hoesch v. Freedman, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 503 ; Nelly v. Diskin, 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 .

1939The object of such an inquiry was relevant, but the mode of proof was objectionable, since it constituted an attempt by oral evidence to insert a clause which properly and ordinarily would have been included in the written agreement: Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320 ; Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579 ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315 ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 458 ; Hoesch v. Freedman, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 503 ; Nelly v. Diskin, 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 .

1939The object of such an inquiry was relevant, but the mode of proof was objectionable, since it constituted an attempt by oral evidence to insert a clause which properly and ordinarily would have been included in the written agreement: Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320 ; Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579 ; Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315 ; Murphy v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 458 ; Hoesch v. Freedman, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 503 ; Nelly v. Diskin, 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 .

1938The object of the requirement that a claim shall be reduced to a judgment against the debtor corporation before liability of the shareholders accrues is that it may be established as a valid claim against the party primarily liable and the one who knows the facts and is in a position to interpose a defense, if there be one: John A. Roebling’s Sons Co. of N. Y. et al. v. Federal Storage Battery Car Co. et al., 185 App. Div. 430 , 173 N. Y.

1938The object of the requirement that a claim shall be reduced to a judgment against the debtor corporation before liability of the shareholders accrues is that it may be established as a valid claim against the party primarily liable and the one who knows the facts and is in a position to interpose a defense, if there be one: John A. Roebling’s Sons Co. of N. Y. et al. v. Federal Storage Battery Car Co. et al., 185 App. Div. 430 , 173 N. Y.

1912It was said, by Mr. Justice Mitchell, in McSparran v. Insurance Co., 193 Pa. 184 , concerning a covenant of this character: “But the object of the clause is to give the company an opportunity to examine into a new factor which may alter its position in the contract, and to regulate its action accordingly.

1905The principle involved herein was early decided in Breneman v. The Franklin Beneficial Association, 3 W. & S. 218 , in which “ it was contended that the plaintiff was physically unable to apply for the benefits of the society at an earlier period than he had done; and that on that ground he was entitled to an allowance previous to his application.

1896Its object was the same as that of the concluding clause in section third of the same article, requiring the subject of an act to be clearly expressed in its title, of which, it was said in Com. ex rel. v. Samuels, 163 Pa. 283 , “the object of that requirement is that legislators and others interested shall receive direct notice in immediate connection with the act itself, of its subject, so that they may know or be put upon inquiry as to its provisions and their effect.