object inquiry in Maryland

1935Dallam v. Dallam’s Lessee, 7 H. & J. 220 ; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G., 111 ; Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 ; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 171 ; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300 ; Starr v. Starr M.

1925Dallam v. Dallam, 7 H. & J. 220; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 111 ; Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 ; Barnum v. *376 Barnum, 26 Md. 171 ; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300 ; Starr v. Starr M.

1935Dallam v. Dallam’s Lessee, 7 H. & J. 220 ; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G., 111 ; Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 ; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 171 ; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300 ; Starr v. Starr M.

1925Dallam v. Dallam, 7 H. & J. 220; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 111 ; Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 ; Barnum v. *376 Barnum, 26 Md. 171 ; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300 ; Starr v. Starr M.

1935Dallam v. Dallam’s Lessee, 7 H. & J. 220 ; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G., 111 ; Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 ; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 171 ; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300 ; Starr v. Starr M.

1925Dallam v. Dallam, 7 H. & J. 220; Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 111 ; Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 ; Barnum v. *376 Barnum, 26 Md. 171 ; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300 ; Starr v. Starr M.

2016The object of the rule “ ‘is to prevent one prospective witness from being taught by hearing another’s testimony; its application avoids an artificial harmony of all the testimony; it may also avoid the outright manufacture of testimony.’ ” Tharp v. *345 State, 362 Md. 77, 95 , 763 A.2d 151 (2000) (quoting Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 629 , 655 A.2d 390 (1995)).

2016The object of the rule “ ‘is to prevent one prospective witness from being taught by hearing another’s testimony; its application avoids an artificial harmony of all the testimony; it may also avoid the outright manufacture of testimony.’ ” Tharp v. *345 State, 362 Md. 77, 95 , 763 A.2d 151 (2000) (quoting Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 629 , 655 A.2d 390 (1995)).

2016The object of the rule “ ‘is to prevent one prospective witness from being taught by hearing another’s testimony; its application avoids an artificial harmony of all the testimony; it may also avoid the outright manufacture of testimony.’ ” Tharp v. *345 State, 362 Md. 77, 95 , 763 A.2d 151 (2000) (quoting Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 629 , 655 A.2d 390 (1995)).

2016The object of the rule “ ‘is to prevent one prospective witness from being taught by hearing another’s testimony; its application avoids an artificial harmony of all the testimony; it may also avoid the outright manufacture of testimony.’ ” Tharp v. *345 State, 362 Md. 77, 95 , 763 A.2d 151 (2000) (quoting Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 629 , 655 A.2d 390 (1995)).

2009Co., 252 U.S. 60 , 40 S.Ct. 228 , 64 L.Ed. 460 (1920), the Supreme Court relied on its prior decisions to discuss the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: The purpose of the provision came under consideration in Paul v. Virginia, [ 75 U.S. 168 ,] 8 Wall. 168, 180 ( 19 L.Ed. 357 ), where the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Field, said: “It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each state upon the same footing with citizens of other states, so far as the advantages resulting *402 from citizenship in those states are concerned.

2009Co., 252 U.S. 60 , 40 S.Ct. 228 , 64 L.Ed. 460 (1920), the Supreme Court relied on its prior decisions to discuss the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: The purpose of the provision came under consideration in Paul v. Virginia, [ 75 U.S. 168 ,] 8 Wall. 168, 180 ( 19 L.Ed. 357 ), where the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Field, said: “It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each state upon the same footing with citizens of other states, so far as the advantages resulting *402 from citizenship in those states are concerned.

1999The Schneckbth Court instructs that the object of the inquiry is to determine the nature of a person’s subjective understanding. 412 U.S. at 230 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 .

1999The Schneckbth Court instructs that the object of the inquiry is to determine the nature of a person’s subjective understanding. 412 U.S. at 230 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 .

1998In Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, 554-55 , 111 A. 81 (1920), the Court of Appeals observed that there is no other class of cases where [previous appellate] decisions are of so little aid in reaching a correct conclusion .... because, of all the cardinal rules governing the interpretation of wills, by far the most important ... is the rule that the intention of the testator, where that can be ascertained from the language of the will and from the circum stances surrounding the testator at the time of its execution, must control....

1998In Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, 554-55 , 111 A. 81 (1920), the Court of Appeals observed that there is no other class of cases where [previous appellate] decisions are of so little aid in reaching a correct conclusion .... because, of all the cardinal rules governing the interpretation of wills, by far the most important ... is the rule that the intention of the testator, where that can be ascertained from the language of the will and from the circum stances surrounding the testator at the time of its execution, must control....

1998Discussion “In the construction of wills, the sole object of the inquiry is to ascertain the intention of the testator.” Patchell v. Groom, 185 Md. 10, 14-15 , 43 A.2d 32 (1945).

1998Discussion “In the construction of wills, the sole object of the inquiry is to ascertain the intention of the testator.” Patchell v. Groom, 185 Md. 10, 14-15 , 43 A.2d 32 (1945).

1996Quoting from Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134 , 355 A.2d 455 (1976), the Gore court reiterated: ‘... [I]t is undoubtedly true that a trial Judge, because of his high and authoritative position, should be exceedingly careful in any remarks made by him during the progress of a trial, either in passing upon evidence or ruling upon prayers, and should carefully refrain, either directly or indirectly, from giving expression to an opinion upon the existence or not of any fact, which should be left to the finding of the jury.... ’ Gore, 309 Md. at 212 , 522 A.2d 1338 (citations omitted).

1996Quoting from Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134 , 355 A.2d 455 (1976), the Gore court reiterated: ‘... [I]t is undoubtedly true that a trial Judge, because of his high and authoritative position, should be exceedingly careful in any remarks made by him during the progress of a trial, either in passing upon evidence or ruling upon prayers, and should carefully refrain, either directly or indirectly, from giving expression to an opinion upon the existence or not of any fact, which should be left to the finding of the jury.... ’ Gore, 309 Md. at 212 , 522 A.2d 1338 (citations omitted).

1996The object of this rule is simply to prevent the court’s opinion from influencing the verdict.” Gore, 309 Md. at 214 , 522 A.2d 1338 .

1996The object of this rule is simply to prevent the court’s opinion from influencing the verdict.” Gore, 309 Md. at 214 , 522 A.2d 1338 .

1996A similar response was made under still more apposite circumstances in Beauchamp v. Somerset County, 243 Md. 98, 103 , 220 A.2d 135 (1966), to an argument that “the present assessment will force the conversion of its agricultural land to non-agricultural uses, which result, it asserts, is contrary to the legislative intent” regarding agricultural uses.

1996A similar response was made under still more apposite circumstances in Beauchamp v. Somerset County, 243 Md. 98, 103 , 220 A.2d 135 (1966), to an argument that “the present assessment will force the conversion of its agricultural land to non-agricultural uses, which result, it asserts, is contrary to the legislative intent” regarding agricultural uses.

1996The sole object of the inquiry, from either point of view, is to determine the comparative market values of the property before and after the appropriation of a part for the intended public use, and in ascertaining those values, with reference to either period, all the available uses of the land may properly be considered. *730 An “objection to the application of the front foot rule of assessment on the ground that its land is rural” was found to be “really a variation of the objection to considering the use of its land for any purpose other than that to which it is presently” (at 450, 115 A.2

1990And again “the object of this clause was to prevent the embodying into the same Act distinct and separate matters of legislation, having no connection whatever with each other.” Gans v. Carter, 77 Md. 1, 10 , 25 A. 663 (1893).

1990And again “the object of this clause was to prevent the embodying into the same Act distinct and separate matters of legislation, having no connection whatever with each other.” Gans v. Carter, 77 Md. 1, 10 , 25 A. 663 (1893).

1989The consequence of a violation of the rule is that a judgment recovered for part of the accrued indebtedness sued for separately may be pleaded to a suit for the residue of the claim, which is treated as being merged in the recovery procured in the first litigation. 157 Md. at 628 , 147 A. at 529 .

1989The consequence of a violation of the rule is that a judgment recovered for part of the accrued indebtedness sued for separately may be pleaded to a suit for the residue of the claim, which is treated as being merged in the recovery procured in the first litigation. 157 Md. at 628 , 147 A. at 529 .

1980"The object of the rule that requires all necessary parties to be joined is to be sure that no one’s rights are adjudicated unless he has had his 'day in Court’; and that there will be a complete determination of the matters in dispute in one suit (this latter being subject to certain exceptions not here pertinent).” Reddick v. State, 213 Md. at 30 . 7 .

1975The appellants reliance upon Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 824 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970); Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Paffile v. Sherman, 84 Idaho 63 , 368 P. 2d 434 (1962); and National Co-op Refinery Ass’n v. Northern Ordnance, Inc., 238 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956), in urging that evidence concerning actual damages should have been allowed, is misplaced.

1975In Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., supra, we said at pages 695-96: “That the title of an act is relevant to ascertainment of its [the Legislature’s] intent and purpose is well settled. .. .” In Shipley, supra, our predecessors said at page 103: “A title which is descriptive to some extent must go *201 far to fix the understanding of its purpose among legislators and interested members of the public. ‘Bills are sometimes read, especially the first time, by their titles only, and the titles only are spread upon the journal.’ Stiefel v. Maryland Institution for the

1975The very object of the clause is to prevent such a controversy.’ Brantly on Contracts (2nd Ed.), section 163; Willson v. Baltimore City, 83 Md. 203 ; Baltimore Bridge Company v. United Railways, etc., Company, supra.” 125 Md. at 465, 94 A. at 22 .

1975The very object of the clause is to prevent such a controversy.’ Brantly on Contracts (2nd Ed.), section 163; Willson v. Baltimore City, 83 Md. 203 ; Baltimore Bridge Company v. United Railways, etc., Company, supra.” 125 Md. at 465, 94 A. at 22 .

1975The appellants reliance upon Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 824 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970); Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Paffile v. Sherman, 84 Idaho 63 , 368 P. 2d 434 (1962); and National Co-op Refinery Ass’n v. Northern Ordnance, Inc., 238 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956), in urging that evidence concerning actual damages should have been allowed, is misplaced.

1975The appellants reliance upon Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 824 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970); Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Paffile v. Sherman, 84 Idaho 63 , 368 P. 2d 434 (1962); and National Co-op Refinery Ass’n v. Northern Ordnance, Inc., 238 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956), in urging that evidence concerning actual damages should have been allowed, is misplaced.

1975The appellants reliance upon Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 824 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970); Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Paffile v. Sherman, 84 Idaho 63 , 368 P. 2d 434 (1962); and National Co-op Refinery Ass’n v. Northern Ordnance, Inc., 238 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956), in urging that evidence concerning actual damages should have been allowed, is misplaced.

1975The appellants reliance upon Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 824 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970); Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Paffile v. Sherman, 84 Idaho 63 , 368 P. 2d 434 (1962); and National Co-op Refinery Ass’n v. Northern Ordnance, Inc., 238 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956), in urging that evidence concerning actual damages should have been allowed, is misplaced.

1975The appellants reliance upon Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 824 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970); Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Paffile v. Sherman, 84 Idaho 63 , 368 P. 2d 434 (1962); and National Co-op Refinery Ass’n v. Northern Ordnance, Inc., 238 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956), in urging that evidence concerning actual damages should have been allowed, is misplaced.

1974And as the object of the inquiry was to show the disreputable and degraded character of the women who found admission to the house of the traverser, it was unquestionably competent to show it either by proof of general reputation, or by proof of particular acts of lewdness, to the knowledge of witnesses; and it could make no difference where such acts occurred.” To like effect, see Herzinger v. State, 70 Md. 278, 280-281 , 17 A. 81 : “The keeping of a bawdy-house constitutes at common law a common nuisance, ‘not only in respect to its endangering the public peace, by drawing together dissolute

1974And as the object of the inquiry was to show the disreputable and degraded character of the women who found admission to the house of the traverser, it was unquestionably competent to show it either by proof of general reputation, or by proof of particular acts of lewdness, to the knowledge of witnesses; and it could make no difference where such acts occurred.” To like effect, see Herzinger v. State, 70 Md. 278, 280-281 , 17 A. 81 : “The keeping of a bawdy-house constitutes at common law a common nuisance, ‘not only in respect to its endangering the public peace, by drawing together dissolute