object rule in New York

1946As is said by Thompson on Corporations (2d ed., § 5414) in a section quoted with approval in Matter of Osborne (supra, 476 ): * The object of the inquiry in every case should be to do justice to the life tenant and remaindermen and at the same time effectuate the intention of the creator of the trust.’ Justice to the remaindermen and to the life tenant requires that the trust fund shall be kept intact, but not enhanced by adding to it any part of the income, and that the life tenant shall receive all of the income whenever that comes into the hands of the trustee.

1929The court, in making the inquiry, concerns itself with the substance of the transaction, and not the form in which the corporation has seen fit to clothe it, and the fact that a dividend is distributed in cash or stock is said to be of little importance in determining whether it is capital or income. * * * The object of the inquiry in every case should be to do justice to the fife tenant and remainderman and at the same time effectuate the intention of the creator of the trust; and on this theory, in order to effectuate such intention and to do justice between the parties, a court may, under t

1921Co. ( 101 N. Y. 362 ), in treating of the arbitration clause in an insurance policy, the court said:. “ Under the arbitration clause, it was the duty of each party to act in good faith to accomplish the appraisement in the way provided in the policy, and if either party acted in bad faith so as to defeat the real object of the clause, it absolved the other party from compliance therewith; and if either party refused to go on with the arbitration, or to complete it, or to procure the appointment of an umpire so that there could be an agreement upon an appraisal, the other party was absolved.” I

1900The learned counsel for the plaintiff admits that compliance with the requirement of the policy that the amount of loss or damage should be ascertained either by agreement between the parties or by an appraisal would, under ordinary circumstances, constitute a condition precedent to the right of action, but contends that the facts of this case bring it within the doctrine of Uhrig v. Williamsburgh City Fire Insurance Co. ( 101 N. Y. 362 ), where it is held that under an arbitration clause in a policy of fire insurance it is the duty of the parties to the contract to act in good faith to accomp

1933(People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 509 ; People v. Bates, 61 App. Div. 559, 561 .) The object of this requirement is two-fold: (1) To enable a defendant to prepare his defense; and (2) to prevent a second indictment for the same offense.

1931(People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 509 ; People v. Bates, 61 App. Div. 559, 561 .) The object of this requirement is twofold: (1) To enable a defendant to prepare his defense; and (2) to prevent a second indictment for the same offense.

1933(People v. Helmer, 154 N. Y. 596, 600 ; People v. Corbalis, 178 id. .516, 520.) “ An analysis of this indictment makes it clear that it meets the requirements of the statute.

1933(People v. Helmer, 154 N. Y. 596, 600 ; People v. Corbalis, 178 id. .516, 520.) “ An analysis of this indictment makes it clear that it meets the requirements of the statute.

1933(People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 509 ; People v. Bates, 61 App. Div. 559, 561 .) The object of this requirement is two-fold: (1) To enable a defendant to prepare his defense; and (2) to prevent a second indictment for the same offense.

1931(People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 509 ; People v. Bates, 61 App. Div. 559, 561 .) The object of this requirement is twofold: (1) To enable a defendant to prepare his defense; and (2) to prevent a second indictment for the same offense.

1926As was said in Hanna v. Mitchell ( 202 App. Div. 504 ; affd., 235 N. Y. 534 ), in referring to the effect of rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice: “ It is not the object of this rule to deprive any one who has a right to a jury trial of an issue of fact, but to require a defendant, when it is claimed that in fact he has no honest defense and no bona fide issue, to show that he has at least an arguable defense, that he has not merely taken advantage of a technicality in the form of pleading for the purpose of delaying the enforcement of an honest claim to which in fact he has no colorable de

1925The court does not try the issues but ascertains whether in fact there is an issue.” (Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 517 .) The order granting the motion for summary judgment, and the judgment entered thereon, should be affirmed, with costs.

1925(Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548 ; Munson v. S., G. & C.

1900He became the owner of an undivided half of property, the whole of which his testator claimed to own,. died in possession' of, and' left to the beneficiaries under his will, in the care and custody of Grant.' ■ Grant could not avail himself of his purchase except by depriving his cestuis que trustent of one-half of the property possessed by his testator in his lifetime, which he claimed to own, and supposed he had left to Grant and the other executor and trustee named by him for the benefit of the persons named in his will. • “ The object of the rule which precludes trustees from dealing for t

1874The object of this rule was to enable the court to make a distribution of the proceeds among the persons interested. ( Dunham v. Minard, 4 Paige, 441 .) The inquiry as to the existence and amount of the lien involved the further question as to its validity, if the party against whose share it was claimed to exist contested it.

1874In case the master reported against the lien claimed, exception could be taken to the report, when it was presented for confirmation. ( Dunham v. Minard, supra .) It was in the power of the court to order a feigned issue to try the question, if it should deem it proper; but I find no authority for holding that the question of the validity of a lien claimed must be raised by the pleadings, or by a formal issue in any stage of the proceedings.

2010To constitute the “subject of the action” within the contemplation of CPLR 6301, the property or assets for which restraint is sought must be unique or sufficiently specific and the very object of the claim giving rise to the demand for preliminary injunctive relief (see Credit Agricole Indosuez v Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, 94 NY2d 541 [2000]; Coby Group, LLC v Hasenfeld, 46 AD3d 593 [2d Dept 2007]).

2010To constitute the “subject of the action” within the contemplation of CPLR 6301, the property or assets for which restraint is sought must be unique or sufficiently specific and the very object of the claim giving rise to the demand for preliminary injunctive relief (see Credit Agricole Indosuez v Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, 94 NY2d 541 [2000]; Coby Group, LLC v Hasenfeld, 46 AD3d 593 [2d Dept 2007]).

2006The agreements were structured by petitioners as leases of equipment and, indeed, petitioners invoiced and collected taxes on the net amount charged under the leases (see Matter of CS Integrated, LLC v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., supra at 889 [the petitioner bound by tax consequences of form of business transaction chosen]; Matter of North Shore Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 13 AD3d 994 , 996 [2004], lv denied 5 NY3d 704 [2005]).

2006Review of this record reveals that, even if we were to apply a test in the nature of the true object test urged by petitioners (see generally Matter of Business Statistics Org. v Joseph, 299 NY 443, 452 [1949]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v City of New York, 276 NY 198, 204-205 [1937]; Booth v City of New York, 268 App Div 502, 504-505 [1944], affd 296 NY 573 [1946]), there is sufficient evidence to support the Tribunal’s determination.

2006The agreements were structured by petitioners as leases of equipment and, indeed, petitioners invoiced and collected taxes on the net amount charged under the leases (see Matter of CS Integrated, LLC v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., supra at 889 [the petitioner bound by tax consequences of form of business transaction chosen]; Matter of North Shore Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 13 AD3d 994 , 996 [2004], lv denied 5 NY3d 704 [2005]).

1995Co. v State of New York (supra) hinged on the view that because "[t]he primary, if not the sole object of the claim is to recover a sum of money equal to the amounts illegally levied upon by the State” (supra, at 156), the Court of Claims is the appropriate forum for such an action.

1995This conclusion was buttressed by the Court of Appeals ruling that the Court of Claims may "apply equitable considerations and perhaps, to some extent, may grant some sort of incidental equitable relief’ (supra, at 154, quoting Psaty v Duryea, 306 NY 413, 417 ) and by the fact that a trust created by article 3-A of the Lien Law is not a creation of equity courts but, rather of the Legislature (supra, at 152).

1994Co. ( 79 NY2d 253, 264-265 , affg 167 AD2d 75 ) to the effect that "liquidation cannot place the liquidator in a better position than the insolvent company he takes over, authorizing him to demand that which the company would not have been entitled to prior to liquidation [citations omitted]”, and likening this action to the situation of setoffs, the court reasoned that the object of the defense is not to create a preference on behalf of the reinsurers, but to insulate the reinsurers from liability in the first instance, there being no asset of Union Indemnity’s to be turned over to the Liquid

1994Co. ( 79 NY2d 253, 264-265 , affg 167 AD2d 75 ) to the effect that "liquidation cannot place the liquidator in a better position than the insolvent company he takes over, authorizing him to demand that which the company would not have been entitled to prior to liquidation [citations omitted]”, and likening this action to the situation of setoffs, the court reasoned that the object of the defense is not to create a preference on behalf of the reinsurers, but to insulate the reinsurers from liability in the first instance, there being no asset of Union Indemnity’s to be turned over to the Liquid

1987Deviating from this practice is wasteful of judicial time and, if countenanced, would cause confusion and vexatious litigation contraproductive to the orderly administration of justice” (Maggiore v Maggiore, 49 AD2d 1021 ).

1983When inserted at the behest of public agencies, restrained as these almost always are by limited financial authorizations, the object of such a clause is not only the usually ascribed avoidance of “vexatious” litigation as to whether delays are reasonable or unreasonable or, for that matter, real or fancied, but also, hopefully, to discourage dilatoriness itself (e.g., Mack v State of New York, 122 Misc 86, 88 , affd 211 App Div 825 ; Psaty & Fuhrman v Housing Auth. of City of Providence, 76 RI 87, 93; Christhilf v Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 152 Md 204, 208-209; Siefford v Housing Auth

1983When inserted at the behest of public agencies, restrained as these almost always are by limited financial authorizations, the object of such a clause is not only the usually ascribed avoidance of “vexatious” litigation as to whether delays are reasonable or unreasonable or, for that matter, real or fancied, but also, hopefully, to discourage dilatoriness itself (e.g., Mack v State of New York, 122 Misc 86, 88 , affd 211 App Div 825 ; Psaty & Fuhrman v Housing Auth. of City of Providence, 76 RI 87, 93; Christhilf v Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 152 Md 204, 208-209; Siefford v Housing Auth

1976Co. ( 30 NY2d 143 ), which permits apportionment among joint or concurrent tortfeasors, a question arose as to whether subdivision 3 of section 167 of the Insurance Law allowed an insurance company to disclaim its obligation to defend and indemnify the insured spouse, absent a specific clause to the contrary, where the insured spouse is made the object of a claim as a joint or concurrent tort-feasor.

1969Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 N. Y. 37, 50 ; 3 Carmody-Wait 2d, New York Practice, § 16:4; Restatement, Judgments, § 62).

1969Since the object of the rule against splitting causes of action is to protect a party from a multiplicity of actions, he may, if he chooses, waive the protection which the law thus has provided him (Blake v. Weiden, 291 N. Y. 134, 140 ; Ocean Acc. & Guar.

1969As to the law he relies upon, the defendant Buxbaum points out by quotation from the Securities Act that section 13, the supporting mainstay of his attack, mandates in peremptory language that, “‘Inno event shall any such action be brought * * * more than three years after the sale.’ ” And, he bolsters the force of this provision by citing the following language from Shonts v. Hirliman ( 28 F. Supp. 478, 486 ) which, however, to my mind deals with the subject of remedy pertaining to statements of sale made before the expiration of the three-year period, and only to such statements when they ar

1967Laws of N. Y., Book 62½, pt. 3, pp. 221-222) to section 8-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the comment applies to the transactions in suit although the Uniform Commercial Code does not): "The jeopardy of the selling broker is broadened by the rules and practice of the organized markets which require that he `know his customer'." Even the Uniform Commercial Code, which apparently modifies the law in this State somewhat in favor of the selling broker by relaxing partially the rigor of the Casey v. Kastel ( 237 N.Y. 305 , supra ) rule, provides by section 8-318 that the test of good faith of a

1967Laws of N. Y., Book 62½, pt. 3, pp. 221-222) to section 8-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the comment applies to the transactions in suit although the Uniform Commercial Code does not): “ The jeopardy of the selling broker is broadened by the rules and practice of the organized markets which require that he ‘ know his customer ’.’’ Even the Uniform Commercial Code, which apparently modifies the law in this State somewhat in favor of the selling broker by relaxing partially the rigor of the Casey v. Kastel ( 237 N. Y. 305 , supra) rule, provides by section 8-318 that the test of good faith