object inquiry in Connecticut

23 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
Daggett v. Stategreen · 1821 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1981–1984 2 sentences 1984It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited.” (Emphasis in original.) Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63-64 , 10 A.D. 100 (1821). 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912).	1	2
Connelly v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen conn · 2001 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019See, e.g., Connelly v. Com- missioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 374, 387 , 780 A.2d 890 (2001). ‘‘[B]y maintaining an affirmative defense pursuant to § 53a-13, the petitioner admitted his com- mission of the crime. . . . 2019See, e.g., Connelly v. Com- missioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 374, 387 , 780 A.2d 890 (2001). ‘‘[B]y maintaining an affirmative defense pursuant to § 53a-13, the petitioner admitted his com- mission of the crime. . . .	1	1
Westminster Investing Corporation v. The Equitable Assurance Society of the United Statesgreen cadc · 1970 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973 2 sentences 1973Compare, as examples of the first instance, Westminster Investing Corporation v. Equitable Assurance Society, 443 F.2d 653 (D.C. 1973Compare, as examples of the first instance, Westminster Investing Corporation v. Equitable Assurance Society, 443 F.2d 653 (D.C.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (22)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Williams green conn · 1987 2 sentences 2018Application of the ... factors [in State v. Williams , supra, 204 Conn. at 540 , 529 A.2d 653 ] provides for such an analysis, and the specific Golding test, therefore, is superfluous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell , 141 Conn. App. 55 , 60-61 n.3, 60 A.3d 967 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933 , 64 A.3d 331 (2013). 2018Application of the ... factors [in State v. Williams , supra, 204 Conn. at 540 , 529 A.2d 653 ] provides for such an analysis, and the specific Golding test, therefore, is superfluous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell , 141 Conn. App. 55 , 60-61 n.3, 60 A.3d 967 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933 , 64 A.3d 331 (2013).	3	2004–2018
Marsala v. City of Bridgeport green connappct · 1988 2 sentences 2001Marsala v. Bridgeport , 15 Conn. App. 323 , 328 , 544 A.2d 191 (1988); State ex rel. 2001Marsala v. Bridgeport , 15 Conn. App. 323 , 328 , 544 A.2d 191 (1988); State ex rel.	3	2001–2001
State v. Stevenson green conn · 2004 2 sentences 2004The object of inquiry before a reviewing court in claims involving prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, is always and only the fairness of the entire trial, and not the specific incidents of misconduct themselves.” State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 574 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004). 2004The object of inquiry before a reviewing court in claims involving prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, is always and only the fairness of the entire trial, and not the specific incidents of misconduct themselves.” State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 574 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004).	2	2004–2010
Young v. American Fidelity Ins. Co. green connappct · 1984 2 sentences 1999By "exception" of course is meant exclusion of one or more of the risks otherwise generally insured against. . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 1990Co., 2 Conn. App. 282, 286 , 479 A.2d 244 (1984), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.).	2	1990–1999
State ex rel. Southey v. Lashar neutral conn · 1899 2 sentences 1988Southey v. Lashar, 71 Conn. 540, 545 , 42 A. 636 (1899), and see cases there cited. 1988Southey v. Lashar, 71 Conn. 540, 545 , 42 A. 636 (1899), and see cases there cited.	2	1980–1988
State v. Campbell green connappct · 2013 2 sentences 2018Application of the ... factors [in State v. Williams , supra, 204 Conn. at 540 , 529 A.2d 653 ] provides for such an analysis, and the specific Golding test, therefore, is superfluous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell , 141 Conn. App. 55 , 60-61 n.3, 60 A.3d 967 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933 , 64 A.3d 331 (2013). 2018Application of the ... factors [in State v. Williams , supra, 204 Conn. at 540 , 529 A.2d 653 ] provides for such an analysis, and the specific Golding test, therefore, is superfluous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell , 141 Conn. App. 55 , 60-61 n.3, 60 A.3d 967 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933 , 64 A.3d 331 (2013).	1	2018–2018
State v. Luster green conn · 2006 2 sentences 2015Application of the Williams factors provides for such an analysis . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luster, 279 Conn. 414, 427 , 902 A.2d 636 (2006).3 Accordingly, I disagree with the majority that two of the four conceded violations are not relevant to our inquiry. 2015Application of the Williams factors provides for such an analysis . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luster, 279 Conn. 414, 427 , 902 A.2d 636 (2006).3 Accordingly, I disagree with the majority that two of the four conceded violations are not relevant to our inquiry.	1	2015–2015
State v. Fauci green conn · 2007 2 sentences 2013Application of the . . . factors [in State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540 , 529 A.2d 653 (1987)] provides for such an analysis, and the specific Golding test, therefore, is superfluous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 34 , 917 A.2d 978 (2007). 2013Application of the . . . factors [in State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540 , 529 A.2d 653 (1987)] provides for such an analysis, and the specific Golding test, therefore, is superfluous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 34 , 917 A.2d 978 (2007).	1	2013–2013
Scoville v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc. green conn · 2005 1 sentence 2006The object of inquiry before a reviewing court in claims involving prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, is always and only the fairness of the entire trial, and not the specific incidents of misconduct themselves.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blackwell, 86 Conn. App. 409, 417-18 , 861 A.2d 548 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 922 , 867 A.2d 838 (2005). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of *179 the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor. . . .	1	2006–2006
State v. Blackwell green conn · 2005 1 sentence 2006The object of inquiry before a reviewing court in claims involving prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, is always and only the fairness of the entire trial, and not the specific incidents of misconduct themselves.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blackwell, 86 Conn. App. 409, 417-18 , 861 A.2d 548 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 922 , 867 A.2d 838 (2005). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of *179 the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor. . . .	1	2006–2006
State v. Blackwell green connappct · 2004 2 sentences 2006The object of inquiry before a reviewing court in claims involving prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, is always and only the fairness of the entire trial, and not the specific incidents of misconduct themselves.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blackwell, 86 Conn. App. 409, 417-18 , 861 A.2d 548 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 922 , 867 A.2d 838 (2005). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of 179 the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor. . . . 2006The object of inquiry before a reviewing court in claims involving prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, is always and only the fairness of the entire trial, and not the specific incidents of misconduct themselves.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blackwell, 86 Conn. App. 409, 417-18 , 861 A.2d 548 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 922 , 867 A.2d 838 (2005). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of 179 the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor. . . .	1	2006–2006
State v. Spencer green conn · 2005 2 sentences 2006Application of the Williams factors provides for such an analysis . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Spencer, 275 Conn. 171, 178 , 881 A.2d 209 (2005). 2006Application of the Williams factors provides for such an analysis . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Spencer, 275 Conn. 171, 178 , 881 A.2d 209 (2005).	1	2006–2006
Dine Out Tonight Club, Inc. v. Department of Revenue Services green conn · 1989 2 sentences 2001Partnership v. Groppo, supra, 211 Conn. 252 -53; Dine Out Tonight Club v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 210 Conn. 567, 572 , 556 A.2d 580 (1989); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 132 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974); and (2) where the applicability of the sales tax depends on the purpose of the sale, which is necessarily a question of intent. 2001Partnership v. Groppo, supra, 211 Conn. 252 -53; Dine Out Tonight Club v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 210 Conn. 567, 572 , 556 A.2d 580 (1989); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 132 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974); and (2) where the applicability of the sales tax depends on the purpose of the sale, which is necessarily a question of intent.	1	2001–2001
Andersen Consulting, LLP v. Gavin green conn · 2001 1 sentence 2001In Andersen Consulting, LLP v. Gavin , 225 Conn. 498 , 526-27 , 767 A.2d 692 (2001), the Supreme Court stated: "we have applied the so-called true object test in generally two contexts: (1) where what would otherwise bring the transaction under the purview of the relevant taxing statute is merely incidental to the objective of the transaction . . . and (2) where the applicability of the sales tax depends on the purpose of the sale, which is necessarily a question of intent." (Citations omitted.) We find that the true object of NERAC's business was to obtain information in the nature of specifi	1	2001–2001
International Business MacHines Corporation v. Brown green conn · 1974 2 sentences 2001Partnership v. Groppo, supra, 211 Conn. 252 -53; Dine Out Tonight Club v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 210 Conn. 567, 572 , 556 A.2d 580 (1989); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 132 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974); and (2) where the applicability of the sales tax depends on the purpose of the sale, which is necessarily a question of intent. 2001Partnership v. Groppo, supra, 211 Conn. 252 -53; Dine Out Tonight Club v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 210 Conn. 567, 572 , 556 A.2d 580 (1989); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 132 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974); and (2) where the applicability of the sales tax depends on the purpose of the sale, which is necessarily a question of intent.	1	2001–2001
Aillon v. Meachum green conn · 1989 1 sentence 1999Aillon v. Meachum , 211 Conn. 352 , 359 .	1	1999–1999
In re Garth neutral nyappdiv · 1896 1 sentence 1984It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited.” (Emphasis in original.) Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63-64 , 10 A.D. 100 (1821).	1	1984–1984
State v. Parker green · 1930 2 sentences 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912). 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912).	1	1981–1981
State v. Faatz green · 1910 2 sentences 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912). 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912).	1	1981–1981
State v. Penner green conn · 1912 2 sentences 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912). 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912).	1	1981–1981
State v. Cataudella green conn · 1970 2 sentences 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912). 1981It was the object of the principle, to establish a certain rule, by conformity to which mankind should be safe, and the discretion of the judge limited. . . .’ Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 [1821].” State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 302-303 , 76 A. 295 (1910); State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 555 , 271 A.2d 99 (1970); State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 46 , 151 A. 325 (1930); State v. Penner, 85 Conn. 481, 484 , 83 A. 625 (1912).	1	1981–1981
Commonwealth v. Keyes neutral mass · 1858 1 sentence 1922Not only was the witness not so instructed, but he was allowed to testify to separate conversations with the defendant, having no relation to the crime charged, and apparently introduced with the sole purpose of showing that the defendant was *268 a notorious criminal.” In Commonwealth v. Keyes, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 323, 325 , the court said: “But if, during the same interview between the witness and the party [accused], other subjects of conversation or discussion are introduced, remote and distinct from that which is the object of inquiry or investigation, it is obvious that whatever may be sa	1	1922–1922

Where else courts name it

CA 70 (1889–2022) TX 65 (1897–2025) MI 61 (1878–2025) NY 52 (1816–2010) IL 46 (1894–2021) GA 38 (1889–2025) MO 36 (1865–2011) LA 31 (1844–2024) NJ 30 (1878–2024) MD 29 (1900–2016) WA 29 (1895–2020) CT 23 (1922–2019) AR 22 (1905–2025) SC 20 (1910–2024) FL 17 (1930–2019) VA 17 (1876–2024) OH 17 (1907–2021) IA 16 (1896–2018) OR 15 (1888–2022) PA 14 (1896–2021) IN 14 (1874–1991) TN 13 (1926–2021) ME 11 (1901–2015) MN 11 (1874–1975) WV 11 (1878–2006) MA 10 (1910–1997) ID 8 (1897–1991) VT 8 (1858–2013) ND 7 (1912–2002) CO 7 (1900–2019) KS 7 (1901–1978) NV 7 (1879–2018) NE 7 (1894–1988) NH 7 (1954–2011) KY 6 (1914–2021) SD 6 (1961–2026) AZ 6 (1946–2025) WI 6 (1869–1990) OK 6 (1912–1975) HI 5 (1926–2018) AL 5 (1856–1998) MT 5 (1896–2001) NM 4 (1924–2021) UT 3 (1894–1969) RI 3 (1914–2006) MS 3 (1944–2003) WY 2 (1923–1964) NC 2 (1918–1985) PR 2 (1937–1954)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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