11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1901–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arnold v. Boulaygreen2 sentences2008The object of the principle is, not to create public rights, but to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated." 147 Me. 116, 121 , 83 A.2d 574, 577 (1951) (emphasis added) (quoting Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n, 41 N.J.Eq. 606, 7 A. 491 , 493 (Err. & App.1886)). 2008The object of the principle is, not to create public rights, but to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated." 147 Me. 116, 121 , 83 A.2d 574, 577 (1951) (emphasis added) (quoting Lennig v. Ocean City Ass’n, 41 N.J.Eq. 606, 7 A. 491 , 493 (Err. & App.1886)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Longleygreen2 sentences1976The appellant argues that the instant indictment does not meet this standard because expert testimony was required to determine whether the forms of the drug included under the generic term were also included in 22 M.R.S.A. § 2212-B, thus forcing him to go “beyond the record.” In considering this argument we note first that “. . . the object of the rule requiring the charge to be particularly, certainly and technically set forth is threefold: To apprise the defendant of the precise nature of the charge made against him; to enable the court to determine whether the facts constitute an offense a 1976The appellant argues that the instant indictment does not meet this standard because expert testimony was required to determine whether the forms of the drug included under the generic term were also included in 22 M.R.S.A. § 2212-B, thus forcing him to go “beyond the record.” In considering this argument we note first that “. . . the object of the rule requiring the charge to be particularly, certainly and technically set forth is threefold: To apprise the defendant of the precise nature of the charge made against him; to enable the court to determine whether the facts constitute an offense a | 1 | 2 |
Callahan v. Ganneston Park Development Corp.green1 sentence2011Corp., 245 A.2d 274, 278 (1968) (quoting Lennig v. Ocean City Ass'n, 7 A. 491 (N.J. 1886)). | 1 | 1 |
Chase v. Eastmangreen1 sentence2008The Nelsons also cite to the case of Chase v. Eastman, in which we characterized land described as "reserved” on a Town plan as creating an easement for the use of that property for waterfront access by the purchasers of inland lots. 563 A.2d 1099, 1100-02 (Me.1989). . | 1 | 1 |
Common Cause v. Stategreen1 sentence1996In Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 13 (Me. 1983), however, we entertained such a challenge but found it unnecessary to address the adoption of the rule because the question in that case did not violate the rule. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wardgreen2 sentences1976The appellant argues that the instant indictment does not meet this standard because expert testimony was required to determine whether the forms of the drug included under the generic term were also included in 22 M.R.S.A. § 2212-B, thus forcing him to go “beyond the record.” In considering this argument we note first that “. . . the object of the rule requiring the charge to be particularly, certainly and technically set forth is threefold: To apprise the defendant of the precise nature of the charge made against him; to enable the court to determine whether the facts constitute an offense a 1976The appellant argues that the instant indictment does not meet this standard because expert testimony was required to determine whether the forms of the drug included under the generic term were also included in 22 M.R.S.A. § 2212-B, thus forcing him to go “beyond the record.” In considering this argument we note first that “. . . the object of the rule requiring the charge to be particularly, certainly and technically set forth is threefold: To apprise the defendant of the precise nature of the charge made against him; to enable the court to determine whether the facts constitute an offense a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sutherland v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2015The second part of this principle relates to the rights of the owners of the lots so received by reference to a plan, or "[i]n this State a grant of land bounded on a highway carries the fee to the centre of it, if there be no words to show a contrary intent." The case notes that, "a grant of land bounded on a street, the soil of which belonged to the grantor, though it did not convey the fee in the street by the terms of the grant, yet the grantee acquired a right of way on the street by implication or estoppel." Sutherland v. Jackson, 32 Me. 80 (1850). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bolster v. Inhabitants of China
neutral
1 sentence1952We said in Bolster v. China, 67 Me. 551 , 553: “There is no limit upon the judge’s discretion as to terms.-----The object of the rule is simply to call the judge’s attention to the question, what, if any, terms shall be imposed, as liable to be affected by the character of the proposed amendment, and the progress the case has made. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Hayford v. Everett
green
1 sentence1952The exercise of his discretion will not be examined, on exceptions, by this Court.------” See also Hayford v. Everett, 68 Me. 505, 508 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass'n
green
2 sentences1951The object of the principle is, not to create public rights, but to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated.” See also Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass’n, 241 Mass. 417 ; 136 N. E. 813 (sea shore) ; Carroll v. Hinckley, 316 Mass. 724 , 56 N. E. (2nd) 608 (lake) ; Douglass v. Belknap Springs Land Co., 76 N. H. 254, 81 A. 1086 , 37 L. 1951The object of the principle is, not to create public rights, but to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated.” See also Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass’n, 241 Mass. 417 ; 136 N. E. 813 (sea shore) ; Carroll v. Hinckley, 316 Mass. 724 , 56 N. E. (2nd) 608 (lake) ; Douglass v. Belknap Springs Land Co., 76 N. H. 254, 81 A. 1086 , 37 L. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Carroll v. Hinchley
green
1 sentence1951The object of the principle is, not to create public rights, but to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated.” See also Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass’n, 241 Mass. 417 ; 136 N. E. 813 (sea shore) ; Carroll v. Hinckley, 316 Mass. 724 , 56 N. E. (2nd) 608 (lake) ; Douglass v. Belknap Springs Land Co., 76 N. H. 254, 81 A. 1086 , 37 L. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Douglass v. Belknap Springs Land Co.
green
1 sentence1951The object of the principle is, not to create public rights, but to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated.” See also Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass’n, 241 Mass. 417 ; 136 N. E. 813 (sea shore) ; Carroll v. Hinckley, 316 Mass. 724 , 56 N. E. (2nd) 608 (lake) ; Douglass v. Belknap Springs Land Co., 76 N. H. 254, 81 A. 1086 , 37 L. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Brooks v. Holden
green
1 sentence1907Brooks v. Holden, 175 Mass. 137 : “To allow the executor or administrator of the deceased client to waive the privilege, and to call the attorney to testify as to a privileged communication, in a suit involving the. client’s estate, no more militates against the spirit of public policy involved, than to allow the client himself to waive the privilege. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Bishop v. Agricultural Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1901Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Insurance Company, 101 N. Y. 362 ; Bishop v. Agricultural Insurance Company, 130 N. Y. 488 . | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Uhrig v. . Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1901Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Insurance Company, 101 N. Y. 362 ; Bishop v. Agricultural Insurance Company, 130 N. Y. 488 . | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.