object rule in Virginia

2024See Cline, 284 Va. at 106 n.1; Philip Morris, 235 Va. at 407 .

2024See Cline, 284 Va. at 106 n.1; Philip Morris, 235 Va. at 407 .

1876Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1 , 26 S. E.

1876Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1 , 26 S. E.

2023But the Supreme Court did not “set about to enable gamesmanship or mere regret.” Id.

2023The object of this standard “is to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in situations where the defendant would not have pled guilty but for some external circumstance such as coercion, or poor or erroneous advice from counsel.” Pritchett, 61 Va. App. at 788 .

2013In Jones, 168 Va. at 292 , 191 S.E. at 610 , the Supreme Court discussed the underlying purposes supporting the application of the doctrine of merger, explaining: The object of the rule against splitting causes of action is to prevent a multiplicity of suits.

2013In Jones, 168 Va. at 292 , 191 S.E. at 610 , the Supreme Court discussed the underlying purposes supporting the application of the doctrine of merger, explaining: The object of the rule against splitting causes of action is to prevent a multiplicity of suits.

2005WTAR Radio-TV v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 877 , 879-80, 234 S.E.2d 245 , 247 (1977); Winchester TV Cable Co. v. Commissioner, 216 Va. 286 , 289-90, 217 S.E.2d 885 , 889 (1975). *800 A. Application of the true object test to lease transactions Virginia imposes a retail sales tax on the sale or rental of tangible personal property.

2005WTAR Radio-TV v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 877 , 879-80, 234 S.E.2d 245 , 247 (1977); Winchester TV Cable Co. v. Commissioner, 216 Va. 286 , 289-90, 217 S.E.2d 885 , 889 (1975). *800 A. Application of the true object test to lease transactions Virginia imposes a retail sales tax on the sale or rental of tangible personal property.

2005WTAR Radio-TV v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 877 , 879-80, 234 S.E.2d 245 , 247 (1977); Winchester TV Cable Co. v. Commissioner, 216 Va. 286 , 289-90, 217 S.E.2d 885 , 889 (1975). *800 A. Application of the true object test to lease transactions Virginia imposes a retail sales tax on the sale or rental of tangible personal property.

2005WTAR Radio-TV v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 877 , 879-80, 234 S.E.2d 245 , 247 (1977); Winchester TV Cable Co. v. Commissioner, 216 Va. 286 , 289-90, 217 S.E.2d 885 , 889 (1975). *800 A. Application of the true object test to lease transactions Virginia imposes a retail sales tax on the sale or rental of tangible personal property.

1998"A lesser included offense is an offense which is composed entirely of elements that are also elements of the greater offense." In other words, "an offense is not a lesser included offense of another if each offense contains an element that the other does not." "Thus, in order for one crime to be a lesser included offense of another crime, every commission of the greater offense must also be a commission of the lesser." Seibert v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 40, 45 , 467 S.E.2d 838 , -11- 840-41 (1996) (citations omitted).

1998"A lesser included offense is an offense which is composed entirely of elements that are also elements of the greater offense." In other words, "an offense is not a lesser included offense of another if each offense contains an element that the other does not." "Thus, in order for one crime to be a lesser included offense of another crime, every commission of the greater offense must also be a commission of the lesser." Seibert v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 40, 45 , 467 S.E.2d 838 , -11- 840-41 (1996) (citations omitted).

1938The object of the rule in question— indeed the principal object in all cases in a court of chancery—is that property may be so sold as to realize the best price.” Judge Cardwell in Benet v. Ford, 113 Va. 442 , 74 S. E. 394, 396 , said: “The controlling purpose and prime object in all cases is to sell the property so that it may realize the best price obtainable.” See also, Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570 , 77 S. E. 458 , and Dunn v. Silk, 155 Va. 504 , 155 S. E. 694 , 71 A. L.

1938The object of the rule in question— indeed the principal object in all cases in a court of chancery—is that property may be so sold as to realize the best price.” Judge Cardwell in Benet v. Ford, 113 Va. 442 , 74 S. E. 394, 396 , said: “The controlling purpose and prime object in all cases is to sell the property so that it may realize the best price obtainable.” See also, Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570 , 77 S. E. 458 , and Dunn v. Silk, 155 Va. 504 , 155 S. E. 694 , 71 A. L.

1938The object of the rule in question— indeed the principal object in all cases in a court of chancery—is that property may be so sold as to realize the best price.” Judge Cardwell in Benet v. Ford, 113 Va. 442 , 74 S. E. 394, 396 , said: “The controlling purpose and prime object in all cases is to sell the property so that it may realize the best price obtainable.” See also, Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570 , 77 S. E. 458 , and Dunn v. Silk, 155 Va. 504 , 155 S. E. 694 , 71 A. L.

1938The object of the rule in question— indeed the principal object in all cases in a court of chancery—is that property may be so sold as to realize the best price.” Judge Cardwell in Benet v. Ford, 113 Va. 442 , 74 S. E. 394, 396 , said: “The controlling purpose and prime object in all cases is to sell the property so that it may realize the best price obtainable.” See also, Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570 , 77 S. E. 458 , and Dunn v. Silk, 155 Va. 504 , 155 S. E. 694 , 71 A. L.

1938The object of the rule in question— indeed the principal object in all cases in a court of chancery—is that property may be so sold as to realize the best price.” Judge Cardwell in Benet v. Ford, 113 Va. 442 , 74 S. E. 394, 396 , said: “The controlling purpose and prime object in all cases is to sell the property so that it may realize the best price obtainable.” See also, Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570 , 77 S. E. 458 , and Dunn v. Silk, 155 Va. 504 , 155 S. E. 694 , 71 A. L.

1938The object of the rule in question— indeed the principal object in all cases in a court of chancery—is that property may be so sold as to realize the best price.” Judge Cardwell in Benet v. Ford, 113 Va. 442 , 74 S. E. 394, 396 , said: “The controlling purpose and prime object in all cases is to sell the property so that it may realize the best price obtainable.” See also, Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570 , 77 S. E. 458 , and Dunn v. Silk, 155 Va. 504 , 155 S. E. 694 , 71 A. L.

1921Otherwise, one joint tort-feasor, or all of. them, acting in concert through the one, or the clerk, might in fact exercise the election which the law says the plaintiff has the right to make, and thus defeat the very object of the rule giving the plaintiff the right to maintain separate actions, and to prosecute them to final judgment.” (Citing Blann v. Crocheron, 20 Ala. 320 , in which the judgment debtor paid the amount of the judgment to the clerk.) “It is well said in the last case cited: ‘Were the law otherwise, it would enable joint trespassers, who were sued separately, to hasten the tr

1897Railroad Co. v. Avery, 109 Ill. 314 ; 2 Thomp.

1893The “speedy trial,” and the policy of the law to expedite the trial of criminal cases, forbid that the person accused of crime shall be detained in prison beyond any term of the court at which he may be lawfully tried unless good cause be shown for a continuance; and. the Acts, 1889-90, p. 79, require the judges of the county courts to set the criminal cases for trial ten days before the first day of the terms of their courts; the object of which requirement is, as interpreted by this court in Hall’s Case, 89 Va., 171 , to insure a speedy trial, for the benefit of the accused no less than for