object test in South Carolina

1963Washington v. Muse, 150 S. C. 414, 148 S. E. 227 ; Hewitt v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 235 S. C. 201, 110 S. E. (2d) 852 ; Fruehauf Trailer Company v. McElmurray, 236 S. C. 141, 113 S. E. (2d) 756 .

1940The rule above reproduced was no doubt adopted to meet just such a situation as. now confronts the Court, for as was stated in Washington v. Muse, 150 S. C., 414, 417, 148 S. E., 227 : “The object of an exception is to present some distinct principle or question of law which the appellant claims to have been violated by the Court from which the appeal is taken, and to present it in such form that it may be properly reviewed.

1938Some of the earlier cases are reviewed in State v. Johnson, 85 S. C., 265, 67 S. E., 453 , from which we quote: “In State v. White, 15 S. C. [381], 392, the Court said: ‘The real object of this clause of the Constitution is to leave the decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expression of the opinion by the judge, whose position would very naturally add great weight to any opinion he might express upon any question of fact arising in a case.’ “In State v. Howell, 28 S. C. [250], 255, 5 S. E., 617 , the court said: ‘The jury must be left perfectly free in

1910In State v. White, 15 S. C., 392, the Court said: “The real object of this clause of the Constitution is to leave the decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expression of the opinion by the Judge, whose position would very naturally add great weight to any opinion he might express upon any question of fact arising in a case.” In State v. Howell, 28 S. C., 225, 5 S. E., 617 , the Court said: “The jury must be left perfectly free in reaching a conclusion upon the testimony introduced, untrammelled by any intimation from the Judge as to whether a certain fa

1938Some of the earlier cases are reviewed in State v. Johnson, 85 S. C., 265, 67 S. E., 453 , from which we quote: “In State v. White, 15 S. C. [381], 392, the Court said: ‘The real object of this clause of the Constitution is to leave the decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expression of the opinion by the judge, whose position would very naturally add great weight to any opinion he might express upon any question of fact arising in a case.’ “In State v. Howell, 28 S. C. [250], 255, 5 S. E., 617 , the court said: ‘The jury must be left perfectly free in

1910In State v. White, 15 S. C., 392, the Court said: “The real object of this clause of the Constitution is to leave the decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expression of the opinion by the Judge, whose position would very naturally add great weight to any opinion he might express upon any question of fact arising in a case.” In State v. Howell, 28 S. C., 225, 5 S. E., 617 , the Court said: “The jury must be left perfectly free in reaching a conclusion upon the testimony introduced, untrammelled by any intimation from the Judge as to whether a certain fa

1963Washington v. Muse, 150 S. C. 414, 148 S. E. 227 ; Hewitt v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 235 S. C. 201, 110 S. E. (2d) 852 ; Fruehauf Trailer Company v. McElmurray, 236 S. C. 141, 113 S. E. (2d) 756 .

1960Washington v. Muse, 150 S. C. 414, 148 S. E. 227 ; Hewitt v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, supra. In accordance with the foregoing, we are of opinion that Appellant’s exception is too general, vague and indefinite to be considered, that this appeal should be dismissed; and it is so ordered.

1959Hobbs v. Carolina Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 194 S. C. 543, 10 S. E. (2d) 25 .” See also Henry Sonneborn & Co. v. Southern R.

1952Hobbs v. Carolina Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 194 S. C. 543, 10 S. E. (2d) 25 .

2005Partnership , 312 S.C. 102 , 439 S.E.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating an issue is deemed abandoned on appeal and not presented for review where it is argued in a short, conclusory statement without supporting authority).

2005Partnership , 312 S.C. 102 , 439 S.E.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating an issue is deemed abandoned on appeal and not presented for review where it is argued in a short, conclusory statement without supporting authority).

1998State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290 , 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974).

1998State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290 , 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974).

1990Winter v. U S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 240 S. C. 561, 126 S. E. (2d) 724 (1962).

1972The cases of Peurifoy v. Loyal , 154 S.C. 267 , 151 S.E. 579 , and Fidelity Fire Ins.

1972The cases of Peurifoy v. Loyal , 154 S.C. 267 , 151 S.E. 579 , and Fidelity Fire Ins.

1963Washington v. Muse, 150 S. C. 414, 148 S. E. 227 ; Hewitt v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 235 S. C. 201, 110 S. E. (2d) 852 ; Fruehauf Trailer Company v. McElmurray, 236 S. C. 141, 113 S. E. (2d) 756 .

1959Co., 59 S. C. 1, 37 S. E. 20 .” In the case of Swygert v. Wingard, 48 S. C. 321, 26 S. E. 653, 654 , we said: “This court has so often held that the proper office of an exception is to point out some specific error complained of, and that an exception faulty in this respect will not be considered, that it is not necessary to cite any of the numerous cases upon the subject.” The object of an exception is to present some distinct principle or question of law which the appellant claims to have been violated by the Court in the trial of the case from which the appeal is taken, and to present it in

1959Co., 59 S. C. 1, 37 S. E. 20 .” In the case of Swygert v. Wingard, 48 S. C. 321, 26 S. E. 653, 654 , we said: “This court has so often held that the proper office of an exception is to point out some specific error complained of, and that an exception faulty in this respect will not be considered, that it is not necessary to cite any of the numerous cases upon the subject.” The object of an exception is to present some distinct principle or question of law which the appellant claims to have been violated by the Court in the trial of the case from which the appeal is taken, and to present it in

1940Our Court has con *389 strued it in the following language: “ * * * This provision of the constitution has been construed in several cases by this court, and in State v. White, 15 S. C., 381, * * * it is said ‘that the real object of this clause of the constitution is to leave the decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expressions of opinion by the Judge. * * * ’ ” State v. Davis, 27 S. C., 609, 4 S. E., 567, 568 .

1940“In Norton v. Livingston, 14 S. C., 177, the Court said: 'The points of law wherein error is charged should be specifically stated in exceptions, otherwise the Court has no guide as to the points contested. * * * This Court is excluded from considering the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, or any other question except errors of law; and it is indispensable to the satisfactory discharge of their duty that these questions, submitted for their consideration, should be separately and distinctly stated.’ ” The appellant takes the position that under the holding in the case of State v. Grego

1940In the case of Enlee v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 110 S. C., 137, 96 S. E., 490, 492 , the Court said: “* * * The purpose of the section of the Constitution is to prevent the trial Judge from intimating to the jury his opinion of the case what weight or credence should be given the evidence and participating in any manner with the jury’s finding of fact. * * *” (Italics added.) In an able and elaborate opinion by Circuit Judge W.

1938In construing this constitutional provision, as declared in the Constitution of 1868, it was said in the case of State v. James, 31 S. C. [218], at page 235, 9 S. E., 844 , that, in stating the testimony as then allowed “the judge must be careful to avoid expressing, or even intimating, any opinion as to the *64 facts, and that if he does so, whether intentionally or unintentionally, a new trial must be granted.

1938Some of the earlier cases are reviewed in State v. Johnson, 85 S. C., 265, 67 S. E., 453 , from which we quote: “In State v. White, 15 S. C. [381], 392, the Court said: ‘The real object of this clause of the Constitution is to leave the decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expression of the opinion by the judge, whose position would very naturally add great weight to any opinion he might express upon any question of fact arising in a case.’ “In State v. Howell, 28 S. C. [250], 255, 5 S. E., 617 , the court said: ‘The jury must be left perfectly free in

1938Some of the earlier cases are reviewed in State v. Johnson, 85 S. C., 265, 67 S. E., 453 , from which we quote: “In State v. White, 15 S. C. [381], 392, the Court said: ‘The real object of this clause of the Constitution is to leave the decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expression of the opinion by the judge, whose position would very naturally add great weight to any opinion he might express upon any question of fact arising in a case.’ “In State v. Howell, 28 S. C. [250], 255, 5 S. E., 617 , the court said: ‘The jury must be left perfectly free in

1924And yet the incontestable clause in cases of suicide has been almost universally upheld by the Courts *239 against attacks upon the ground of public policy; the Supreme Court of the United States, in the comparatively recent case of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, supra, saying: “The object of the clause is plain and laudable — to create an absolute assurance of the benefit, as free as may be from any dispute of fact except the fact of death, and as soon as it reasonably can be done. * * * The state decisions, so far as we know, have upheld it.

1910In State v. White, 15 S. C., 392, the Court said: “The real object of this clause of the Constitution is to leave the *283 decision of all questions of fact to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expression of opinion by the Judge, whose position would naturally add great weight to any opinion he might express upon any question of fact arising in a case.” In State v. Howell, 28 S. C., 255, 5 S. E., 617 , the Court said: “The jury must be left perfectly free in reaching a conclusion upon the testimony introduced, untrammelled by any intimation from the Judge as to whether a certain fact a