object rule in Arizona

1971DuPont v. Mills, 39 Del. 42 , 196 A. 168 , 119 A.L.R. 174 (1937); Frazier, supra. Thus, we find no merit in appellant’s reliance on Ehrenreich v. Fox Film Corporation, 198 App.Div. 10 , 189 N.Y.S. 488 (1921) where language like that of A.R.S. § 13-685 was found to mean that restoration was a complete defense since there the court did not also have before it a counterpart to A.R.S. § 13-686.

1971DuPont v. Mills, 39 Del. 42 , 196 A. 168 , 119 A.L.R. 174 (1937); Frazier, supra. Thus, we find no merit in appellant’s reliance on Ehrenreich v. Fox Film Corporation, 198 App.Div. 10 , 189 N.Y.S. 488 (1921) where language like that of A.R.S. § 13-685 was found to mean that restoration was a complete defense since there the court did not also have before it a counterpart to A.R.S. § 13-686.

1971DuPont v. Mills, 39 Del. 42 , 196 A. 168 , 119 A.L.R. 174 (1937); Frazier, supra. Thus, we find no merit in appellant’s reliance on Ehrenreich v. Fox Film Corporation, 198 App.Div. 10 , 189 N.Y.S. 488 (1921) where language like that of A.R.S. § 13-685 was found to mean that restoration was a complete defense since there the court did not also have before it a counterpart to A.R.S. § 13-686.

1971DuPont v. Mills, 39 Del. 42 , 196 A. 168 , 119 A.L.R. 174 (1937); Frazier, supra. Thus, we find no merit in appellant’s reliance on Ehrenreich v. Fox Film Corporation, 198 App.Div. 10 , 189 N.Y.S. 488 (1921) where language like that of A.R.S. § 13-685 was found to mean that restoration was a complete defense since there the court did not also have before it a counterpart to A.R.S. § 13-686.

1966As we stated in State v. Goff, 99 Ariz. 79 , 407 P.2d 55 : “The objective of criminal procedures is to establish rules by which the truth may be ascertained so as to determine the guilt or innocence of those suspected or charged with offenses. * * * ” 99 Ariz. at 83 , 407 P.2d at 57 .

1966As we stated in State v. Goff, 99 Ariz. 79 , 407 P.2d 55 : “The objective of criminal procedures is to establish rules by which the truth may be ascertained so as to determine the guilt or innocence of those suspected or charged with offenses. * * * ” 99 Ariz. at 83 , 407 P.2d at 57 .

1960C, the Department of Law “may institute action * * * for recovery of escheats * * *.” Also, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1841, in any proceeding in which a “statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, *145 the attorney general of the state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.” As stated in Ethington v. Wright, 66 Ariz. 382, 388 , 189 P.2d 209 , 213: “The object of this requirement is to protect the state and its citizens should the parties be indifferent to the outcome of the litigation.” See also, Valley National Bank of Phoenix v.

1960C, the Department of Law “may institute action * * * for recovery of escheats * * *.” Also, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1841, in any proceeding in which a “statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, *145 the attorney general of the state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.” As stated in Ethington v. Wright, 66 Ariz. 382, 388 , 189 P.2d 209 , 213: “The object of this requirement is to protect the state and its citizens should the parties be indifferent to the outcome of the litigation.” See also, Valley National Bank of Phoenix v.

1960C, the Department of Law “may institute action * * * for recovery of escheats * * *.” Also, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1841, in any proceeding in which a “statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, *145 the attorney general of the state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.” As stated in Ethington v. Wright, 66 Ariz. 382, 388 , 189 P.2d 209 , 213: “The object of this requirement is to protect the state and its citizens should the parties be indifferent to the outcome of the litigation.” See also, Valley National Bank of Phoenix v.

1960C, the Department of Law “may institute action * * * for recovery of escheats * * *.” Also, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1841, in any proceeding in which a “statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, *145 the attorney general of the state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.” As stated in Ethington v. Wright, 66 Ariz. 382, 388 , 189 P.2d 209 , 213: “The object of this requirement is to protect the state and its citizens should the parties be indifferent to the outcome of the litigation.” See also, Valley National Bank of Phoenix v.

1953In Bucy v. Nevada Construction Company, 9 Cir., 125 F.2d 213, 218 , the court pointed out the object of this rule in the following language: "* * * As pointed out in the discussions of Rule 46, the function of an exception was to bring pointedly to the attention of the trial judge the importance of the ruling from the standpoint of the lawyer and to give the trial judge an opportunity to make further reflection regarding his ruling.

1953In Bucy v. Nevada Construction Company, 9 Cir., 125 F.2d 213, 218 , the court pointed out the object of this rule in the following language: “* * * As pointed out in the' discussions of Rule 46, the function of an exception was to bring pointedly to the attention of the trial judge the importance of the ruling from the standpoint of the lawyer and to give the trial judge an opportunity to make further reflection regarding his ruling.

1946Such being the case, when the question involved is the carrying out of this public *287 policy by a public agency, we think that no question of estoppel as between the carriers can arise, and that the commission must determine whether the certificate applied for shall issue on the basis laid down by the law.” Chief Justice Stanford, in support of his conclusion that the commission was correct in determining that the applicant proposed to serve virgin territory, cites the following cases: Gilbert v. Public Utilities Commission, 131 Ohio St. 392 , 3 N.E.2d 46 ; Wheeling, Clarissville and Cambrid

1946Such being the case, when the question involved is the carrying out of this public *287 policy by a public agency, we think that no question of estoppel as between the carriers can arise, and that the commission must determine whether the certificate applied for shall issue on the basis laid down by the law.” Chief Justice Stanford, in support of his conclusion that the commission was correct in determining that the applicant proposed to serve virgin territory, cites the following cases: Gilbert v. Public Utilities Commission, 131 Ohio St. 392 , 3 N.E.2d 46 ; Wheeling, Clarissville and Cambrid

1946As so well said by the Supreme Court in Corporation Commission v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, 54 Ariz. at page 178 , 94 P.2d at page 451 : “* * * As we have stated, the regulated monopoly, which is the public policy of the State of Arizona, was not established primarily for the benefit of the public service corporations affected thereby, but for the benefit of the general public, any benefits accruing to these corporations being merely incidental to the principal object of the rule.

1946As so well said by the Supreme Court in Corporation Commission v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, 54 Ariz. at page 178 , 94 P.2d at page 451 : “* * * As we have stated, the regulated monopoly, which is the public policy of the State of Arizona, was not established primarily for the benefit of the public service corporations affected thereby, but for the benefit of the general public, any benefits accruing to these corporations being merely incidental to the principal object of the rule.