object requirement in Oregon

2006Id.

2006Id. at 610 .

1958The test, so far as one can be formulated, is: “Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession, for the object of the rule is not to exclude a confession of the truth but to avoid the possibility of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact innocent.” State v. Green, supra, 128 Or at 62 ; State v. Folkes, supra, 174 Or at 580 ; State v. Linn, supra, 179 Or at 507 .

1946The rule has been stated thus: “Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession, for the object of the rule is not to exclude a confession of the truth but to avoid the possibility of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact innocent.” State v. Green, 128 Or. 49 , 273 P. 381 .

2022The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 US 410 , 126 S Ct 1951 , 164 L Ed 2d 689 (2006), supports that analysis.

2022The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 US 410 , 126 S Ct 1951 , 164 L Ed 2d 689 (2006), supports that analysis.

2022Plaintiff asks us to reason from the status of the speaker to determine whether the topic is of public concern, going so far as to suggest that, whenever a competitor or its employee speaks about Cite as 369 Or 806 (2022) 831 another business, the speech is of purely private concern.

2020On the one hand, Simonov adverts 802 State v. Haltom to a default rule whereby, in the absence of any specification of the required mental state in a statute defining a crimi- nal offense, any one of three mental states—criminal negli- gence, recklessness, or knowledge—will suffice with respect to a “circumstance” element, while, for a “conduct” element, either knowledge or intention is required. 358 Or at 539 - 40.

1979There the Court referred to the object of the requirement to secure “a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237, 242-243 , 15 S Ct 337 , 39 L Ed 409 (1895), quoted at 390 US 721 .

1979There the Court referred to the object of the requirement to secure “a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237, 242-243 , 15 S Ct 337 , 39 L Ed 409 (1895), quoted at 390 US 721 .

1978Citing Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, 113 US 205 , 5 S Ct 423 , 28 L Ed 959 (1885), which had construed the same language in the California Admission Act, the court said that the object of this clause: "* * * was to preserve the rivers as highways equally open to all persons without preference to any, and unobstructed by duties or tolls, and thus prevent the use of the navigable streams by private parties to the exclusion of the public, and the exaction of toll for their navigation. * * * As thus construed the clause would prevent any exclusive use of the navigable waters of the State—a

1978Citing Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, 113 US 205 , 5 S Ct 423 , 28 L Ed 959 (1885), which had construed the same language in the California Admission Act, the court said that the object of this clause: "* * * was to preserve the rivers as highways equally open to all persons without preference to any, and unobstructed by duties or tolls, and thus prevent the use of the navigable streams by private parties to the exclusion of the public, and the exaction of toll for their navigation. * * * As thus construed the clause would prevent any exclusive use of the navigable waters of the State—a

1978Citing Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, 113 US 205 , 5 S Ct 423 , 28 L Ed 959 (1885), which had construed the same language in the California Admission Act, the court said that the object of this clause: "* * * was to preserve the rivers as highways equally open to all persons without preference to any, and unobstructed by duties or tolls, and thus prevent the use of the navigable streams by private parties to the exclusion of the public, and the exaction of toll for their navigation. * * * As thus construed the clause would prevent any exclusive use of the navigable waters of the State—a

1958The test, so far as one can be formulated, is: “Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession, for the object of the rule is not to exclude a confession of the truth but to avoid the possibility of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact innocent.” State v. Green, supra, 128 Or at 62 ; State v. Folkes, supra, 174 Or at 580 ; State v. Linn, supra, 179 Or at 507 .

1958The test, so far as one can be formulated, is: “Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession, for the object of the rule is not to exclude a confession of the truth but to avoid the possibility of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact innocent.” State v. Green, supra, 128 Or at 62 ; State v. Folkes, supra, 174 Or at 580 ; State v. Linn, supra, 179 Or at 507 .

1928The only fair test, if such it may be called, which can be applied is this: Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession, for the object of the rule is not to exclude a confession of the truth but to avoid the possibility of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact innocent: State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512 ( 90 Pac. 981 , 119 Am.

1928The only fair test, if such it may be called, which can be applied is this: Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession, for the object of the rule is not to exclude a confession of the truth but to avoid the possibility of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact innocent: State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512 ( 90 Pac. 981 , 119 Am.

1927The language of Mr. Justice Belt used in the opinion of U’Ren v. Bagley, 118 Or. 77 , on pages 82 and 83, of the Report (46 A. L.

1921That such testimony is admissible, see State v. Welch, 33 Or. pp. 33, 37 ( 54 Pac. 213 ).

1919An appeal, being a statutory right, the method prescribed by statute must be strictly pursued: Donart v. Stewart, 63 Or. 76 ( 126 Pac. 608 ); Lewis v. Chamberlain, 61 Or. 150 ( 121 Pac. 430 ); Baskin v. Marion County, 70 Or. 363 ( 141 Pac. 1014 ), and cases there cited.

1919An appeal, being a statutory right, the method prescribed by statute must be strictly pursued: Donart v. Stewart, 63 Or. 76 ( 126 Pac. 608 ); Lewis v. Chamberlain, 61 Or. 150 ( 121 Pac. 430 ); Baskin v. Marion County, 70 Or. 363 ( 141 Pac. 1014 ), and cases there cited.

1919An appeal, being a statutory right, the method prescribed by statute must be strictly pursued: Donart v. Stewart, 63 Or. 76 ( 126 Pac. 608 ); Lewis v. Chamberlain, 61 Or. 150 ( 121 Pac. 430 ); Baskin v. Marion County, 70 Or. 363 ( 141 Pac. 1014 ), and cases there cited.

1919An appeal, being a statutory right, the method prescribed by statute must be strictly pursued: Donart v. Stewart, 63 Or. 76 ( 126 Pac. 608 ); Lewis v. Chamberlain, 61 Or. 150 ( 121 Pac. 430 ); Baskin v. Marion County, 70 Or. 363 ( 141 Pac. 1014 ), and cases there cited.

1919An appeal, being a statutory right, the method prescribed by statute must be strictly pursued: Donart v. Stewart, 63 Or. 76 ( 126 Pac. 608 ); Lewis v. Chamberlain, 61 Or. 150 ( 121 Pac. 430 ); Baskin v. Marion County, 70 Or. 363 ( 141 Pac. 1014 ), and cases there cited.

1919An appeal, being a statutory right, the method prescribed by statute must be strictly pursued: Donart v. Stewart, 63 Or. 76 ( 126 Pac. 608 ); Lewis v. Chamberlain, 61 Or. 150 ( 121 Pac. 430 ); Baskin v. Marion County, 70 Or. 363 ( 141 Pac. 1014 ), and cases there cited.

1897In Ah Lep v. Gong Choy, 13 Or. 429 ( 11 Pac. 72 ), the court, in considering these provisions of the statute, said: “We think the clerk is required to certify as to both undertakings, where two are given, and that the object of the requirement is to enable the appellant, in case the judgment or decree is reversed, and it has been enforced by the giving of such undertaking, to obtain judgment against the sureties upon the respondent’s undertaking.

1897In Ah Lep v. Gong Choy, 13 Or. 429 ( 11 Pac. 72 ), the court, in considering these provisions of the statute, said: “We think the clerk is required to certify as to both undertakings, where two are given, and that the object of the requirement is to enable the appellant, in case the judgment or decree is reversed, and it has been enforced by the giving of such undertaking, to obtain judgment against the sureties upon the respondent’s undertaking.

1888In Day v. Holland, supra, the ground of Judge Lord’s dissent was the construction given a like section of the California Code by the Supreme Court of that State, although his opinion indicates that he regarded the section as a statutory declaration of the principle as it existed at the common law, and in the absence of the decisions to which he referred, he would have applied that construction to it which would have been in conformity to what is here said.