list factors in Oregon

2025Cite as 340 Or App 318 (2025) 325 were ‘the product of an earlier Miranda violation’—by con- sidering ‘all relevant circumstances,’ which include [the five Jarnagin factors].” (Quoting Jarnagin, 351 Or at 716 .)).

2025Cite as 340 Or App 318 (2025) 325 were ‘the product of an earlier Miranda violation’—by con- sidering ‘all relevant circumstances,’ which include [the five Jarnagin factors].” (Quoting Jarnagin, 351 Or at 716 .)).

2025S. R. v. Dept. of Human Services, 319 Or App 149, 156-59 , 510 P3d 209 (2022) (recognizing that the appellant “expressly identified a judgment that was not the judgment that he sought to challenge,” namely a limited judgment disposing of a negligent inflic- tion of emotional distress claim, but concluding that the notice of appeal none- theless gave jurisdictionally adequate notice of the correct judgment on appeal within the 30-day time limit from that judgment).

2025S. R. v. Dept. of Human Services, 319 Or App 149, 156-59 , 510 P3d 209 (2022) (recognizing that the appellant “expressly identified a judgment that was not the judgment that he sought to challenge,” namely a limited judgment disposing of a negligent inflic- tion of emotional distress claim, but concluding that the notice of appeal none- theless gave jurisdictionally adequate notice of the correct judgment on appeal within the 30-day time limit from that judgment).

2022Instead, plaintiff urges this court to announce, as a new rule, that “[t]hird- party records are admissible under OEC 803(6) where the party propounding the records adopted and relied upon those records in the regular course of its own business, and where the records demonstrate sufficient indicia of trust- worthiness.” According to plaintiff, under its proposed rule, “[w]hether sufficient indicia of trustworthiness exist to admit third-party business records will generally be a mat- ter committed to the discretion of the trial court.” Plaintiff offers a list of factors that a trial court shou

2021Regarding defendant’s third assignment of error, under State v. Sassarini, 300 Or App 106, 126 , 452 P3d 457 (2019), OEC 901(1) represents a “flexible approach to authentication” that simply “requires the proponent of evi- dence to establish a prima facie case of authenticity,” i.e., “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Though State v. Miller, 6 Or App 366, 369-70 , 487 P2d 1387 (1971) sets out a list of factors for authentication, these are not rigid.

2021Regarding defendant’s third assignment of error, under State v. Sassarini, 300 Or App 106, 126 , 452 P3d 457 (2019), OEC 901(1) represents a “flexible approach to authentication” that simply “requires the proponent of evi- dence to establish a prima facie case of authenticity,” i.e., “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Though State v. Miller, 6 Or App 366, 369-70 , 487 P2d 1387 (1971) sets out a list of factors for authentication, these are not rigid.

2021Regarding defendant’s third assignment of error, under State v. Sassarini, 300 Or App 106, 126 , 452 P3d 457 (2019), OEC 901(1) represents a “flexible approach to authentication” that simply “requires the proponent of evi- dence to establish a prima facie case of authenticity,” i.e., “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Though State v. Miller, 6 Or App 366, 369-70 , 487 P2d 1387 (1971) sets out a list of factors for authentication, these are not rigid.

2021Regarding defendant’s third assignment of error, under State v. Sassarini, 300 Or App 106, 126 , 452 P3d 457 (2019), OEC 901(1) represents a “flexible approach to authentication” that simply “requires the proponent of evi- dence to establish a prima facie case of authenticity,” i.e., “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Though State v. Miller, 6 Or App 366, 369-70 , 487 P2d 1387 (1971) sets out a list of factors for authentication, these are not rigid.

2021If Congress had Cite as 314 Or App 385 (2021) 391 intended a traditional balancing test—in which multiple factors are set forth for a court to consider and to exercise broad discretion in balancing—we believe that Congress would have used different statutory language than it did.

2020Under Southern Pacific, therefore, Defendant must examine whether a company subject to Oregon central assessment also “uses” the non-Oregon property,17 including Pacific Transportation v. Dept. of Rev., 9 OTR 481, 483 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 295 Or 47 , 664 P2d 401 (1983). 16 For this reason, the court rejected this court’s attempt in that case to determine the scope of the unit based solely on a list of factors demonstrating the presence or absence of integration.

2020Under Southern Pacific, therefore, Defendant must examine whether a company subject to Oregon central assessment also “uses” the non-Oregon property,17 including Pacific Transportation v. Dept. of Rev., 9 OTR 481, 483 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 295 Or 47 , 664 P2d 401 (1983). 16 For this reason, the court rejected this court’s attempt in that case to determine the scope of the unit based solely on a list of factors demonstrating the presence or absence of integration.

2020Cite as 305 Or App 389 (2020) 403 the same statute at issue in that case.

2019Id. " 260 F.3d at 1027-28 (brackets in original; emphasis added).

2016The list included many of the factors now listed in ORS 475.900, including “[t]he presence of drug transaction records or customer lists.” Id.

2013Id. at 102-09 .

2013Id.

2011The list of factors in the Restatement for determining “whether a conversion occurs is nonexclusive * * * and no one factor is considered dispositive.” Becker v. Pacific Forest Industries, Inc., 229 Or App 112, 116 , 211 P3d 284 (2009).

2011The list of factors in the Restatement for determining “whether a conversion occurs is nonexclusive * * * and no one factor is considered dispositive.” Becker v. Pacific Forest Industries, Inc., 229 Or App 112, 116 , 211 P3d 284 (2009).

2009The above list of factors to be considered in determining whether a conversion occurs is nonexclusive, Mustola, 253 Or at 666 , and no one factor is considered dispositive, Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 707 , 64 P3d 1193 (2003).

2009The above list of factors to be considered in determining whether a conversion occurs is nonexclusive, Mustola, 253 Or at 666 , and no one factor is considered dispositive, Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 707 , 64 P3d 1193 (2003).

2009The above list of factors to be considered in determining whether a conversion occurs is nonexclusive, Mustola, 253 Or at 666 , and no one factor is considered dispositive, Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 707 , 64 P3d 1193 (2003).

2009Cooksey, 203 Or App at 167 .

2001As mother argued before the special master, this rule is consistent with Mock and Sceva, 143 Or App 362 , 923 P2d 1310 (1996) (the parties’ agreement establishing an amount of child support different from the presumptive amount is not ipso facto void, but may be considered by the trial court and incorporated into whatever award the court makes); Petersen and Petersen, 132 Or App 190 , 888 P2d 23 (1994) (the child support guidelines do not contain an exclusive list of factors that a court may consider in determining whether to award child support and the amount thereof, but, rather, the court m

2001As mother argued before the special master, this rule is consistent with Mock and Sceva, 143 Or App 362 , 923 P2d 1310 (1996) (the parties’ agreement establishing an amount of child support different from the presumptive amount is not ipso facto void, but may be considered by the trial court and incorporated into whatever award the court makes); Petersen and Petersen, 132 Or App 190 , 888 P2d 23 (1994) (the child support guidelines do not contain an exclusive list of factors that a court may consider in determining whether to award child support and the amount thereof, but, rather, the court m

2001As mother argued before the special master, this rule is consistent with Mock and Sceva, 143 Or App 362 , 923 P2d 1310 (1996) (the parties’ agreement establishing an amount of child support different from the presumptive amount is not ipso facto void, but may be considered by the trial court and incorporated into whatever award the court makes); Petersen and Petersen, 132 Or App 190 , 888 P2d 23 (1994) (the child support guidelines do not contain an exclusive list of factors that a court may consider in determining whether to award child support and the amount thereof, but, rather, the court m

2001As mother argued before the special master, this rule is consistent with Mock and Sceva, 143 Or App 362 , 923 P2d 1310 (1996) (the parties’ agreement establishing an amount of child support different from the presumptive amount is not ipso facto void, but may be considered by the trial court and incorporated into whatever award the court makes); Petersen and Petersen, 132 Or App 190 , 888 P2d 23 (1994) (the child support guidelines do not contain an exclusive list of factors that a court may consider in determining whether to award child support and the amount thereof, but, rather, the court m