list factors in California

2026The list of factors considered in People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 , is not exhaustive.

2025The list of factors considered in People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 , is not exhaustive.

2022This list of factors is meant to provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the other.” (Filip, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 834 .) The trial court is not limited to the specific factors listed in section 3439.04 subdivision (b).

2020This list of factors is meant to provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the other. [Citation.]” (Filip, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 834 .) One other section of the UFTA particularly apt here is Civil Code section 3432, which provides as follows: “A debtor may pay one creditor in preference to another, or may give to one creditor security for the payment of his demand in preference to another.” And finally pertinent here—with the transfers from Robertson to her sister Bennett—are the cases that recognize that such transfers be given “strict scrutiny.” (See Wood v.

2016(Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2469 .) Miller determined that the Eighth Amendment does not necessarily foreclose an LWOP sentence on a juvenile but the trial court, before imposing such a sentence, must “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” (Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 6 . p. 2469.) Miller sets forth a list of factors for the trial court to determine before imposing an LWOP sentence, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; whether “the family

2016(Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2469 .) Miller determined that the Eighth Amendment does not necessarily foreclose an LWOP sentence on a juvenile but the trial court, before imposing such a sentence, must “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” (Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 6 . p. 2469.) Miller sets forth a list of factors for the trial court to determine before imposing an LWOP sentence, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; whether “the family

2026(Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 526–530.) The appellate court recommended a list of factors, not meant to be exhaustive, which should be considered.

2023(Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 526–530.) The appellate court then determined a list of factors that may be considered: the seriousness of the problem leading to dependency and the reason that problem was not overcome by the final review; the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers and the length of time a child has been in the dependency system in relationship to the parental bond; and, the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.

2024Instructing a jury with the list of factors identified in 8 Banks and Clark remains optional for trial court judges and our Supreme Court has confirmed “the mandatory [jury] instructions did not change in the wake of Banks and Clark . . . .” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at 719 .) To be sure, major participant and reckless indifference findings that pre-date Banks and Clark often do not foreclose relief under section 1172.6, but the reason this is so is not because juries must be instructed on all the particulars of the factors our Supreme Court identified in those cases.

2024Code, § 2.02, subd. (2)(c).)” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 677.) In Clark, our Supreme Court handed down a list of factors to consider in determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life: (1) The defendant’s use of, or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons; (2) The defendant’s physical presence at the crime, and the opportunities to limit it and/or to aid the victim(s); (3) The duration of the felony and restraint of the victim(s); (4) The defendant’s awareness that an associate is likely to kill; and (5) The defendant’s efforts to minimize th

2024(Clark, at p. 617; In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 677.) 9 Factors to consider include use or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623.) This list of factors overlaps with those identified in connection with the major participation inquiry in Banks.

2024Code, § 2.02, subd. (2)(c).)” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 677.) In Clark, our Supreme Court handed down a list of factors to consider in determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life: (1) The defendant’s use of, or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons; (2) The defendant’s physical presence at the crime, and the opportunities to limit it and/or to aid the victim(s); (3) The duration of the felony and restraint of the victim(s); (4) The defendant’s awareness that an associate is likely to kill; and (5) The defendant’s efforts to minimize th

2016(See Guardianship of Thrasher (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 768 [ 234 P.2d 230 ] (Thrasher) 18 ) when there was relatively greater use of state mental hospitals to care for such *508 spouses). 19 The statute then moves on to a list of factors to be used by the probate court in establishing an order for support and maintenance of a conservatee spouse, and those factors are a short version of the factors given in section 4320 of the Family Code to determine spousal support. 20 And, similar to traditional spousal support in family law cases, section 3088 envisions support being paid in periodic payments.

2016(See Guardianship of Thrasher (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 768 [ 234 P.2d 230 ] (Thrasher) 18 ) when there was relatively greater use of state mental hospitals to care for such *508 spouses). 19 The statute then moves on to a list of factors to be used by the probate court in establishing an order for support and maintenance of a conservatee spouse, and those factors are a short version of the factors given in section 4320 of the Family Code to determine spousal support. 20 And, similar to traditional spousal support in family law cases, section 3088 envisions support being paid in periodic payments.

2001Approval of the Settlement In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, such as “the *245 strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (Dunk, supra, 48

2000Both the federal circuit courts and our Court of Appeal have adopted a mix of relevant considerations, including “[1] the strength of plaintiffs’ case, [2] the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, [3] the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, [4] the amount offered in settlement, [5] the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [6] the experience and views of counsel, . . . and [7] the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” {Dunk, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1801 .) The list of factors is not exhaustive

2026(People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162 ; accord, People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172-173 (Torres); People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 455 (Saldana).) This court has 11 considered the same list of factors.

2022(Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162 ; accord, People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172-173 ; People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 455 (Saldana); People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403-1404 (Pilster).) This court has considered the same list of factors.

2024(Citing People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096 , 1116- 1117.) “The weighing process under section 352 depends upon the trial court’s consideration of the unique facts and issues of each case, rather than upon the mechanical application of automatic rules.” (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314 .) Here, the trial court was aware of and properly exercised its duty to weigh the relative probative value of the proffered evidence against the likelihood of undue prejudice.

2021(People v. Nguyen, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116 .) The California Supreme Court has delineated a more complete list of factors such as the uncharged conduct’s “ ‘nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitt

2024(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 ; People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37 , 44; Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 465.) As the parties agree, a judgment is not yet final under Estrada when a defendant is placed on probation with execution of sentence suspended, as Tapia was.

2023(See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393 , 400.) 5 Senate Bill No. 567 also amended section 1170 to provide that “unless the [trial] court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term” if one of a list of factors “was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170(b)(6); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) One such factor is that the defendant was under 26 years old at the time of the offense. (§§ 1016.7,

2023Legal Principles “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘ “a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.” ’ ” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 .) We review “de novo whether this ‘ “essential prerequisite” ’ to recover is satisfied.” (Id. at p. 398.) “Biakanja set forth a list of factors that inform whether a duty of care exists between a plaintiff and defendant in the absence of privity: ‘the extent to which the transaction was intended

2023However, as the Supreme Court 10 The Supreme Court in Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at page 401 explained the Biakanja balancing test applies a subset of the factors used in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 , 112 to 113 for consideration of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff not in privity with the defendant.

2022(Id. at pp. 618– 623.) Because the major participant and reckless indifference elements often “ ‘significantly overlap’ ” (id. at p. 615, quoting Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 153 ), this list of factors also overlapped with those we had identified in connection with the major participation inquiry in Banks.

2022(Id. at pp. 618– 623.) Because the major participant and reckless indifference elements often “ ‘significantly overlap’ ” (id. at p. 615, quoting Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 153 ), this list of factors also overlapped with those we had identified in connection with the major participation inquiry in Banks.

2020This list of factors is meant to provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the other. [Citation.]” (Filip, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 834 .) One other section of the UFTA particularly apt here is Civil Code section 3432, which provides as follows: “A debtor may pay one creditor in preference to another, or may give to one creditor security for the payment of his demand in preference to another.” And finally pertinent here—with the transfers from Robertson to her sister Bennett—are the cases that recognize that such transfers be given “strict scrutiny.” (See Wood v.

2020This list of factors is meant to provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the other. [Citation.]” (Filip, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 834 .) One other section of the UFTA particularly apt here is Civil Code section 3432, which provides as follows: “A debtor may pay one creditor in preference to another, or may give to one creditor security for the payment of his demand in preference to another.” And finally pertinent here—with the transfers from Robertson to her sister Bennett—are the cases that recognize that such transfers be given “strict scrutiny.” (See Wood v.

2017Second, there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone." ( Sonora Diamond, supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 .) While courts have developed a list of factors that may be analyzed in making these determinations, "[t]here is no litmus test to determine when the corporate veil will be pierced; rather the result will depend on the circumstances of each particular case." ( Mesler , supra , 39 Cal.3d at p. 300 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 702 P.2d 601 .) Reverse veil piercing is similar to traditional veil piercing in that when

2017Second, there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone." ( Sonora Diamond, supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 .) While courts have developed a list of factors that may be analyzed in making these determinations, "[t]here is no litmus test to determine when the corporate veil will be pierced; rather the result will depend on the circumstances of each particular case." ( Mesler , supra , 39 Cal.3d at p. 300 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 702 P.2d 601 .) Reverse veil piercing is similar to traditional veil piercing in that when

2017In Hess , the court concluded that in this context the statute's **1100 reference to " 'may' means 'must' " because " ' "[w]ords permissive in form ... are considered as mandatory" ' " when duties of public entities like the Board are at issue. ( Hess , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1607 , 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 .) Neither Gerawan nor the Court of Appeal assigns any significance to the statute's use of the word "may," and the Court of Appeal simply assumed that a mediator " shall consider this list of factors." (Italics added.) We need not decide how to interpret "may" as used in section 1164, sub

2017In Hess , the court concluded that in this context the statute's **1100 reference to " 'may' means 'must' " because " ' "[w]ords permissive in form ... are considered as mandatory" ' " when duties of public entities like the Board are at issue. ( Hess , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1607 , 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 .) Neither Gerawan nor the Court of Appeal assigns any significance to the statute's use of the word "may," and the Court of Appeal simply assumed that a mediator " shall consider this list of factors." (Italics added.) We need not decide how to interpret "may" as used in section 1164, sub