list factors in Indiana

2016D.S.I. v. Natare Corp., 742 N.E.2d 15, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

2016D.S.I. v. Natare Corp., 742 N.E.2d 15, 27 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied. [21] Runnels’ Complaint advances that Ellis, as owner of KS & E Sports, used the store as its alter ego to promote the illegal activities and participate in the sale of the Smith & Wesson handgun in violation of state and federal laws, causing physical injury and associated harm to Runnels.

2013Id. (citing 509 U.S. at 593 - 594; Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting this list of factors is “non-exclusive”), reh’g denied).

2010The Daubert factors include whether the scientific theory or technique (1) can be and has been tested; (2) has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) has a known or potential error rate; (4) is governed by maintained standards controlling its operation; and (5) has gained widespread acceptance in a relevant scientific community. 509 U.S. at 593-94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ; see also Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (noting this list of factors is "non-exclusive").

2026“This list of factors is not necessarily exhaustive, and all factors need not be shown to support a decision to pierce the corporate veil.” Longhi v. Mazzoni, 914 N.E.2d 834, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. [16] The trial court found piercing the corporate veil was proper because Allure Pools “is undercapitalized, Watters made fraudulent representations, and used the corporate form to fraud and injustice[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 18.) Watters contends “[t]here is no evidence in the record to conclude Allure was Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-1703 | April 2, 2026 Page 16 of 18

2014Longhi v. Mazzoni, 914 N.E.2d 834, 839 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied (2010).

2026Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994).

2020State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 680 (Ind. 2019) (citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012)). 4 We have also identified a similar list of factors as significant in determining whether a person is in custody, including: whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions; whether there has been prolonged coercive, and accusatory questioning, or whether police have employed subterfuge in order to induce self-incrimination; the degree of police control over the environment in which 4 The majority cites State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 3

2020However, in Ruiz, our supreme court held that “freedom of movement is curtailed when a reasonable person would feel not free to terminate the interrogation and leave.”) (emphasis added) (citing Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 ).

2020State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 680 (Ind. 2019) (citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012)). 4 We have also identified a similar list of factors as significant in determining whether a person is in custody, including: whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions; whether there has been prolonged coercive, and accusatory questioning, or whether police have employed subterfuge in order to induce self-incrimination; the degree of police control over the environment in which 4 The majority cites State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 3

2020See In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 922-23 (adopting a list of factors for a trial court to consider when determining whether to permit an incarcerated parent to attend a TPR hearing).

2020State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 680 (Ind. 2019) (citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012)). 4 We have also identified a similar list of factors as significant in determining whether a person is in custody, including: whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions; whether there has been prolonged coercive, and accusatory questioning, or whether police have employed subterfuge in order to induce self-incrimination; the degree of police control over the environment in which 4 The majority cites State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 3

2020State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 680 (Ind. 2019) (citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012)). 4 We have also identified a similar list of factors as significant in determining whether a person is in custody, including: whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions; whether there has been prolonged coercive, and accusatory questioning, or whether police have employed subterfuge in order to induce self-incrimination; the degree of police control over the environment in which 4 The majority cites State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 3

2019Furthermore, “this list of factors is non-exhaustive.” Id. “[G]enerally ‘an independent contractor controls the method and details of his task and is answerable to the principal as to results only.’” Id. (quoting Detrick v. Midwest Pipe & Steel, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). [9] The designated evidence favorable to Willmon indicates that ACH provided a physician and a registered nurse to render healthcare at the PCJ.

2017Id. (“This listing is not exhaustive but merely illustrative.”).

2016The juvenile court abuses its discretion if its action is “clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” D.B. v. State, 842 N.E.2d 399, 404-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [14] Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 sets forth a list of factors that the juvenile court must consider in entering a dispositional decree, and provides as follows: If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that

2016D.B., 842 N.E.2d at 405 .

2015In Weeks v. State, our Supreme Court set out a list of factors bearing on the mitigating weight to be attributed to the defendant’s mental illness. 697 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998).

2015“These factors include: (1) the extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime.” Id.

2013In Williams v. State, 798 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), we explained that, “we do not believe the legislature intended these factors [of Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3] to serve as a litmus test nor do we believe that the list of factors need even be consulted if the character of the relationship is clearly ‘domestic.’” Roberts concedes that he and Miller “had a 10-year long relationship” during which they lived together and shared a bed.

2012See Wabash Grain, Inc. v. Bank One, 713 N.E.2d 323, 325 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

2007State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154, 165 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied (citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind.2002)). 2 Gauvin has presented no accusation that his statements were induced by violence, threats, or promises.

2007State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154, 165 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied (citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind.2002)). 2 Gauvin has presented no accusation that his statements were induced by violence, threats, or promises.

2006See, e.g., Taylor v. Buehler, 694 N.E.2d 1156 , *140 1160 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)[, trans. denied], describing the predecessor statute's list of factors as "the factors [that] must have been considered with regard to the initial custody-vigitation determination." See also In re Banning, 541 N.E.2d 283, 284 [ ] fn. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1989); Pence v. Pence, 667 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

2006See, e.g., Taylor v. Buehler, 694 N.E.2d 1156 , *140 1160 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)[, trans. denied], describing the predecessor statute's list of factors as "the factors [that] must have been considered with regard to the initial custody-vigitation determination." See also In re Banning, 541 N.E.2d 283, 284 [ ] fn. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1989); Pence v. Pence, 667 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

2006See, e.g., Taylor v. Buehler, 694 N.E.2d 1156 , *140 1160 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)[, trans. denied], describing the predecessor statute's list of factors as "the factors [that] must have been considered with regard to the initial custody-vigitation determination." See also In re Banning, 541 N.E.2d 283, 284 [ ] fn. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1989); Pence v. Pence, 667 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

2000In Minton v. Weaver, 697 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, this court held that “[I]t is possible that other evidence can constitute direct, clear, and convincing evidence capable of rebutting the marriage presumption.” Ind.Code Ann. § 29-1-2-7 (West 1998) provides as follows: (b) For the purpose of inheritance (on the paternal side) to, through, and from a child born out of wedlock, the child shall be treated as if the child’s father were married to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth, if one (1) of the following requirements is met: ^ ❖ (4) The putative fath