list factors in Texas

2025Id. at 372 ; In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 533 .

2025Id. at 372 ; In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 533 .

2024And, the Texas Supreme Court has provided a similar list of factors outlined in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976) to help determine a child’s best interest. 4 Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and “[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest—especially when the evidence shows the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety.” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18- 00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, p

2024And, the Texas Supreme Court has provided a similar list of factors outlined in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976) to help determine a child’s best interest. 2 Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and “[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest—especially when the evidence shows the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety.” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18- 00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, p

2011Sosa v. State , 845 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).

2011Sosa v. State , 845 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d) .

2023Id. (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 ).

2014Id. 5 A list of factors to consider in deciding best interest is found at section 263.307(b) of the Family Code.

2004Whitworth v. State, 808 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref'd).

2003Whitworth v. State, 808 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref'd).

2015This court previously noted that these factors “are more applicable when discussing the expectation of privacy in a place than in discussing the expectation of privacy in a computer hard drive or even a closed container.” Rogers v. State, 113 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.).

2015This court previously noted that these factors “are more applicable when discussing the expectation of privacy in a place than in discussing the expectation of privacy in a computer hard drive or even a closed container.” Rogers v. State, 113 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).

2006Jones v. State , 818 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.), citing Keeton v. State , 749 S.W.2d 861, 868 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).

1997See Keeton v. State , 749 S.W.2d 861, 866-868 (Tex. Crim.

2003It has been stated that the "affirmative link customarily emerges from an orchestration of several of a list of factors and the logical force they have in combination." Trejo v. State , 766 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no pet.).

1993Trejo v. State, 766 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tex.App.—Austin 1989, no pet.).

2015See Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 19 . 5 Appellant also argues that the jury’s finding was not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence because he voluntarily released complainant.

2015See Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 19 . 5 Appellant also argues that the jury's finding was not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence because he voluntarily released complainant.

2014See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (setting forth a list of factors that may be considered in assessing a defendant’s future dangerousness). .

1996In Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), we adopted a list of factors we would consider in considering an appellant’s claim the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the “future dangerousness” special issue: (1) the circumstances of the capital offense, including the defendant’s state of mind and whether he was working alone or with other parties; (2) the calculated nature of the defendant’s acts; (3) the forethought and deliberateness exhibited by the crime’s execution; (4) the existence of a prior criminal record, and the severity of the prior

2003Id. at 151-52. [3] This Court concluded While we today recognize the existence of the community caretaking function in Texas, we emphasize its narrow applicability.

2003Id. at 151-52. 3 This Court concluded While we today recognize the existence of the community caretaking function in Texas, we emphasize its narrow applicability.

2019“This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and none is dispositive of a particular assertion of privacy; rather we examine the circumstances surrounding the search in their totality.” Id.

2015“This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and none is dispositive of a particular assertion of privacy; rather, we examine the circumstances surrounding the search in their totality.” Id.

2023Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 .

1998In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson , the supreme court identified a list of factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex.1995).

2004Id. at 318-19 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex.1995)).

2000Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex.1998).

2023In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

2023In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

2020El Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero, S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622 , 634–35 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Daimler–Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 721 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

2019El Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero, S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622 , 634–35 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 19 2002, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Daimler–Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 721 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

2020El Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero, S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622 , 634–35 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Daimler–Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 721 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

2019El Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero, S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622 , 634–35 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 19 2002, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Daimler–Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 721 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

2019See Sterling v. State, 800 S.W.2d 513 , 519–20 (Tex. Crim.

2019See Sterling v. State, 800 S.W.2d 513 , 519–20 (Tex. Crim.

2015In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 55 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) Analysis & Argument The record in this case is silent as to most of the Holly and §263.307(b) factors.

2015In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 55 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) Analysis & Argument When all the evidence is considered in light of the Holly and §263.307(b) factors it is clear that no rational trier of fact could have formed a strong conviction or belief that severing the mother-child bond was in the children’s best interest.

2015Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 830-831 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d).

2002See Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 830-31 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd); Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd).

2015In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013) In cases where a governmental agency is the petitioner §263.307(a) states “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” §263.307(b) provides a list of factors to consider in determining whether a parent is willing to provide the child with a safe environment.

2015In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013) In cases where a governmental agency is the petitioner §263.307(a) states “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” §263.307(b) provides a list of factors to consider in determining whether a parent is willing to provide the child with a safe environment.

2013Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 291 (footnotes omitted) (citing 40 George E.

2013Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 291 (footnotes omitted).

2024“This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and none is dispositive of a particular assertion of privacy; rather, we examine the circumstances surrounding the search in their totality.” Id.

2015“This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and none is dispositive of a particular assertion of privacy; rather, [the court will] examine the circumstances surrounding the search in their totality.” Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 223 . - 45 - D.

2022Id. at 19 .

2020Kibble, 340 S.W.3d at 19 .

2025Id.

2022Similar to the links for establishing possession, the list of factors that our sister courts consider in determining whether a defendant had the intent to deliver includes “the nature of the location where the defendant was arrested, the quantity of drugs the defendant possessed, the manner of packaging the drugs, the presence or absence of drug paraphernalia, whether the defendant possessed a large amount of cash, and the defendant’s status as a drug user.” Hughitt v. State, 539 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. Crim.

2023See id. at 713–14.

2016Id.

2019In his appellant’s brief, appellant contends the evidence did not support the trial court’s implied finding that the fees awarded were reasonable and necessary.7 In Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997), the Texas Supreme Court set forth a list of factors to be considered when determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood . . . that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclu

2007Corp. , 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997) (both providing a list of factors to consider in determining whether an attorney’s fee is reasonable). 25: Gill Sav.