list factors in Connecticut

2025Recognizing that the federal constitution establishes a minimum national standard and that states are permit- ted to afford greater protections, in State v. Harris, supra, 330 Conn. 91 , we considered whether the due process provision of article first, § 8, of the state consti- tution ‘‘affords greater protection than the federal due process clause with respect to the admissibility of an eyewitness identification following an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure.’’ Id., 114.

2025In Neil v. Biggers, supra, 409 U.S. 188 , the United States Supreme Court set forth the following list of factors to aid courts in determining whether an unnec- essarily suggestive identification is reliable under the federal constitution: ‘‘[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the witness’ degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of his [or her] prior description of the criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated at the [identification], and [5] the time between the crime and the [identification].’’ Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. 114

2023A too ‘‘heavy focus on enumerated factors, or comparisons to other precedents, may eclipse the ultimate inquiry before the court, which is case specific: whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that there was a restraint on [his] freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311, 341 , 186 A.3d 672 (2018) (D’Auria, J., dissenting).

2023A too ‘‘heavy focus on enumerated factors, or comparisons to other precedents, may eclipse the ultimate inquiry before the court, which is case specific: whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that there was a restraint on [his] freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311, 341 , 186 A.3d 672 (2018) (D’Auria, J., dissenting).

2018The Salamon court set forth a list of factors "[f]or purposes of making [the] determination [of whether a criminal defendant's movement or confinement of a victim was necessary or incidental to the commission of another crime; specifically] the jury should be instructed to consider the various relevant factors, including [1] the nature and duration of the victim's movement or confinement by the defendant, [2] whether that movement or confinement occurred during the commission of the separate offense, [3] whether the restraint was inherent in the nature of the separate offense, [4] whether the

2018The Salamon court set forth a list of factors "[f]or purposes of making [the] determination [of whether a criminal defendant's movement or confinement of a victim was necessary or incidental to the commission of another crime; specifically] the jury should be instructed to consider the various relevant factors, including [1] the nature and duration of the victim's movement or confinement by the defendant, [2] whether that movement or confinement occurred during the commission of the separate offense, [3] whether the restraint was inherent in the nature of the separate offense, [4] whether the

2018"The Salamon court set forth a list of factors [f]or purposes of making [the] determination [of whether a criminal defendant's movement or confinement of a victim was necessary or incidental to the commission of another crime; specifically] the jury should be instructed to consider the various relevant factors, including [1] the nature and duration of the victim's movement or confinement by the defendant, [2] whether that movement or confinement occurred during the commission of the separate offense, [3] whether the restraint was inherent in the nature of the separate offense, [4] whether the

2018At this point, a discussion of Banks v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 184 Conn. App. at 101 , --- A.3d ----, facilitates our analysis.

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2017See Rockefeller v. Grabow , 136 Idaho 637 , 643, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) ; Kaye v. Rosefielde , supra, 223 N.J. at 237 , 121 A.3d 862 ; Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , supra, 157 N.J. at 521 -22 , 724 A.2d 783 ; Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 , 609, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) ; Burrow v. Arce , supra, 997 S.W.2d at 243 ; Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer , 94 Wis.2d 571 , 586, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980).

2006As set forth in footnote 16 of this opinion, the trial court provided a list that was merely illustrative of the potential causes of an extreme emotional disturbance, including “passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation or other similar emotions.” Indeed, we have specifically noted that these illustrative examples “are neither conclusive nor exclusive.” State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 351 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996); id. (“[i]n an effort to [interpret] the meaning of the phrase extreme emotional disturbance . . . [this court has] enumerated understandable guidelines for instructing a jury

2006As set forth in footnote 16 of this opinion, the trial court provided a list that was merely illustrative of the potential causes of an extreme emotional disturbance, including “passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation or other similar emotions.” Indeed, we have specifically noted that these illustrative examples “are neither conclusive nor exclusive.” State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 351 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996); id. (“[i]n an effort to [interpret] the meaning of the phrase extreme emotional disturbance . . . [this court has] enumerated understandable guidelines for instructing a jury

2002He contends that a jury instruction that fails to provide such guidance undermines a defendant’s rights to due process and to a fair trial pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. 3 Because he did not preserve his claim of an inadequate juiy instruction at trial, the defendant seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or the plain error doctrine.

2002He contends that a jury instruction that fails to provide such guidance undermines a defendant’s rights to due process and to a fair trial pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. 3 Because he did not preserve his claim of an inadequate juiy instruction at trial, the defendant seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or the plain error doctrine.

2001Lesser v. Lesser , 16 Conn. App. 513 (1988).

1998Ill The final certified issue in this appeal is: “Was the trial court correct in prohibiting the custodial parent from calling the attorney for the minor child as a witness to examine him with respect to his written report filed with the court recommending that the child’s best interest would be served if the child remains in Connecticut?” Ireland v. Ireland, supra, 243 Conn. 905 .

1996While not an exhaustive list, “courts have considered matters such as: the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing of the request,-, the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself; the availability of other, adequat

1996While not an exhaustive list, “courts have considered matters such as: the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing of the request,-, the likelihood that the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend himself; the availability of other, adequat