promissory estoppel doctrine in Florida

1994In Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital 190 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court approved the district court's rejection of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, [15] "as a sort of counteraction to the legislatively created Statute of Frauds." The supreme court cited with approval its holding in Yates v. Ball that the statute of frauds should be strictly construed, and the district court's observation that great caution should be exercised "in the consideration of the advisability of ingrafting onto the law of this State a provision *157 which may have the effect of nullifying th

1994In Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital 190 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court approved the district court's rejection of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, [15] "as a sort of counteraction to the legislatively created Statute of Frauds." The supreme court cited with approval its holding in Yates v. Ball that the statute of frauds should be strictly construed, and the district court's observation that great caution should be exercised "in the consideration of the advisability of ingrafting onto the law of this State a provision *157 which may have the effect of nullifying th

2019The Florida Supreme Court has explained that “the Statute of Frauds is a legislative prerogative, grounded in a policy judgment that certain contracts should not be enforced unless supported by written evidence.” DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So. 3d 85, 93 (Fla. 2013) (citing Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1966)).

2015The Florida Supreme Court has expressly • stated that the' Statute of Frauds cannot be circumvented by application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel Id. at 97 (“Application of the.

2019Inc., 757 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (concluding that trial court erred in entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the jury’s award on the promissory estoppel claim); W.R.

2018Inc., 757 So.2d 1231 , 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (concluding that trial court erred in entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the jury's award on the promissory estoppel claim); W.R.

2019Statute of Frauds Lastly, the statute of frauds requires a written contract for the sale of real estate and further “prohibits the oral modification of a contract for the sale of land under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Bradley, 943 So. 2d at 222 (citing Shore Holdings, Inc. v. Seagate Beach Quarters, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2010Id.

2011See Baxter’s Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. v. Liberty Cnty., 406 So.2d 461, 467-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (on rehearing) (allowing “costs in preparing ... bids as well as other ‘reliance’ damages,” but excluding lost profits because “it would be unjust to allow a recovery for loss of profits based on the theory of promissory estoppel due to a violation of a public bidding statute”), reversed, on other grounds by 421 So.2d 505 (Fla.1982); Royal Am.

1982Lastly, Baxter's argues that the district court was correct in awarding it damages based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel in that "the public entity by soliciting bids promised that the contract would be awarded to the lowest possible bidder, and that the rejected bidder reasonably and detrimentally relied on that promise." 406 So.2d at 466 .

2003The court then recognized an exception to the general rule that: "the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a qualified form of equitable estoppel ... applies to representations relating to a future act of the promisor rather than to an existing fact." 517 So.2d at 661-62 .

1990Wausau argued that Pox should have been covered by all of the insurance on the Alamo car (including the excess policies.) Wausau argued that coverage was created in favor of Fox under those policies under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, citing Crown Life Insurance Company v. McBride, 517 So.2d 660 (Fla.1987).

1988Watson, Inc., 172 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965), this court said: We find no Florida case which has applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

1977Watson, Inc., 172 So.2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)) should be considered and applied as the facts suggest after a hearing on the merits.

2019Statute of Frauds Lastly, the statute of frauds requires a written contract for the sale of real estate and further “prohibits the oral modification of a contract for the sale of land under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Bradley, 943 So. 2d at 222 (citing Shore Holdings, Inc. v. Seagate Beach Quarters, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2013I would instead exercise jurisdiction based on conflict with Bradley v. Sanchez, 943 So.2d 218, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), which held that an oral waiver regarding the timely performance of a contract requirement was invalid because “the statute of frauds prohibits the oral modification of a contract for the sale of land under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” On the merits, I agree with the analysis employed by the Fourth District Court.

2019Townsend Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Constr., Inc., 728 So. 2d 297, 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing order dismissing promissory estoppel claim and remanding with instructions for a jury trial).

2018Townsend Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Constr., Inc., 728 So.2d 297 , 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing order dismissing promissory estoppel claim and remanding with instructions for a jury trial).

2011See Baxter’s Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. v. Liberty Cnty., 406 So.2d 461, 467-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (on rehearing) (allowing “costs in preparing ... bids as well as other ‘reliance’ damages,” but excluding lost profits because “it would be unjust to allow a recovery for loss of profits based on the theory of promissory estoppel due to a violation of a public bidding statute”), reversed, on other grounds by 421 So.2d 505 (Fla.1982); Royal Am.

2011See Baxter’s Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. v. Liberty Cnty., 406 So.2d 461, 467-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (on rehearing) (allowing “costs in preparing ... bids as well as other ‘reliance’ damages,” but excluding lost profits because “it would be unjust to allow a recovery for loss of profits based on the theory of promissory estoppel due to a violation of a public bidding statute”), reversed, on other grounds by 421 So.2d 505 (Fla.1982); Royal Am.

2014See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.2009) (section 230 barred negligence claim against the internet service provider (ISP), but did not bar a promissory estoppel claim based on the ISP’s promise to remove from its website nude photographs of the plaintiff and other indecent materials posted by the plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend; the asserted liability for promissory estoppel was not based upon the ISP’s status as a publisher, but rather from its status as a promisor who displayed a manifest intention to be legally obligated to do something).

2013The Supreme Court of Kentucky, despite prior language appearing to endorse a promissory estoppel exception, recently dismissed such language as dicta and stated that “it is not clear that under Kentucky law promissory estoppel can defeat the Statute of Frauds.” Sawyer v. Mills, 295 S.W.3d 79, 89 (Ky.2009).

2012In Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc., 190 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla.1966), the Florida Supreme Court rejected the application of promissory estoppel as a defense, agreeing with this Court’s recognition that to do so would “ingraft[ ] onto the law of this State a provision which may have the effect of nullifying the legislative will of the State as expressed by the inactment [sic] of the Statute of Frauds.” Tanenbaum 190 So.2d at 778 (quoting Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 173 So.2d 492, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)).

2011Next, in Revlon Group Inc. v. LJS Realty, Inc., 579 So.2d 365, 367-68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), this court approved recovery of $144,000 for leasehold improvements made by the assignee of a lease, holding that the assignor was responsible under the “doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Finally, in Sunshine Bottling Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 757 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), on a promissory estoppel claim, the third district allowed recovery of $592,000 that a bottling company “expended in restructuring its plant.” Also, unsuccessful bidders for public contracts have been allowed reliance

2011Next, in Revlon Group Inc. v. LJS Realty, Inc., 579 So.2d 365, 367-68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), this court approved recovery of $144,000 for leasehold improvements made by the assignee of a lease, holding that the assignor was responsible under the “doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Finally, in Sunshine Bottling Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 757 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), on a promissory estoppel claim, the third district allowed recovery of $592,000 that a bottling company “expended in restructuring its plant.” Also, unsuccessful bidders for public contracts have been allowed reliance

2009Next to ALM’s name, the certificate states that “coverage applies only to those employees leased, not to subcontractors.” Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a party is estopped from denying liability where that party makes a “promise which [it] should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance ... [and] injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Criterion Leasing Group v. Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (q

2009Next to ALM's name, the certificate states that "coverage applies only to those employees leased, not to subcontractors." Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a party is estopped from denying liability where that party makes a "promise which [it] should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance ... [and] injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Criterion Leasing Group v. *646 Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 199

2009Next to ALM’s name, the certificate states that “coverage applies only to those employees leased, not to subcontractors.” Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a party is estopped from denying liability where that party makes a “promise which [it] should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance ... [and] injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Criterion Leasing Group v. Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (q

2009Next to ALM's name, the certificate states that "coverage applies only to those employees leased, not to subcontractors." Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a party is estopped from denying liability where that party makes a "promise which [it] should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance ... [and] injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Criterion Leasing Group v. *646 Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 199

2006Promissory Estoppel Pleading in the alternative, as they were entitled to do, see Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So.2d 63, 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) ("[W]e ... hold that plaintiff may plead the contract and promissory estoppel claims in the alternative."), the school transportation contractors eventually stated a promissory estoppel claim.

2005See also Leonardi v. City of Hollywood, 715 So.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(finding that an employee at will does not have a promissory estoppel claim against a former or future employer as a matter of law).

2004See Doe v. Allstate Insurance Company, 653 So.2d 371 (Fla.1995); Crown Life Insurance Company v. McBride, 517 So.2d 660 (Fla.1987).

2003See Wharfside at Boca Pointe, Inc. v. Superior Bank, 741 So.2d 542, 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (explaining that "[a]n agreement that is required by the statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be orally modified").

1998Inc., 547 So.2d 919, 924 (Fla.1989); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn.1992) (holding that a reporter's breach of a promise of confidentiality to a source does not create a contract but is actionable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel).

1998Inc., 547 So.2d 919, 924 (Fla.1989); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn.1992) (holding that a reporter's breach of a promise of confidentiality to a source does not create a contract but is actionable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel).

1988Further, "The doctrine of estoppel, when invoked for the purpose of working a change in the title to land, is to be applied with great caution." South Investment Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1952) (quoting Lyon v. Morgan, 143 N.Y. 505, 509 , 38 N.E. 960, 961 (1894)). *115 In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be applied if injustice can otherwise be avoided.

1988Further, "The doctrine of estoppel, when invoked for the purpose of working a change in the title to land, is to be applied with great caution." South Investment Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1952) (quoting Lyon v. Morgan, 143 N.Y. 505, 509 , 38 N.E. 960, 961 (1894)). *115 In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be applied if injustice can otherwise be avoided.

1988Further, "The doctrine of estoppel, when invoked for the purpose of working a change in the title to land, is to be applied with great caution." South Investment Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1952) (quoting Lyon v. Morgan, 143 N.Y. 505, 509 , 38 N.E. 960, 961 (1894)). *115 In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be applied if injustice can otherwise be avoided.

1987Broadly stated, the doctrine arises in those situations where the promisor "make[s] a promise which he should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the promisee." Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So.2d 484, 486 (Fla. 1974); Royal American Development v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 508 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. v. Liberty County, 406 So.2d 461, 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), on petition for rehearing; reversed on other grounds, 421 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1982); Allen v. A.G.