promissory estoppel doctrine in Vermont

2024Co., 158 Vt. 566, 573 (1992), “[t]he doctrine of promissory estoppel, as recognized in Vermont, is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981).” The Second Restatement defines the doctrine as follows A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

2023The promissory estoppel doctrine is commonly described as follows: “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1), quoted in Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Co., 158 Vt. 566, 573 (1992).

2024See Tour Costa Rica, 171 Vt. at 120 (discussing the elements of a promissory estoppel claim under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1)).

2001Welfare, 159 Vt. 408, 419 , 620 A.2d 737, 743 (1992)); see Wesco, Inc. v. City of Montpelier, 169 Vt. 520, 523-24 , 739 A.2d 1241, 1244 (1999) (equitable estoppel is based on grounds of fair dealing and justice, and may be invoked against government only in extraordinary circumstances); In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 547-48 , 726 A.2d 31, 37-38 (1998) (same); see also Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 171 Vt. 116, 120, 123 , 758 A.2d 795, 799, 801 (2000) (under doctrine of promissory estoppel, promise *570 is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing promise; whether justic

2024To sustain a promissory estoppel claim, employee must “[1] demonstrate that the termination was in breach of a specific promise made by the employer, [2] that the employer should have reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance on the part of the employee, and [3] that the employee did in fact detrimentally rely on the promise.” Dillon, 175 Vt. 1, ¶ 19 , 819 A.2d at 709 . ¶ 37.

2024To sustain a promissory estoppel claim, employee must “[1] demonstrate that the termination was in breach of a specific promise made by the employer, [2] that the employer should have reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance on the part of the employee, and [3] that the employee did in fact detrimentally rely on the promise.” Dillon, 175 Vt. 1, ¶ 19 , 819 A.2d at 709 . ¶ 37.

2014The doctrine of promissory estoppel applies “where there is no contract, where the promise is gratuitous, and there is unbargained-for reliance.” Big G Corp. v. Henry, 148 Vt. 589, 594 , 536 A.2d 559, 562 (1987) (quotation omitted).

2014The doctrine of promissory estoppel applies “where there is no contract, where the promise is gratuitous, and there is unbargained-for reliance.” Big G Corp. v. Henry, 148 Vt. 589, 594 , 536 A.2d 559, 562 (1987) (quotation omitted).

2025“The doctrine of promissory estoppel applies ‘where there is no contract, where the promise is gratuitous, and there is unbargained-for reliance.’” Hayes v. Town of Manchester Water & Sewer Boards, 2014 VT 126, ¶ 37 , 198 Vt. 92 (2014).

2025“The doctrine of promissory estoppel applies ‘where there is no contract, where the promise is gratuitous, and there is unbargained-for reliance.’” Hayes v. Town of Manchester Water & Sewer Boards, 2014 VT 126, ¶ 37 , 198 Vt. 92 (2014).

2025“A plaintiff must show the following for a promissory estoppel claim: “(1) defendant made a promise to [the promisee] that defendant should have reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; (2) [the promisee] relied on the promise to [the promisee’s] detriment; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Dewdney v. Duncan, 2025 VT 26, ¶ 25 (quoting Pettersen v. Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, 2021 VT 16, ¶ 11 , 214 Vt. 269 ).

2020See Hayes v. Town of Manchester Water & Sewer Bds., 2014 VT 126, ¶ 37 , 198 Vt. 92 , 112 A.3d 742 (holding that doctrine of promissory estoppel applies only “where there is no contract” (quotation omitted)); DJ Painting, Inc. v. Baraw Enters., Inc., 172 Vt. 239, 243 , 776 A. 2d 413, 417 (2001) (noting that although existence of a contract does not necessarily preclude remedy in quasi-contract, “the terms of the contract and the remedies exercised under it become highly relevant in determining whether denying further payment to 5 Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s claim is barred by laches, ren

2020See Hayes v. Town of Manchester Water & Sewer Bds., 2014 VT 126, ¶ 37 , 198 Vt. 92 , 112 A.3d 742 (holding that doctrine of promissory estoppel applies only “where there is no contract” (quotation omitted)); DJ Painting, Inc. v. Baraw Enters., Inc., 172 Vt. 239, 243 , 776 A. 2d 413, 417 (2001) (noting that although existence of a contract does not necessarily preclude remedy in quasi-contract, “the terms of the contract and the remedies exercised under it become highly relevant in determining whether denying further payment to 5 Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s claim is barred by laches, ren

2001Welfare, 159 Vt. 408, 419 , 620 A.2d 737, 743 (1992)); see Wesco, Inc. v. City of Montpelier, 169 Vt. 520, 523-24 , 739 A.2d 1241, 1244 (1999) (equitable estoppel is based on grounds of fair dealing and justice, and may be invoked against government only in extraordinary circumstances); In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 547-48 , 726 A.2d 31, 37-38 (1998) (same); see also Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 171 Vt. 116, 120, 123 , 758 A.2d 795, 799, 801 (2000) (under doctrine of promissory estoppel, promise *570 is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing promise; whether justic

2001Welfare, 159 Vt. 408, 419 , 620 A.2d 737, 743 (1992)); see Wesco, Inc. v. City of Montpelier, 169 Vt. 520, 523-24 , 739 A.2d 1241, 1244 (1999) (equitable estoppel is based on grounds of fair dealing and justice, and may be invoked against government only in extraordinary circumstances); In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 547-48 , 726 A.2d 31, 37-38 (1998) (same); see also Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 171 Vt. 116, 120, 123 , 758 A.2d 795, 799, 801 (2000) (under doctrine of promissory estoppel, promise *570 is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing promise; whether justic

2001Welfare, 159 Vt. 408, 419 , 620 A.2d 737, 743 (1992)); see Wesco, Inc. v. City of Montpelier, 169 Vt. 520, 523-24 , 739 A.2d 1241, 1244 (1999) (equitable estoppel is based on grounds of fair dealing and justice, and may be invoked against government only in extraordinary circumstances); In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 547-48 , 726 A.2d 31, 37-38 (1998) (same); see also Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 171 Vt. 116, 120, 123 , 758 A.2d 795, 799, 801 (2000) (under doctrine of promissory estoppel, promise *570 is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing promise; whether justic

2001Welfare, 159 Vt. 408, 419 , 620 A.2d 737, 743 (1992)); see Wesco, Inc. v. City of Montpelier, 169 Vt. 520, 523-24 , 739 A.2d 1241, 1244 (1999) (equitable estoppel is based on grounds of fair dealing and justice, and may be invoked against government only in extraordinary circumstances); In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 547-48 , 726 A.2d 31, 37-38 (1998) (same); see also Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 171 Vt. 116, 120, 123 , 758 A.2d 795, 799, 801 (2000) (under doctrine of promissory estoppel, promise *570 is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing promise; whether justic

2001Welfare, 159 Vt. 408, 419 , 620 A.2d 737, 743 (1992)); see Wesco, Inc. v. City of Montpelier, 169 Vt. 520, 523-24 , 739 A.2d 1241, 1244 (1999) (equitable estoppel is based on grounds of fair dealing and justice, and may be invoked against government only in extraordinary circumstances); In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 547-48 , 726 A.2d 31, 37-38 (1998) (same); see also Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 171 Vt. 116, 120, 123 , 758 A.2d 795, 799, 801 (2000) (under doctrine of promissory estoppel, promise *570 is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing promise; whether justic

2001Welfare, 159 Vt. 408, 419 , 620 A.2d 737, 743 (1992)); see Wesco, Inc. v. City of Montpelier, 169 Vt. 520, 523-24 , 739 A.2d 1241, 1244 (1999) (equitable estoppel is based on grounds of fair dealing and justice, and may be invoked against government only in extraordinary circumstances); In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 547-48 , 726 A.2d 31, 37-38 (1998) (same); see also Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 171 Vt. 116, 120, 123 , 758 A.2d 795, 799, 801 (2000) (under doctrine of promissory estoppel, promise *570 is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing promise; whether justic

2000See Nelson v. Percy, 149 Vt. 168, 171 , 540 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1987) (defendant waived right to raise issue because he raised it for first time in motion for judgment as matter of law). 6 Defendant’s *126 attempt to create a right of appeal through a Rule 50(b) motion fails, as well, due to its failure to seek a ruling from the trial court, by a prejudgment motion, regarding the remedies available in a promissory estoppel claim.

2000See Nelson v. Percy, 149 Vt. 168, 171 , 540 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1987) (defendant waived right to raise issue because he raised it for first time in motion for judgment as matter of law). 6 Defendant’s *126 attempt to create a right of appeal through a Rule 50(b) motion fails, as well, due to its failure to seek a ruling from the trial court, by a prejudgment motion, regarding the remedies available in a promissory estoppel claim.

2000The action or inaction taken in reliance on the promise must be ‘“of a definite and substantial character.’” Ragosta v. Wilder, 156 Vt. 390, 396 , 592 A.2d 367, 371 (1991) (quoting Stacy v. Merchants Bank, 144 Vt. 515, 521 , 482 A.2d 61, 64 (1984)).

2000The action or inaction taken in reliance on the promise must be ‘“of a definite and substantial character.’” Ragosta v. Wilder, 156 Vt. 390, 396 , 592 A.2d 367, 371 (1991) (quoting Stacy v. Merchants Bank, 144 Vt. 515, 521 , 482 A.2d 61, 64 (1984)).

2000The action or inaction taken in reliance on the promise must be ‘“of a definite and substantial character.’” Ragosta v. Wilder, 156 Vt. 390, 396 , 592 A.2d 367, 371 (1991) (quoting Stacy v. Merchants Bank, 144 Vt. 515, 521 , 482 A.2d 61, 64 (1984)).

2000The action or inaction taken in reliance on the promise must be ‘“of a definite and substantial character.’” Ragosta v. Wilder, 156 Vt. 390, 396 , 592 A.2d 367, 371 (1991) (quoting Stacy v. Merchants Bank, 144 Vt. 515, 521 , 482 A.2d 61, 64 (1984)).

1996See Estate of Sawyer v. Crowell, 151 Vt. 287, 294 , 559 A.2d 687, 692 (1989) (where relationship governed.by contract, promissory estoppel doctrine does not arise); Big G Corp. v. Henry, 148 Vt. 589, 594 , 536 A.2d 559, 562 (1987) (doctrine of promissory estoppel applies only where there is no contract).

1996See Estate of Sawyer v. Crowell, 151 Vt. 287, 294 , 559 A.2d 687, 692 (1989) (where relationship governed.by contract, promissory estoppel doctrine does not arise); Big G Corp. v. Henry, 148 Vt. 589, 594 , 536 A.2d 559, 562 (1987) (doctrine of promissory estoppel applies only where there is no contract).

1987The doctrine of promissory estoppel will only apply, however, where there is no contract, “where the promise is gratuitous, and there is unbargained-for reliance.” Chomicky v. Buttolph, 147 Vt. 128 , 131 n., 513 A.2d 1174 , 1176 n. (1986) (citation omitted).

1987The doctrine of promissory estoppel will only apply, however, where there is no contract, “where the promise is gratuitous, and there is unbargained-for reliance.” Chomicky v. Buttolph, 147 Vt. 128 , 131 n., 513 A.2d 1174 , 1176 n. (1986) (citation omitted).

1986In promissory estoppel, “reliance is the basis, and detriment is the justification.” Overlock v. Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 126 Vt. 549, 553 , 237 A.2d 356, 359 (1967).

1986In promissory estoppel, “reliance is the basis, and detriment is the justification.” Overlock v. Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 126 Vt. 549, 553 , 237 A.2d 356, 359 (1967).