promissory estoppel doctrine in Rhode Island

2021This Court has applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to “alleviate the plight of those who [might otherwise] suffer a serious injustice as a result of their good-faith reliance on the unfulfilled promises of others.” East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 103 R.I. 597, 603 , 239 A.2d 725, 728 (1968); see Filippi, 818 A.2d at 626 ; Alix v. Alix, 497 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I. 1985).

2021Promissory estoppel has been defined by this Court as referring to “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance [and therefore] is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Alix, 497 A.2d at 21 (quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90 at 242 (1981)); see also Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537, 547 (R.I. 2016); Filippi, 818 A.2d at 625 .

2021However, on appeal, we specifically stated that, because the defendant in Dellagrotta had been unable to establish the first element under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, we would decline to decide “whether [one owner’s] silence in the face of [the other owner’s] promise was sufficient to bind her on that promise.” Id. at 110 (emphasis added).

2009Filippi , 818 A.2d at 626 ; see also Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta , 873 A.2d 101 , 110 (R.I. 2005).

2021This Court has applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to “alleviate the plight of those who [might otherwise] suffer a serious injustice as a result of their good-faith reliance on the unfulfilled promises of others.” East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 103 R.I. 597, 603 , 239 A.2d 725, 728 (1968); see Filippi, 818 A.2d at 626 ; Alix v. Alix, 497 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I. 1985).

2021This Court has applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to “alleviate the plight of those who [might otherwise] suffer a serious injustice as a result of their good-faith reliance on the unfulfilled promises of others.” East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 103 R.I. 597, 603 , 239 A.2d 725, 728 (1968); see Filippi, 818 A.2d at 626 ; Alix v. Alix, 497 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I. 1985).

2021This Court has applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to “alleviate the plight of those who [might otherwise] suffer a serious injustice as a result of their good-faith reliance on the unfulfilled promises of others.” East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 103 R.I. 597, 603 , 239 A.2d 725, 728 (1968); see Filippi, 818 A.2d at 626 ; Alix v. Alix, 497 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I. 1985).

2021Promissory estoppel has been defined by this Court as referring to “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance [and therefore] is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Alix, 497 A.2d at 21 (quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90 at 242 (1981)); see also Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537, 547 (R.I. 2016); Filippi, 818 A.2d at 625 .

2010Our Supreme Court clarified that "`[e]stoppel against a municipal corporation growing out of affirmative action must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .'" Romano v. Retirement Bd. of the Employees' Retirement System of the State , 767 A.2d 35 , 41 (R.I. 2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ferrelli v. Department of Employment Security , 106 R.I. 588 , 592-93 , 261 A.2d 906 , 909 (1970)); see also Mancuso v. City of Providence , 685 A.2d 279 (R.I. 1996) (holding that doctrine of promissory estoppel could

2010Our Supreme Court further noted that "`courts are reluctant to invoke estoppel against the government on the basis of an action of one of its officers.'" Casa DiMario , 763 A.2d at 612 (quoting Lerner v. Gill , 463 A.2d 1352 , 1362 (R.I. 1983)); Romano , 767 A.2d at 39 (quoting D.

2010Our Supreme Court clarified that "`[e]stoppel against a municipal corporation growing out of affirmative action must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .'" Romano v. Retirement Bd. of the Employees' Retirement System of the State , 767 A.2d 35 , 41 (R.I. 2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ferrelli v. Department of Employment Security , 106 R.I. 588 , 592-93 , 261 A.2d 906 , 909 (1970)); see also Mancuso v. City of Providence , 685 A.2d 279 (R.I. 1996) (holding that doctrine of promissory estoppel could

2001See Romano, 767 A.2d at 40 (emphasis added); Mancuso v. City of Providence, 685 A.2d 279 (R.I. 1996).

2003The doctrine of promissory estoppel provides "a substitute for a consideration, rendering a gratuitous promise enforceable as a contract," and thus "the acts of reliance by the promisee to his detriment [provide] a substitute for consideration." Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co. , 438 A.2d 1091 , 1096 (R.I. 1982) (citing East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia , 239 A.2d at 727 ).

1985Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co., — R.I. —, -, 438 A.2d 1091, 1095 (1982).

2021At the conclusion of that reviewing process, the trial justice must be guided by “the principle that, if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the Rule 50 motion ‘would justify a reasonable jury’s finding for the plaintiff, the jury is entitled to decide the facts and the motion should be denied.’” Bajakian, 880 A.2d at 849-50 (emphasis added) (quoting Cinq-Mars v. Rodriguez, 674 A.2d 401, 405 (R.I. 1996)). - 15 - Mr. Palangio argues that, as to the promissory estoppel claim, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2021At the conclusion of that reviewing process, the trial justice must be guided by “the principle that, if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the Rule 50 motion ‘would justify a reasonable jury’s finding for the plaintiff, the jury is entitled to decide the facts and the motion should be denied.’” Bajakian, 880 A.2d at 849-50 (emphasis added) (quoting Cinq-Mars v. Rodriguez, 674 A.2d 401, 405 (R.I. 1996)). - 15 - Mr. Palangio argues that, as to the promissory estoppel claim, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2021Promissory estoppel has been defined by this Court as referring to “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance [and therefore] is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Alix, 497 A.2d at 21 (quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90 at 242 (1981)); see also Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537, 547 (R.I. 2016); Filippi, 818 A.2d at 625 .

1985Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance Co., 45 U.S. (4 How.) 185, 223-24 , 11 L.Ed. 931, 948 (1846); Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.3 at 34, 44 n. 24 (1973).

1985Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance Co., 45 U.S. (4 How.) 185, 223-24 , 11 L.Ed. 931, 948 (1846); Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.3 at 34, 44 n. 24 (1973).