9 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2012The promise or agreement supporting a promissory estoppel claim must be “clear, definite, and unambiguous as to essential terms before the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be invoked to enforce an agreement or to award damages for the breach thereof.” Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352, 357 (N.D.1986). 2012The promise or agreement supporting a promissory estoppel claim must be “clear, definite, and unambiguous as to essential terms before the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be invoked to enforce an agreement or to award damages for the breach thereof.” Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 389 N.W.2d 352, 357 (N.D. 1986). | 4 | 4 |
Hurt v. Freelandgreen2 sentences2012See Hurt v. Freeland, 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D.1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n. 4 (N.D.1983) (“Because we have concluded that 2012See Hurt v. Freeland, 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D.1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n. 4 (N.D.1983) (“Because we have concluded that | 2 | 2 |
State v. McLaingreen2 sentences2012See Hurt v. Freeland, 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D.1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n. 4 (N.D.1983) (“Because we have concluded that 2012See Hurt v. Freeland , 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain , 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D. 1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi , 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n.4 (N.D. 1983) (“Because we have concluded that [plaintiff] failed to establi | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2012See Hurt v. Freeland, 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D.1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n. 4 (N.D.1983) (“Because we have concluded that 2012See Hurt v. Freeland, 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D.1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n. 4 (N.D.1983) (“Because we have concluded that | 1 | 2 |
Buzzell v. Libigreen2 sentences2012See Hurt v. Freeland, 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain, 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D.1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n. 4 (N.D.1983) (“Because we have concluded that 2012See Hurt v. Freeland , 1997 ND 194, ¶ 5 , 569 N.W.2d 266 (dismissing an appeal for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification this Court stated, “Determining the first prong is unnecessary, because this case obviously fails the second[.]”); State v. McLain , 403 N.W.2d 16, 18 (N.D. 1987) (in post-conviction relief case if we can dispose of a case by addressing only one element of the Strickland [v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] test, it is unnecessary to address both elements); Buzzell v. Libi , 340 N.W.2d 36 , 41 n.4 (N.D. 1983) (“Because we have concluded that [plaintiff] failed to establi | 1 | 2 |
Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plazagreen1 sentence2006Ill [¶ 10] UHD argues the district court improperly granted Dusterhoft’s motion *157 for summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim because there were genuine issues of material fact. [¶ 11] Before the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked, four elements must be established: “1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect will cause the promisee to change his position; 2) a substantial change of the promisee’s position through action, or forbearance; 3) justifiable reliance on the promise; and 4) injustice which can only be avoided by enforcing the promise.” Russell v | 1 | 1 |
Union State Bank v. Woellgreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 717 (N.D.1989); Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352, 355-357 (N.D.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Vallejo v. Jamestown Collegegreen1 sentence1976In Vallejo v. Jamestown College, 244 N.W.2d 753, 757 (N.D.1976), we stated: “In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. [Citations omitted.] “Our review of the facts is limited to consideration of whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict; if there is, we are bound by the verdict even though there was conflicting evidence.” After having examined the evidence in this case, in light of the concession by Hieb’s counsel in oral argument that the evidence supports the app | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
University Hotel Development, LLC v. Dusterhoft Oil, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013As in University Hotel Dev., LLC , we decline to address whether a third party may enforce a promise under the promissory estoppel doctrine because an essential element of the claim is missing. 2006 ND 121, ¶ 18 , 715 N.W.2d 153 . 2013As in University Hotel Dev., LLC , we decline to address whether a third party may enforce a promise under the promissory estoppel doctrine because an essential element of the claim is missing. 2006 ND 121, ¶ 18 , 715 N.W.2d 153 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Shinrone, Inc. v. Tasco, Inc.
green
1 sentence1986Furthermore, neither of the cases cited by Russell, Shinrone, Inc. v. Tasco, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979), and Twin City Const. Co. v. ITT Indus. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Northern State Construction Co. v. Robbins
green
1 sentence1973In Northern State Construction Company v. Robbins, supra 457 P.2d at 190 , we find the elements of promissory estoppel set out: “The requisites of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise, (2) which the promissor should reasonably expect will cause the promisee to change his position, (3) which does cause a substantial change of position, action or forbearance by the promisee, (4) acting in justifiable reliance on the promise, and (5) injustice which can only be avoided by enforcing the promise.” In 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 89, page 432, we find further explanation: “But in order for the doctri | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Abbey v. State
green
2 sentences1973Also, justifiable reliance and irreparable detriment to the promisee are necessary factors to enable him to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” In addition, this court, in Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D.1972), in paragraph 5 of the syllabus, held: “It is essential that the party invoking the doctrine of estoppel should have been misled by the acts or conduct of the party against whom the estoppel is claimed, that he changed his position in reliance thereon, and was justified in so doing, and that he was prejudiced thereby, or that a benefit resulted to the party against whom the 1973Also, justifiable reliance and irreparable detriment to the promisee are necessary factors to enable him to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” In addition, this court, in Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D.1972), in paragraph 5 of the syllabus, held: “It is essential that the party invoking the doctrine of estoppel should have been misled by the acts or conduct of the party against whom the estoppel is claimed, that he changed his position in reliance thereon, and was justified in so doing, and that he was prejudiced thereby, or that a benefit resulted to the party against whom the | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.