promissory estoppel doctrine (California) · Go Syfert
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promissory estoppel doctrine in California

142 California opinions name it 3 courts 1958–2026 32 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (55)

CaseFollowedCited
Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authoritygreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 32 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2023
2 sentences

2023Childhelp Cannot Rely on Promissory Estoppel To Compel the City To Act Contrary to Its Charter “[U]nder the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ‘[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’” (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310 ; accord, Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 727

2023Childhelp Cannot Rely on Promissory Estoppel To Compel the City To Act Contrary to Its Charter “[U]nder the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ‘[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’” (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310 ; accord, Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 727

1632
C & K ENGINEERING CONTRACTORS v. Amber Steel Co.green
cal · 1978 · cited in 19 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–2026
2 sentences

2026(C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8 .) “The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’ ” (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901 .) As to the first two elements, there is evidence that (1) Parents promised Resident that Brother would transfer the House to Resident after Parents’ deaths; a

2023(Id. at p. 6.) After concluding the doctrine of promissory estoppel was “essentially equitable in nature,” the court turned to whether “the equitable nature of plaintiff’s action precluded a jury trial as a matter of right.” (C & K Engineering, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 8 .) While the court recognized plaintiff’s complaint sought damages for breach of contract, the “gist of the action” was equitable because “the complaint seeks relief which was available only in equity, namely, the enforcement of defendant’s gratuitous promise to perform its bid through application of the equitable doctrine of pr

1019
Garcia v. World Savings, FSBgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 17 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2026
2 sentences

2026We agree with Defendants. “ ‘[A] promise is an indispensable element of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.’ ” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1044 .) Promissory estoppel requires “ ‘that a promise had been made upon which the complaining party relied to [that party’s] prejudice.’ ” (Ibid.) The promise must be “ ‘clear and unambiguous in its terms’ ” and cannot be established from “ ‘preliminary discussions and negotiations.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiffs claim Defendants promised to (1) “create CHange,” (2) “provide the use of Scripps labs and post-docs,” and (3) “wor

2024(Ibid.) In reversing a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim, the Aceves court concluded the promise was “sufficiently concrete to be enforceable.” (Id. at p. 222.) In West, the defendant bank promised the plaintiff homeowner that it would review her financial data to determine whether she qualified for a loan modification, and the bank assured the homeowner that no foreclosure sale was pending. ( West, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 788–790, 804.) Two days later, the bank sold her home at a trustee’s sale.

817
Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Districtgreen
cal · 1969 · cited in 11 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–2026
2 sentences

2016The lack of consideration discussed above does not bar the Orcillas’ promissory estoppel cause of action because the promissory estoppel doctrine makes “a promise binding, under certain circumstances, without consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given in exchange.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 249 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 449 P.2d 462 ].) Put differently, promissory estoppel “ ‘employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced.’ ” (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. L

2016The lack of consideration discussed above does not bar the Orcillas’ promissory estoppel cause of action because the promissory estoppel doctrine makes “a promise binding, under certain circumstances, without consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given in exchange.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 249 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 449 P.2d 462 ].) Put differently, promissory estoppel “ ‘employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced.’ ” (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. L

811
US Ecology, Inc. v. Stategreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 19 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2026
2 sentences

2026(C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8 .) “The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’ ” (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901 .) As to the first two elements, there is evidence that (1) Parents promised Resident that Brother would transfer the House to Resident after Parents’ deaths; a

2024“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’ [Citation.]” (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901 .) It is undisputed that Grant told Jill he was saving for the family’s future.

719
Toscano v. Greene Musicgreen
calctapp · 2004 · cited in 14 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2016
2 sentences

2016Promissory Estoppel The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are "(1) a clear promise, (2) reliance, (3) substantial detriment, and (4) damages 'measured by the extent of the obligation assumed and not performed.' " (Toscano v. Greene Music (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 685, 692 .) 9 In regard to the allegedly defamatory statements made to the treasury department, even if we were to determine there existed a disputed issue of material fact regarding whether the statements based on the talking points were impliedly defamatory, they too would be covered by the common interest privilege.

2015A trial court’s damage award on a promissory estoppel claim “must not be speculative, remote, contingent or merely possible.” (Toscano v. Greene Music (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 685, 694 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 ].) IV.

714
Raedeke v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen
cal · 1974 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–2021
2 sentences

2021(Offer v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. at p. 121 [“[t]he right of action to which the insurer was subrogated being legal, that is, for the recovery of money for damages suffered, it is enforceable at law”]; Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 672 [actions at law ordinarily seek money damages].) However, “[a]n action is one in equity where the only manner in which the legal remedy of damages is available is by application of equitable principles.” (Van de Kamp v. Bank of America (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 819, 865 ; see also C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co

2010(See 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 218, p. 251 [“[D]oing or promising to do what one is already legally bound to do cannot be consideration for a promise.”].) The absence of consideration or benefit to the promisor does not, however, defeat a claim based on promissory estoppel. 10 The doctrine of promissory estoppel “make[s] a promise binding, under certain circumstances, without consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for *1041 and given in exchange.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 249 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 449 P.2d 462 ]

66
Laks v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen
calctapp · 1976 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2026
2 sentences

2026Sav. & Loan Assn. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 885, 891 [describing important terms missing from the commitment to include the “payment schedules for each loan, identification of the security, prepayment conditions, terms for interest calculations, loan 14 disbursement procedures, and rights and remedies of the parties in case of default,” and affirming the trial court’s ruling sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim].) Schuman argues that the April 20, 2022 conditional loan approval letter became an enforceable contract when he, by May 3, 2022, performed 14 conditions prece

2022Clear and Unambiguous Promise A promissory estoppel claim must be founded on a promise that is “clear and unambiguous in its terms.” (Laks, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 890 .) Wilkes identified in his Complaint that the alleged 2010 promise by Bank representative Barcelona upon which he relied was that that his “loan was in default and he would need to miss a couple more payments to qualify for their loan modification program.” It is not apparent that this was a promise to do anything at all.

57
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.green
cal · 1958 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 1959–2016
2 sentences

1978I, § 16.) We will conclude that because plaintiff's suit for damages for breach of contract was based entirely upon the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel (see Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409 [ 333 P.2d 757 ]), the gist of the action must be deemed equitable in nature and, under well established principles, neither party was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.

1978I, § 16.) We will conclude that because plaintiff's suit for damages for breach of contract was based entirely upon the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel (see Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 409 [ 333 P.2d 757 ]), the gist of the action must be deemed equitable in nature and, under well established principles, neither party was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.

47
Jones v. Wachovia Bankgreen
calctapp · 2014 · cited in 11 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2024
2 sentences

2024Wilkes’s third cause of action is for promissory estoppel. “ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” [Citation.]’ ” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945 .) Here, the alleged promise to pay Wilkes $2.5 million—if it was made at all—was a conditional promise to pay Wilkes if Wilkes performed some service for the Clippers.

2024Wilkes’s third cause of action is for promissory estoppel. “ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” [Citation.]’ ” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945 .) Here, the alleged promise to pay Wilkes $2.5 million—if it was made at all—was a conditional promise to pay Wilkes if Wilkes performed some service for the Clippers.

311
Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.green
calctapp · 2015 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2026
2 sentences

2026(Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 411, 416 (Granadino).) To the extent these promises were part of a bargain, like Clarke obtaining equity when 14 creating CHange, promissory estoppel “is inapplicable.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 249 .) Thus, a claim for promissory estoppel based on creating CHange fails as a matter of law.

2024The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment White argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to the promissory estoppel claim.11 “A claim for promissory estoppel requires (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms, (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, (3) the reliance must be reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his or her reliance.” (Murphy v. Twitter, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 12 , 38.) “‘“‘[W]hether a party’s reliance was justified may be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds

34
Healy v. Brewstergreen
cal · 1963 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–2013
2 sentences

2013If the promisee’s performance was requested at the time the promisor made his promise and that performance was bargained for, the doctrine is inapplicable.” (Ibid., italics added.) “In other words, where the promisee’s reliance was bargained for, the law of consideration applies; and it is only where the reliance was unbargained for that there is room for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” (Healy v. Brewster (1963) 59 Cal.2d 455, 463 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 380 P.2d 817 ].) Avidity’s promissory estoppel cause of action alleged that Pacific Lumber acted in reliance on certain all

2013If the promisee’s performance was requested at the time the promisor made his promise and that performance was bargained for, the doctrine is inapplicable.” (Ibid., italics added.) “In other words, where the promisee’s reliance was bargained for, the law of consideration applies; and it is only where the reliance was unbargained for that there is room for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” (Healy v. Brewster (1963) 59 Cal.2d 455, 463 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 380 P.2d 817 ].) Avidity’s promissory estoppel cause of action alleged that Pacific Lumber acted in reliance on certain all

33
Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Department of Health Servicesgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2023
2 sentences

2023A. Legal principles “ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” [Citation].’ [Citations.]” (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1672 .) B.

2015Promissory Estoppel Claim “‘“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’”’ (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of 15 Under Supplemental Directive 09-01, before a lender offers a TPP to a distressed borrower, the lender (1) has already found that the borrower satisfies certain simple threshold requirements under HAMP regarding the basic nature of the

28
Smith v. City and County of San Franciscogreen
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–2014
2 sentences

2014Promissory Estoppel “Promissory estoppel is ‘a doctrine which employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced.’ ” (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310 .) “The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his relianc

2014(See Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 48 .) " '[A] promise is an indispensable element of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

26
Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc.green
calctapp · 2016 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2025
2 sentences

2025We disagree. “ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” ’ ” (Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 727, 734 .) “Although ‘promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine [and] courts are given wide discretion in its application’ [citations], ‘[t]he existence of an estoppel is generally a question of fact for the

2023Childhelp Cannot Rely on Promissory Estoppel To Compel the City To Act Contrary to Its Charter “[U]nder the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ‘[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’” (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310 ; accord, Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 727

25
Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppegreen
calctapp · 1979 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–2022
2 sentences

2022(See, e.g., Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 627 , 632–633 [awarding plaintiff lost profits under doctrine of promissory estoppel].) Similarly, unjust enrichment describes circumstances where there is no enforceable contract, but plaintiffs nonetheless conferred a benefit on defendants that they “knowingly accepted under circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value.”4 (Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932, 938 .) Plaintiffs immediately made monetary investments and purchases, including property adja

2022(See, e.g., Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 627 , 632–633 [awarding plaintiff lost profits under doctrine of promissory estoppel].) Similarly, unjust enrichment describes circumstances where there is no enforceable contract, but plaintiffs nonetheless conferred a benefit on defendants that they “knowingly accepted under circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value.”4 (Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932, 938 .) Plaintiffs immediately made monetary investments and purchases, including property adja

25
Cotta v. City and County of San Franciscogreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2015
2 sentences

2015(Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 320-321 .) To be binding, the promise “‘must be clear and unambiguous.’” (Cotta v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1566 ; CalFarm Ins.

2012(See Cotta v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1566 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 ] [rejecting promissory estoppel claim of taxi drivers who purchased clean air vehicles after the city passed a resolution granting certain benefits to drivers of such vehicles (e.g., an incentive program) because the “facts do not show that the [c]ity promised not to amend the incentive program”].) In fact, the Savings Clause in the 2002 MOU expressly provided that the 2002 MOU was “subject to all current and future applicable federal, state and local laws, regulations and the Charter of City

23
Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwellgreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2016
2 sentences

2016Assuming appellants alleged a clear promise to offer them a loan modification on any terms, they cannot allege reasonable reliance on that promise. “ ‘[Wjhether a party’s reliance was justified may be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion based on the facts.’ ” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1239 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 900 P.2d 601 ].) “ ‘ “[A] party plaintiff’s misguided belief or guileless action in relying on a statement on which no reasonable person would rely is not justifiable reliance,” ’ ” nor is his or her “ ‘ “hopef

2016Assuming appellants alleged a clear promise to offer them a loan modification on any terms, they cannot allege reasonable reliance on that promise. “ ‘[Wjhether a party’s reliance was justified may be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion based on the facts.’ ” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1239 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 900 P.2d 601 ].) “ ‘ “[A] party plaintiff’s misguided belief or guileless action in relying on a statement on which no reasonable person would rely is not justifiable reliance,” ’ ” nor is his or her “ ‘ “hopef

22
H. W. Stanfield Construction Corp. v. Robert McMullan & Son, Inc.green
calctapp · 1971 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(Drennan, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 416 [“the loss resulting from the mistake should fall on the party who caused it”]; Saliba-Kringlen, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at pp. 100-101 [subcontractor claimed mistake in bid]; Stanfield, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 852 [same].) When a general contractor uses a subcontractor’s “offer in computing his own bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant’s terms.” (Drennan, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 415 .) Hence, “a general contractor is not free to . . . . reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a continuing right to accept the o

2016(Drennan, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 416 [“the loss resulting from the mistake should fall on the party who caused it”]; Saliba-Kringlen, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at pp. 100-101 [subcontractor claimed mistake in bid]; Stanfield, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 852 [same].) When a general contractor uses a subcontractor’s “offer in computing his own bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant’s terms.” (Drennan, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 415 .) Hence, “a general contractor is not free to . . . . reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a continuing right to accept the o

22
A-C Co. v. Security Pacific National Bankgreen
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2012
22
Lange v. Tig Insurancegreen
calctapp · 1998 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2012
22
Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. Stategreen
calctapp · 1965 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1979–2001
22
West v. JPMorgan Chase Bankgreen
calctapp · 2013 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2024
2 sentences

2024Instead, plaintiff cites cases like Aceves, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 218 , West v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780 (West), and Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031 (Garcia).

2015Promissory Estoppel Claim “‘“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’”’ (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of 15 Under Supplemental Directive 09-01, before a lender offers a TPP to a distressed borrower, the lender (1) has already found that the borrower satisfies certain simple threshold requirements under HAMP regarding the basic nature of the

16
Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.green
calctapp · 2016 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2022
2 sentences

2022The allegations do not support the existence of a promise that is clear and ambiguous that the Bank agreed to take specific action, such as approving a loan modification, suspending any available contractual remedies upon a default, or forgoing foreclosure proceedings, if Wilkes were, in fact, to omit making required loan payments. 11 In Daniels, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at page 1178 , the plaintiffs alleged a promissory estoppel claim based upon a lender’s promise on two occasions to provide a loan modification with lower monthly payments and a reduced interest rate if all required documents we

2021Thus, Zambrano “could not have had legitimate expectations that this was a binding offer; therefore, [he] could not reasonably have relied on it.” (See Laks, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 893 [promissory estoppel claim failed for lack of clear and unambiguous promise and lack of reasonable reliance where loan offer was conditional and did not include many key terms of loan].) Indeed, without the offer specifying the interest rate Zambrano was approved to receive as part of the loan modification, “[n]o borrower could reasonably rely 3Because we agree with the trial court on this point, we need not

14
Van De Kamp v. Bank of Americagreen
calctapp · 1988 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2021
2 sentences

2021(Offer v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. at p. 121 [“[t]he right of action to which the insurer was subrogated being legal, that is, for the recovery of money for damages suffered, it is enforceable at law”]; Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 672 [actions at law ordinarily seek money damages].) However, “[a]n action is one in equity where the only manner in which the legal remedy of damages is available is by application of equitable principles.” (Van de Kamp v. Bank of America (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 819, 865 ; see also C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co

2017(C & K Engineering, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 5, 10 [concluding that because the suit for damages for breach of contract was based entirely upon the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel, the action was equitable in nature and neither party was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right]; accord Van de Kamp v. Bank of America (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 819, 863-865 [damages sought for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud causes of action did not entitle plaintiffs to jury trial, because assessing faith, exercised to promote the interest of the stockholders.” (Id. at p. 27; accord Ashton v. Dasha

12
Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.green
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2021
2 sentences

2021(Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264 , disapproved of on other grounds by Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 937 .) 2 The court made this ruling in analyzing the negligent misrepresentation claim, but it applies equally to Zambrano’s promissory estoppel claim, which is based on the same factual allegations regarding Ocwen’s March 2015 statements as the promissory estoppel claim and requires a showing of reasonable reliance on the alleged false promise. 8 1.

2012The claim instead must be pleaded as one for breach of the bargained-for contract.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 275 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 ].) And, more than two decades ago we defined the doctrine of promissory estoppel and then immediately stated: “It can be seen that the doctrine creates only an enforceable promise, not a contract, since the promisee is not obligated to act or forebear and the promisor has no enforceable contract.” (A-C Co. v. Security Pacific Nat.

12
Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Engineering Co.green
calctapp · 1971 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–2016
2 sentences

1978Promissory Estoppel (1) The elements of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as described concisely in section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, are as follows: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." The foregoing rule has been judicially adopted in California and it applies to actions, such as the present case, to enforce a subcontractor's bid. ( Drennan

1978Promissory Estoppel (1) The elements of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as described concisely in section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, are as follows: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." The foregoing rule has been judicially adopted in California and it applies to actions, such as the present case, to enforce a subcontractor's bid. ( Drennan

12
Palmer v. GTE California, Inc.green
cal · 2003 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016The opinion never addressed the substance of the underlying promissory estoppel claim. “ ‘ “Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” ’ [Citations.]” (Palmer v. GTE California, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1265, 1278 .) Barnhart therefore does not support Flintco’s reasonable reliance argument. 9 invoking the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply here.

2016The opinion never addressed the substance of the underlying promissory estoppel claim. “ ‘ “Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” ’ [Citations.]” (Palmer v. GTE California, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1265, 1278 .) Barnhart therefore does not support Flintco’s reasonable reliance argument. 9 invoking the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply here.

12
Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc.green
calctapp · 2006 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2015
2 sentences

2015The cases are uniform in holding that this doctrine cannot be invoked and must be held inapplicable in the absence of a showing that a promise had been made upon which the complaining party relied to his prejudice.' [Citation.] The promise must, in addition, be 27 'clear and unambiguous in its terms.' " (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1044 .) For a promise to be enforceable, it need only be " 'definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the duty[,] and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis for the assessment of

2013The cases are uniform in holding that this doctrine cannot be invoked and must be held inapplicable in the absence of a showing that a promise had been made upon which the complaining party relied to his prejudice . . . .’ [Citation.] The promise must, in addition, be ‘clear and unambiguous in its terms.’ [Citation.]” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1044 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 ].) For a promise to be enforceable, it need only be “ ‘definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the duty[,] and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined to provide

12
Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Servicesgreen
calctapp · 2013 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2014
2 sentences

2014Promissory Estoppel “Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that allows enforcement of a promise that would otherwise be unenforceable based on lack of consideration.” (Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1063 .) “‘In California, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. . . .”’” (Moncada v. West Coast Qua

2014Promissory Estoppel “Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that allows enforcement of a promise that would otherwise be unenforceable based on lack of consideration.” (Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1063 .) “‘In California, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. . . .”’” (Moncada v. West Coast Qua

12
City of Long Beach v. Mansellgreen
cal · 1970 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2012
12
Div. of Labor Law Enf't v. Transpacific Transp. Co.green
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–2010
12
Seymour v. Oelrichsgreen
cal · 1909 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1958–1978
12
Parrish v. Latham & Watkinsgreen
cal · 2017 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
11
Bertero v. National General Corp.green
cal · 1974 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
11
Pac. Bay Recovery, Inc. v. Cal. Physicians' Servs., Inc.green
calctapp5d · 2017 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.green
cal · 2005 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramentogreen
calctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.green
cal · 2013 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of La Habragreen
cal · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
West v. JPMorgan Chase Bankgreen
calctapp · 2013 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2024
2 sentences

2024Instead, plaintiff cites cases like Aceves, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 218 , West v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780 (West), and Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031 (Garcia).

2015Promissory Estoppel Claim “‘“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’”’ (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of 15 Under Supplemental Directive 09-01, before a lender offers a TPP to a distressed borrower, the lender (1) has already found that the borrower satisfies certain simple threshold requirements under HAMP regarding the basic nature of the

16

Also cited on this issue (25)

CaseCitedYears
Hunter v. Sparling green
calctapp · 1948
2 sentences

1976Rejecting that contention, the Court of Appeal cited the language from Kern quoted above and concluded that once the employee performed services in reliance upon the promised pension, he could enforce his right to a pension either under traditional contract principles of offer, acceptance and consideration or under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. ( 87 Cal.App.2d at p. 725 .) In subsequent years the courts have repeatedly reaffirmed that a nonvested pension right is nonetheless a contractual right, and thus a property right. 7 Although, as we have pointed out, supra, courts have previously

1976Rejecting that contention, the Court of Appeal cited the language from Kern quoted above and concluded that once the employee performed services in reliance upon the promised pension, he could enforce his right to a pension either under traditional contract principles of offer, acceptance and consideration or under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. ( 87 Cal. App.2d at p. 725 .) In subsequent years the courts have repeatedly reaffirmed that a nonvested pension right is nonetheless a contractual right, and thus a property right. [7] Although, as we have pointed out, supra, courts have previou

31970–1976
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. green
ca9 · 2009
2 sentences

2024The negligence claim was barred by section 230 because “the duty that Barnes claims Yahoo violated derives from Yahoo’s conduct as a publisher—the steps it allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the offensive profiles.” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1103 .) By contrast, the promissory estoppel claim was not barred because “the duty the defendant allegedly violated springs from a contract—an enforceable promise— not from any non-contractual conduct or capacity of the defendant. [Citation.] Barnes does not seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party

2024The negligence claim was barred by section 230 because “the duty that Barnes claims Yahoo violated derives from Yahoo’s conduct as a publisher—the steps it allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the offensive profiles.” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1103 .) By contrast, the promissory estoppel claim was not barred because “the duty the defendant allegedly violated springs from a contract—an enforceable promise— not from any non-contractual conduct or capacity of the defendant. [Citation.] Barnes does not seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party

22024–2024
Hernandez v. Lopez green
calctapp · 2009
2 sentences

2022(See, e.g., Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 627 , 632–633 [awarding plaintiff lost profits under doctrine of promissory estoppel].) Similarly, unjust enrichment describes circumstances where there is no enforceable contract, but plaintiffs nonetheless conferred a benefit on defendants that they “knowingly accepted under circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value.”4 (Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932, 938 .) Plaintiffs immediately made monetary investments and purchases, including property adja

2022(See, e.g., Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 627 , 632–633 [awarding plaintiff lost profits under doctrine of promissory estoppel].) Similarly, unjust enrichment describes circumstances where there is no enforceable contract, but plaintiffs nonetheless conferred a benefit on defendants that they “knowingly accepted under circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value.”4 (Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932, 938 .) Plaintiffs immediately made monetary investments and purchases, including property adja

22022–2022
Waters v. Waters green
calctapp · 1946
21976–1976
Crowley v. Katleman green
cal · 1994
12026–2026
Hart v. Darwish green
calctapp5d · 2017
12026–2026
Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto green
calctapp · 1974
12024–2024
Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank green
calctapp · 1991
12024–2024
E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services green
calctapp · 2007
12022–2022
Eden Township Healthcare District v. Eden Medical Center green
calctapp · 2013
12021–2021
Turner v. Schultz green
calctapp · 2009
12021–2021
Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. green
cal · 2016
12021–2021
Golden Eagle Land Inv., L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n green
calctapp5d · 2018
12020–2020
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1976
12018–2018
Bostanian v. Liberty Savings Bank green
calctapp · 1997
12016–2016
Haley v. DOW LEWIS MOTORS, INC. green
calctapp · 1999
12016–2016
Santa Rosa Bank v. Paxton green
cal · 1906
12016–2016
Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson green
cal · 1993
12015–2015
McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC green
calctapp · 2008
12015–2015
Alimena v. Vericrest Financial, Inc. green
caed · 2013
12015–2015
DeHermosillo v. Morales green
calctapp · 1956
12015–2015
Finch v. McKee green
calctapp · 1936
12015–2015
Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC green
calctapp · 2012
12015–2015
Beckwith v. Dahl green
calctapp · 2012
12015–2015
Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. green
calctapp · 2014
12015–2015

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Business and Professions Code § 17200 (16) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (13) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 2924 (12) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1698 (8) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1624 (6) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1605 (5) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 2924g (5) USC § 12u.s.c.5219 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 168 (1984–2026) CA 142 (1958–2026) TX 128 (1965–2025) NY 61 (1935–2026) IN 53 (1979–2025) IL 48 (1963–2026) MI 46 (1968–2025) CT 43 (1991–2021) PA 43 (1940–2026) WY 32 (1978–2024) GA 32 (1991–2025) DE 30 (1954–2025) FL 30 (1965–2019) WA 29 (1962–2025) CO 27 (1975–2025) MN 26 (1925–2026) NJ 22 (1956–2026) MO 22 (1984–2025) UT 21 (1953–2025) VT 19 (1986–2026) MA 18 (1994–2024) ME 16 (1953–2023) WI 16 (1965–2022) TN 15 (1994–2018) AZ 14 (1969–2024) IA 12 (1979–2024) NE 12 (1989–2019) RI 11 (1978–2021) AK 10 (1981–2017) ND 9 (1973–2013) KS 9 (1977–2026) SD 9 (1966–2020) DC 8 (1968–1995) ID 8 (1964–2023) SC 8 (2004–2025) KY 7 (1990–2026) OR 7 (1956–2013) AR 7 (1980–2025) OK 6 (1978–2021) HI 6 (1948–2025) MT 5 (1980–2024) MD 5 (1994–2017) VA 5 (1985–1997) AL 5 (1975–2009) WV 5 (2002–2022) MS 4 (1940–2006) NC 3 (1987–2015) NV 2 (1989–2021) NM 2 (1986–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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