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5 Alabama opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bush v. Bushgreen2 sentences2009Promissory estop- pel was defined in Bush v. Bush, 278 Ala. 244, 245 , 177 So.2d 568, 570 (1964): “ ‘A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’ Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 90, page 110.” Here, the law implied to the wife a covenant, or promise, to use the power conferred upon her solely for the benefit of the husband. 2009Promissory estop- pel was defined in Bush v. Bush, 278 Ala. 244, 245 , 177 So.2d 568, 570 (1964): “ ‘A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’ Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 90, page 110.” Here, the law implied to the wife a covenant, or promise, to use the power conferred upon her solely for the benefit of the husband. | 1 | 1 |
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2001See Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Washington, 719 So.2d 774, 776 (Ala.1998)). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Grand Manor, Inc.green1 sentence2001See Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Washington, 719 So.2d 774, 776 (Ala.1998)). | 1 | 1 |
Remes v. Nordic Group, Inc.green2 sentences2000We are impressed with the analysis in Remes v. Nordic Group, Inc. , 169 Vt. 37 , 40-41 , 726 A.2d 77 , 79-80 (1999), where the Supreme Court of Vermont stated: "Vermont courts have in the past allowed compensatory or reliance damages in promissory estoppel cases. 2000We are impressed with the analysis in Remes v. Nordic Group, Inc. , 169 Vt. 37 , 40-41 , 726 A.2d 77 , 79-80 (1999), where the Supreme Court of Vermont stated: "Vermont courts have in the past allowed compensatory or reliance damages in promissory estoppel cases. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Geddert
green
2 sentences2000While Alabama has accepted the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as it is stated in Restatement (First) of Contracts § 90 (1932), see Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Geddert , 505 So.2d 371 (Ala. 1987), this Court has not had occasion to determine the scope of the damages recoverable under this doctrine. 2000While Alabama has accepted the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as it is stated in Restatement (First) of Contracts § 90 (1932), see Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Geddert, 505 So.2d 371 (Ala.1987), this Court has not had occasion to determine the scope of the damages recoverable under this doctrine. | 2 | 1988–2000 |
Ivey v. Dixon Investment Company
green
2 sentences2001This Court addressed the application of the promissory-estoppel doctrine in Bates, supra. Quoting our opinion in Ivey v. Dixon Investment Co., 283 Ala. 590 , 219 So.2d 639 (1969), we stated that "estoppel cannot operate to create binding effect against a party under circumstances which would not sustain a contract if one had been made." Bates, 418 So.2d at 905 . 2001This Court addressed the application of the promissory-estoppel doctrine in Bates, supra. Quoting our opinion in Ivey v. Dixon Investment Co., 283 Ala. 590 , 219 So.2d 639 (1969), we stated that "estoppel cannot operate to create binding effect against a party under circumstances which would not sustain a contract if one had been made." Bates, 418 So.2d at 905 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001This Court addressed the application of the promissory-estoppel doctrine in Bates, supra. Quoting our opinion in Ivey v. Dixon Investment Co., 283 Ala. 590 , 219 So.2d 639 (1969), we stated that "estoppel cannot operate to create binding effect against a party under circumstances which would not sustain a contract if one had been made." Bates, 418 So.2d at 905 . 2001This Court addressed the application of the promissory-estoppel doctrine in Bates, supra. Quoting our opinion in Ivey v. Dixon Investment Co., 283 Ala. 590 , 219 So.2d 639 (1969), we stated that "estoppel cannot operate to create binding effect against a party under circumstances which would not sustain a contract if one had been made." Bates, 418 So.2d at 905 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Dean v. Myers
green
1 sentence1988Farnsworth, Contracts § 6.12, at 435-36 (1982). 7 The possibility that Dean approves a promissory estoppel exception arises from language to the effect that "[t]his Court has held that while a contract within the Statute of Frauds may not be made effectual by estoppel merely because the promisee has acted on it and the promisor has not performed, acceptance of the benefits by the promisor may give rise to estoppel, particularly if the promisee has fully performed." Dean v. Myers , 466 So.2d at 955 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Steiner
green
1 sentence1988Farnsworth, Contracts § 6.11 (1982) ("Even though the statute of frauds may prevent an injured party from enforcing the contract when the other party unjustifiably refuses to perform, courts generally allow the injured party restitution of any benefit he has conferred on the other party"). 8 Similarly, the cases of Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Geddert , 505 So.2d 371 (Ala. 1987), and Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Steiner , 404 So.2d 14 (Ala. 1981), should not be read as approving a promissory estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Clanton v. Scruggs
green
1 sentence1975This court in Clanton v. Scruggs, 95 Ala. 279 , 10 So. 757 , 758, a case cited by appellants in favor of this proposition, discussed in detail the doctrine of estoppel in pais. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Hicks Bros. v. Swift Creek Mill Co.
green
1 sentence1975Hicks Bros. v. Swift Creek Mill Co., 133 Ala. 411 , 31 So. 947 , 57 L.R.A. 720 ; § 3, Title 20, Code of 1940; § 22, Title 47, Code of 1940.” Appellants, however, contend that we are presented with facts calling for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, or estoppel in pais, which would take this case out of the Statute of Frauds. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.