promissory estoppel claim in Georgia

2025See Underwood, 362 Ga. App. at 556 (2) (“promises that are vague, indefinite, or of uncertain duration are not enforceable”); Ga. Investments Intl. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 305 Ga. App. 673, 676 (1) ( 700 SE2d 662 ) (2010) (promise that was vague and indefinite as to 16 material terms was unenforceable); see also Woodstone Townhouses, 358 Ga. App. at 531 (4) (a) (“an ‘implied understanding’ is not sufficient to support a promissory estoppel claim”). 3.

2025See Underwood, 362 Ga. App. at 556 (2) (“promises that are vague, indefinite, or of uncertain duration are not enforceable”); Ga. Investments Intl. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 305 Ga. App. 673, 676 (1) ( 700 SE2d 662 ) (2010) (promise that was vague and indefinite as to 16 material terms was unenforceable); see also Woodstone Townhouses, 358 Ga. App. at 531 (4) (a) (“an ‘implied understanding’ is not sufficient to support a promissory estoppel claim”). 3.

2014Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998) (referencing “Georgia’s equity doctrine of promissory estoppel”). 16 Girardot, 251 Ga. App. at 104 (1); see also Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 837 ( 528 SE2d 282 ) (2000) (“[Pjromissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.” (emphasis and punctuation omitted)). 17 Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648, 657 (5) ( 490 SE2d 184 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds by Williams Gen.

2010See OCGA § 13-5-30 (7). “[T]he Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the statute of frauds bars a promissory estoppel claim.” Sun-Pacific Enterprises v. Girardot, 251 Ga. App. 101, 105 (2) ( 553 SE2d 638 ) (2001).

2021See id. at 783-784 (promise to help is too vague absent specifics to support a promissory estoppel claim); Ga. Investments Intl., Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 305 Ga. App. 673, 675-676 (1) ( 700 SE2d 662 ) (2010) (promise did not support a promissory estoppel claim because it was vague and indefinite as to material terms).

2013A promise made by the defendant thus is an essential element of a promissory estoppel claim, and “while the promise need not meet the formal requirements of a contract, it must, nonetheless, have been communicated with sufficient particularity to enforce the commitment.” Mooney v. Mooney, 245 Ga. App. 780, 783 ( 538 SE2d 864 ) (2000).

2013In light of this record, the trial court erred in concluding that the Marinos were precluded from challenging the enforceability of the Garage Use Covenant under the 19 doctrine of promissory estoppel.2 Compare Canterbury Forest Assn., 243 Ga. App. at 428 (2) (landowners were estopped from challenging validity of renewal of restrictive covenants even though renewal was legally ineffective, where they had signed an agreement extending the term of the covenants and had continued to abide by and enforce the covenants in reliance on their continued viability). 4.

2013In light of this record, the trial court erred in concluding that the Marinos were precluded from challenging the enforceability of the Garage Use Covenant under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 2 Compare Canterbury Forest Assn., 243 Ga. App. at 428 (2) (landowners were estopped from challenging validity of renewal of restrictive covenants even though renewal was legally ineffective, where they had signed an agreement extending the term of the covenants and had continued to abide by and enforce the covenants in reliance on their continued viability). 4.

2021It is important to note that “estoppels are not favored by our law[,]” Griffin v. State Bank of Cochran, 312 Ga. App. 87, 95 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 35 ) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted), and the party asserting a promissory estoppel claim bears the burden of proving all elements of the claim.

2021It is important to note that “estoppels are not favored by our law[,]” Griffin v. State Bank of Cochran, 312 Ga. App. 87, 95 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 35 ) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted), and the party asserting a promissory estoppel claim bears the burden of proving all elements of the claim.

2014Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998) (referencing “Georgia’s equity doctrine of promissory estoppel”). 16 Girardot, 251 Ga. App. at 104 (1); see also Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 837 ( 528 SE2d 282 ) (2000) (“[Pjromissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.” (emphasis and punctuation omitted)). 17 Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648, 657 (5) ( 490 SE2d 184 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds by Williams Gen.

2014Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998) (referencing “Georgia’s equity doctrine of promissory estoppel”). 16 Girardot, 251 Ga. App. at 104 (1); see also Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 837 ( 528 SE2d 282 ) (2000) (“[Pjromissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.” (emphasis and punctuation omitted)). 17 Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648, 657 (5) ( 490 SE2d 184 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds by Williams Gen.

2012Greenway asserted that this promise precluded summary judgment in NALAA’s favor in his written brief below and during the summary judgment hearing, and he also relies upon it in his brief to this court. “[CJomplaints and other pleadings should be construed as to do substantial justice, that is, liberally in favor of the pleader.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dudley v. Wachovia Bank, 290 Ga. App. 220, 225 (2) ( 659 SE2d 658 ) (2008).

2012Greenway asserted that this promise precluded summary judgment in NALAA’s favor in his written brief below and during the summary judgment hearing, and he also relies upon it in his brief to this court. “[CJomplaints and other pleadings should be construed as to do substantial justice, that is, liberally in favor of the pleader.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dudley v. Wachovia Bank, 290 Ga. App. 220, 225 (2) ( 659 SE2d 658 ) (2008).

2023And importantly, when parties enter into a contract, “the consideration of which was a mutual exchange of promises[,] [t]he promises exchanged were bargained for[,] [and so] [p]romissory estoppel is not present.”20 Put more simply, when parties enter into a contract with “bargained for consideration, the terms of which include the promises alleged in support of a promissory estoppel claim, promissory estoppel is not available as a remedy.”21 Given these circumstances, the trial court erred in ruling that promissory estoppel—as codified in OCGA § 13-3-44 (a)—barred Emile from discontinuing the

2023And importantly, when parties enter into a contract, “the consideration of which was a mutual exchange of promises[,] [t]he promises exchanged were bargained for[,] [and so] [p]romissory estoppel is not present.”20 Put more simply, when parties enter into a contract with “bargained for consideration, the terms of which include the promises alleged in support of a promissory estoppel claim, promissory estoppel is not available as a remedy.”21 Given these circumstances, the trial court erred in ruling that promissory estoppel—as codified in OCGA § 13-3-44 (a)—barred Emile from discontinuing the

2022(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mariner Healthcare v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406, 412 (5) ( 634 SE2d 162 ) (2006). “[E]stoppels are not favored by our law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted) Griffin v. State Bank of Cochran, 312 Ga. App. 87, 95 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 35 ) (2011).

2022(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mariner Healthcare v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406, 412 (5) ( 634 SE2d 162 ) (2006). “[E]stoppels are not favored by our law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted) Griffin v. State Bank of Cochran, 312 Ga. App. 87, 95 (2) (a) ( 718 SE2d 35 ) (2011).

2013“Landowners may be bound to uphold legally insufficient covenants under the doctrine of promissory estoppel[.]” Duffy v. The Landings Assn., 245 Ga. App. 104, 108 ( 536 SE2d 758 ) (2000).

2013“Landowners may be bound to uphold legally insufficient covenants under the doctrine of promissory estoppel[.]” Duffy v. The Landings Assn., 245 Ga. App. 104, 108 ( 536 SE2d 758 ) (2000).

2018See generally 20/20 Vision Center v. Hudgens , 256 Ga. 129 , 135 (7) n. 6, 345 S.E.2d 330 (1986) (reversing dismissal of complaint because its allegations could support relief under theory of promissory estoppel, although complaint did not raise that argument); U.S. Foodservice v. Bartow County Bank , 300 Ga. App. 519 , 522 (2), 685 S.E.2d 777 (2009) (applying 20/20 Vision Center , supra, in resolving appeal from denial of summary judgment, where complaint did not expressly set forth promissory estoppel argument but did allege facts that, if proved, could entitle plaintiff to relief under that

2018See generally 20/20 Vision Center v. Hudgens , 256 Ga. 129 , 135 (7) n. 6, 345 S.E.2d 330 (1986) (reversing dismissal of complaint because its allegations could support relief under theory of promissory estoppel, although complaint did not raise that argument); U.S. Foodservice v. Bartow County Bank , 300 Ga. App. 519 , 522 (2), 685 S.E.2d 777 (2009) (applying 20/20 Vision Center , supra, in resolving appeal from denial of summary judgment, where complaint did not expressly set forth promissory estoppel argument but did allege facts that, if proved, could entitle plaintiff to relief under that

2018Bank , 231 Ga. App. 259 , 263 (3), 498 S.E.2d 152 (1998) ("To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) defendant made certain promises, (2) defendant should have expected that plaintiffs would rely on such promises, (3) the plaintiffs did in fact rely on such promises to his detriment, and (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."). 2 OCGA § 9-11-12 (a) provides in part: "A defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon him, unless otherwise provided by statute. ..." 3 OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) p

2018Bank , 231 Ga. App. 259 , 263 (3), 498 S.E.2d 152 (1998) ("To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) defendant made certain promises, (2) defendant should have expected that plaintiffs would rely on such promises, (3) the plaintiffs did in fact rely on such promises to his detriment, and (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."). 2 OCGA § 9-11-12 (a) provides in part: "A defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon him, unless otherwise provided by statute. ..." 3 OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) p

2016Bank, 248 Ga. 322, 323 (2) ( 283 SE2d 262 ) (1981) (trial court erred in dismissing complaint as it did not show with certainty that appellant would not be entitled to relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel; the complaint prayed for damages on account of appellant’s reliance on appellee’s promises).

2016Bank, 248 Ga. 322, 323 (2) ( 283 SE2d 262 ) (1981) (trial court erred in dismissing complaint as it did not show with certainty that appellant would not be entitled to relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel; the complaint prayed for damages on account of appellant’s reliance on appellee’s promises).

2012Compare Dukes v. Bd. of Trustees for the Police Officers Pension Fund, 280 Ga. 550 ( 629 SE2d 240 ) (2006) (in petition for mandamus to compel the hoard to reinstate its initial decision as to plaintiff’s pension, Court considered whether board was estopped by its previous decision). 259 Ga. 253 ( 379 SE2d 515 ) (1989).

2012Compare Dukes v. Bd. of Trustees for the Police Officers Pension Fund, 280 Ga. 550 ( 629 SE2d 240 ) (2006) (in petition for mandamus to compel the hoard to reinstate its initial decision as to plaintiff’s pension, Court considered whether board was estopped by its previous decision). 259 Ga. 253 ( 379 SE2d 515 ) (1989).

2012Compare Dukes v. Bd. of Trustees for the Police Officers Pension Fund, 280 Ga. 550 ( 629 SE2d 240 ) (2006) (in petition for mandamus to compel the hoard to reinstate its initial decision as to plaintiff’s pension, Court considered whether board was estopped by its previous decision). 259 Ga. 253 ( 379 SE2d 515 ) (1989).

2012Compare Dukes v. Bd. of Trustees for the Police Officers Pension Fund, 280 Ga. 550 ( 629 SE2d 240 ) (2006) (in petition for mandamus to compel the hoard to reinstate its initial decision as to plaintiff’s pension, Court considered whether board was estopped by its previous decision). 259 Ga. 253 ( 379 SE2d 515 ) (1989).

2025See Hewitt Assoc. v. Rollins Inc., 294 Ga. App. 600, 603 (2) ( 669 SE2d 551 ) (2008) (finding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on a promissory estoppel claim when it was predicated upon a mere agreement to agree). 4.

2025See Hewitt Assoc. v. Rollins Inc., 294 Ga. App. 600, 603 (2) ( 669 SE2d 551 ) (2008) (finding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on a promissory estoppel claim when it was predicated upon a mere agreement to agree). 4.

2021To constitute sufficient consideration to support a promissory estoppel claim, a party must show “[d]etrimental reliance which causes a substantial change in position.” Clark v. Byrd, 254 Ga. App. 826, 828 (1) (b) ( 564 SE2d 742 ) (2002) (jury issue exists where facts show that a party induced conduct through a promise of settlement that probably would provide a complete defense) (physical precedent only).

2021To constitute sufficient consideration to support a promissory estoppel claim, a party must show “[d]etrimental reliance which causes a substantial change in position.” Clark v. Byrd, 254 Ga. App. 826, 828 (1) (b) ( 564 SE2d 742 ) (2002) (jury issue exists where facts show that a party induced conduct through a promise of settlement that probably would provide a complete defense) (physical precedent only).

2021See Goddard v. City of Albany, 285 Ga. 882, 886 (3) ( 684 SE2d 635 ) (2009).

2021See Goddard v. City of Albany, 285 Ga. 882, 886 (3) ( 684 SE2d 635 ) (2009).

2018See generally 20/20 Vision Center v. Hudgens , 256 Ga. 129 , 135 (7) n. 6, 345 S.E.2d 330 (1986) (reversing dismissal of complaint because its allegations could support relief under theory of promissory estoppel, although complaint did not raise that argument); U.S. Foodservice v. Bartow County Bank , 300 Ga. App. 519 , 522 (2), 685 S.E.2d 777 (2009) (applying 20/20 Vision Center , supra, in resolving appeal from denial of summary judgment, where complaint did not expressly set forth promissory estoppel argument but did allege facts that, if proved, could entitle plaintiff to relief under that

2018See generally 20/20 Vision Center v. Hudgens , 256 Ga. 129 , 135 (7) n. 6, 345 S.E.2d 330 (1986) (reversing dismissal of complaint because its allegations could support relief under theory of promissory estoppel, although complaint did not raise that argument); U.S. Foodservice v. Bartow County Bank , 300 Ga. App. 519 , 522 (2), 685 S.E.2d 777 (2009) (applying 20/20 Vision Center , supra, in resolving appeal from denial of summary judgment, where complaint did not expressly set forth promissory estoppel argument but did allege facts that, if proved, could entitle plaintiff to relief under that

2016See also Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. at 775 (At the motion to dismiss stage, it did “not matter that the existence of [facts that would be required to show a violation of ministerial duty, the pivotal determination in the case] is unlikely.”).9 Nor does the complaint show that Mbigi would not be entitled to any relief on the claim for promissory estoppel.

2016See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 311 Ga. App. 726, 729 ( 716 SE2d 809 ) (2011) (trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff was required to allege additional facts sufficient to support a claim for “required Wells to offer [him] a loan modification.” In his reply brief, Mbigi concedes that he cannot base a promissory estoppel claim on account of any loan modification procedure contemplated thereby; however, the complaint does not show that the promises on which Mbigi relied were necessarily related to the settlement agreement. 26 change of custody from parent to grandparent where petition gave fa

2016See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 311 Ga. App. 726, 729 ( 716 SE2d 809 ) (2011) (trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff was required to allege additional facts sufficient to support a claim for “required Wells to offer [him] a loan modification.” In his reply brief, Mbigi concedes that he cannot base a promissory estoppel claim on account of any loan modification procedure contemplated thereby; however, the complaint does not show that the promises on which Mbigi relied were necessarily related to the settlement agreement. 26 change of custody from parent to grandparent where petition gave fa

2015See Rymer I, supra, 294 Ga. at 491 (1).

2014See Bank of Dade v. Reeves, 257 Ga. 51, 53 (3) ( 354 SE2d 131 ) (1987) (holding that theory of promissory estoppel did not apply when there was instead “simply the possibility of a breach of contract” and noting that “the key difference between a promise supported by consideration and a promise supported by a promissory estoppel is that in the former case the detriment is bargained for in exchange for the promise; in the latter, there is no bargain”); see also Brown v. Rader, 299 Ga. App. 606, 611 (2) (a) ( 683 SE2d 16 ) (2009).

2014See Bank of Dade v. Reeves, 257 Ga. 51, 53 (3) ( 354 SE2d 131 ) (1987) (holding that theory of promissory estoppel did not apply when there was instead “simply the possibility of a breach of contract” and noting that “the key difference between a promise supported by consideration and a promise supported by a promissory estoppel is that in the former case the detriment is bargained for in exchange for the promise; in the latter, there is no bargain”); see also Brown v. Rader, 299 Ga. App. 606, 611 (2) (a) ( 683 SE2d 16 ) (2009).

2014Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998) (referencing “Georgia’s equity doctrine of promissory estoppel”). 16 Girardot, 251 Ga. App. at 104 (1); see also Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 837 ( 528 SE2d 282 ) (2000) (“[Pjromissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.” (emphasis and punctuation omitted)). 17 Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648, 657 (5) ( 490 SE2d 184 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds by Williams Gen.

2014Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998) (referencing “Georgia’s equity doctrine of promissory estoppel”). 16 Girardot, 251 Ga. App. at 104 (1); see also Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 837 ( 528 SE2d 282 ) (2000) (“[Pjromissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.” (emphasis and punctuation omitted)). 17 Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648, 657 (5) ( 490 SE2d 184 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds by Williams Gen.

2014Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998) (referencing “Georgia’s equity doctrine of promissory estoppel”). 16 Girardot, 251 Ga. App. at 104 (1); see also Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 837 ( 528 SE2d 282 ) (2000) (“[Pjromissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.” (emphasis and punctuation omitted)). 17 Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648, 657 (5) ( 490 SE2d 184 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds by Williams Gen.

2014Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998) (referencing “Georgia’s equity doctrine of promissory estoppel”). 16 Girardot, 251 Ga. App. at 104 (1); see also Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 837 ( 528 SE2d 282 ) (2000) (“[Pjromissory estoppel requires only that the reliance by the injured party be reasonable.” (emphasis and punctuation omitted)). 17 Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648, 657 (5) ( 490 SE2d 184 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds by Williams Gen.

2012As a rule, the decisions of our Supreme Court do not “stand for points that were neither raised by the parties nor actually decided in the resulting opinion . . . .”47 Further, in Quillian the Employment Retirement System was estopped from denying benefits, but the Court does not 43 Compare Dukes v. Bd. of Trustees for the Police Officers Pension Fund, 280 Ga. 550 ( 629 SE2d 240 ) (2006) (in petition for mandamus to compel the board to reinstate its initial decision as to plaintiff’s pension, Court considered whether board was estopped by its previous decision). 44 259 Ga. 253 ( 379 SE2d 515 )

2012As a rule, the decisions of our Supreme Court do not “stand for points that were neither raised by the parties nor actually decided in the resulting opinion . . . .”47 Further, in Quillian the Employment Retirement System was estopped from denying benefits, but the Court does not 43 Compare Dukes v. Bd. of Trustees for the Police Officers Pension Fund, 280 Ga. 550 ( 629 SE2d 240 ) (2006) (in petition for mandamus to compel the board to reinstate its initial decision as to plaintiff’s pension, Court considered whether board was estopped by its previous decision). 44 259 Ga. 253 ( 379 SE2d 515 )

2011See generally Tampa Bay Financial v. Nordeen, 272 Ga. App. 529, 535 (2) ( 612 SE2d 856 ) (2005) (recognizing that a claimant cannot establish a case for promissory estoppel without proving that he justifiably relied upon the promises).

2011Ford-Mercury, 201 Ga. App. 589, 591 (2) ( 411 SE2d 518 ) (1991), a merger clause may preclude a claimant from showing that he or she reasonably relied upon prior representations outside of the contract in support of a promissory estoppel claim to enforce the promise as binding, see Tampa Bay Financial, supra, 272 Ga. App. at 533-534 (2).

2011Ford-Mercury, 201 Ga. App. 589, 591 (2) ( 411 SE2d 518 ) (1991), a merger clause may preclude a claimant from showing that he or she reasonably relied upon prior representations outside of the contract in support of a promissory estoppel claim to enforce the promise as binding, see Tampa Bay Financial, supra, 272 Ga. App. at 533-534 (2).

2011Ford-Mercury, 201 Ga. App. 589, 591 (2) ( 411 SE2d 518 ) (1991), a merger clause may preclude a claimant from showing that he or she reasonably relied upon prior representations outside of the contract in support of a promissory estoppel claim to enforce the promise as binding, see Tampa Bay Financial, supra, 272 Ga. App. at 533-534 (2).