promissory estoppel doctrine in Texas

2020We need not reach Cathy’s liability under this theory because we hold that she is liable for breach of contract. 8 “The requisites of promissory estoppel in Texas are[] (1) a promise[,] (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor[,] and (3) substantial reliance by the promisees to their detriment.” Wade v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 02-12-00007-CV, 2013 WL 257361 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983)). 9 The findings that Pickel concedes are not supported by the record are findings 18 and 20.

2019See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018) (noting that one of the elements of a common law fraud claim is that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct); id. at 653–54 (noting that elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim include that the plaintiff “suffer[ed] pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the representation”); First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214 , 220–21 (Tex. 2017) (noting that to recover on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim for actual damages, the plaintiff must sh

2023The Patels’ promissory estoppel claim Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them.” In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965)).

2022Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965); Lucas v. Ryan, No. 02-18- 00053-CV, 2019 WL 2635561 , at *18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[T]he weight of authority in Texas is that attorney’s fees are recoverable under Section 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil Practice[] & Remedies Code in a promissory estoppel claim.” Turner v. NJN Cotton Co., 485 S.W.3d 513, 528 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied).

2013“If an alleged promise is part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue for reliance damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Stable Energy, LP. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327, 336 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.); accord Doctors Hosp.1997, 154 S.W.3d at 636 . 2.

2013“If an alleged promise is part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue for reliance damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327, 336 (Tex. App.— Austin 2001, no pet.); accord Doctors Hosp. 1997, 154 S.W.3d at 636 . 2.

2021The doctrine of promissory estoppel, however, “presumes no contract exists.” Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2002)); see also Pabla v. Myers, No. 13- 20-00292-CV, 2021 WL 3196965 , at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 29, 2021, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“Because there was no valid contract between the parties, promissory estoppel may apply to [the appellant’s] allegations.”).

2013“Promissory estoppel does not apply to a promise covered by a valid contract between the parties; it does apply, however, to a promise outside the contract.” Barnett v. Coppell N. Tex. Court, Ltd., 123 S.W.3d 804, 825 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied); see also Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2002) (noting that “the promissory- estoppel doctrine presumes no contract exists”).

2015Plaintiff would show that this court can enforce an oral promise to sign an Instrument complying with the Statute of Frauds if: (1) the promisor should have expected that his promise would lead the promisee to some definite and substantial injury; (2) such an injury occurred; (3) the court must enforce the promise to avoid injustice See “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Company, et al, 492 S.W.2d at 934, 1972 Tex. Lexis 282 More specifically, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the promissory estoppel exception to cases where the promise was to “sign a written agreement which itself com

1999The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, under our view, defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise.” “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex.1972).

2023The Patels’ promissory estoppel claim Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them.” In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965)).

2008As it has been recognized by the Texas Supreme Court, "[t]he function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is . . . defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise." See Wheeler v. White , 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981)); see also In re Weekley Homes, L.P. , 180 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Tex. 2005) ("we have long recognized . . . the defensive theory of promissory estoppel.").

2025See Richter v. Wagner Oil Co., 90 S.W.3d 890, 899 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (“Promissory estoppel is not applicable to a promise covered by a valid contract between the parties; however, promissory estoppel will apply to a promise outside the contract.”); see also Stable Energy, LP. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327, 336 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (“If an alleged promise is part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue for reliance damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” (citing Guaranty Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins.

2013“If an alleged promise is part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue for reliance damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” Stable Energy, LP. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327, 336 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.); accord Doctors Hosp.1997, 154 S.W.3d at 636 . 2.

2016Additionally, the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds is "narrow" and applies only "to cases where the promise was 'to sign a written agreement which itself complies with the Statute of Frauds.'" Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1982). 22 i. No Promise.

2013However, in the subsequent case of Nagle v. Nagle, the Texas Supreme Court clarified that the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds is “narrow” and applies only “to cases where the promise was ‘to sign a written agreement which itself complies with the Statute of Frauds.’” Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. - 16 - 04-12-00363-CV 1982).

2019Miller v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 229 S.W.3d 358, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983)).

2015Miller v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 229 S.W.3d 358, 378-79 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1983)).

2025See Richter v. Wagner Oil Co., 90 S.W.3d 890, 899 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (“Promissory estoppel is not applicable to a promise covered by a valid contract between the parties; however, promissory estoppel will apply to a promise outside the contract.”); see also Stable Energy, LP. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327, 336 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (“If an alleged promise is part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue for reliance damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” (citing Guaranty Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins.

2005Co., 966 S.W.2d 748, 754 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.)); Richter, RMS v. Wagner Oil Co., 90 S.W.3d 890, 899 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (“Promissory es-toppel is not applicable to a promise covered by a valid contract ....”) (citation omitted); Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327, 336 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) (“If an alleged promise is part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue ... under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”) (citation omitted); Fretz Constr.

2008That is, promissory estoppel prevents a promisor who has induced substantial action or forebearance by another from denying that promise if "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement," id. (citing Harkinson , 944 S.W.2d at 636 ), but "it does not create a contract right that does not otherwise exist," Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley , 626 S.W.2d 726, 734 (Tex. 1981); see Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville , 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1988).

2008That is, promissory estoppel prevents a promisor who has induced substantial action or forebearance by another from denying that promise if “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement,” id. (citing Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d at 636 ), but “it does not create a contract right that does not otherwise exist,” Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 734 (Tex. 1981); see Hruska v. First State an option contract).

2008Appellants argue that CITGO presented no evidence of any damages compensable under a promissory estoppel theory, (16) that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that CITGO reasonably relied on any promise to its detriment, (17) that CITGO's "promissory estoppel" claim "sounded in tort," (18) and that CITGO's recovery in negligence eliminates any "injustice" that would justify the application of the promissory estoppel doctrine. (19) See, e.g. , Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. William Jefferson Harkinson and Jeff Harkinson Investments, Inc. , 944 S.W.2d 631

2008Appellants argue that CITGO presented no evidence of any damages compensable under a promissory estoppel theory,16 that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that CITGO reasonably relied on any promise to its 16 Appellants’ thirteenth issue. 42 detriment,17 that CITGO’s “promissory estoppel” claim “sounded in tort,”18 and that CITGO’s recovery in negligence eliminates any “injustice” that would justify the application of the promissory estoppel doctrine.19 See, e.g., Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. William Jefferson Harkinson and Jeff Harkinson Investments

2013See Frost Crushed Stone Co., Inc. v. Odell Geer Const. Co., Inc. , 110 S.W.3d 41 , 46 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (explaining the difference between promissory estoppel as a counter-defense to statute of frauds and as a cause of action for affirmative relief).

2013See Frost Crushed Stone Co., Inc. v. Odell Geer Const. Co., Inc., 110 S.W.3d 41 , 46 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (explaining the difference between promissory estoppel as a counter-defense to statute of frauds and as a cause of action for affirmative relief). 13 an agreement from compliance with the statute of frauds, the party is entitled to only reliance damages, not benefit-of-the-bargain damages.

2008That is, promissory estoppel prevents a promisor who has induced substantial action or forebearance by another from denying that promise if "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement," id. (citing Harkinson , 944 S.W.2d at 636 ), but "it does not create a contract right that does not otherwise exist," Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley , 626 S.W.2d 726, 734 (Tex. 1981); see Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville , 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1988).

2008That is, promissory estoppel prevents a promisor who has induced substantial action or forebearance by another from denying that promise if "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement," id. (citing Harkinson , 944 S.W.2d at 636 ), but "it does not create a contract right that does not otherwise exist," Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley , 626 S.W.2d 726, 734 (Tex. 1981); see Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville , 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1988).

2025Corpus Christi Day Cruise, LLC v. Christus Spohn Health Sys., 398 S.W.3d 303, 315 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2012, pet. denied); Traco, 814 S.W.2d at 193 ; see also Turner v. NJN Cotton Co., 485 S.W.3d 513, 528 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2015, pet. denied) (noting weight of authority in Texas allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees for a promissory estoppel claim).

2022Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965); Lucas v. Ryan, No. 02-18- 00053-CV, 2019 WL 2635561 , at *18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[T]he weight of authority in Texas is that attorney’s fees are recoverable under Section 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil Practice[] & Remedies Code in a promissory estoppel claim.” Turner v. NJN Cotton Co., 485 S.W.3d 513, 528 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied).

2023This cause of action is “a viable alternative to breach of contract.” Allied Vista, Inc. v. Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).

2014This court reasoned as follows: “Relying on such promises is unreasonable as a matter of law and cannot be the basis for a promissory estoppel claim” because “[t]he parties never discussed or negotiated the specific pieces of business, the price, when and for how long such 2 See, e.g., Allied Vista, Inc. v. Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (“Significantly, the sort of ‘false information’ contemplated in a negligent misrepresentation case is a misstatement of existing fact, not a promise of future conduct.”) (original emphasis) (citing Airborne Freigh

2015See id., see also Coastal Corp.. v. Atl Richfield Co, 852 S. W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. App.-Co1pus Christi, no writ) ("Promissory estoppel is applied when a party promises to sign an existing written contract that would satisfy the statute of frauds, but for the lack of a signature..

2015See id., see also Coastal Corp.. v. Atl Richfield Co, 852 S. W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. App.-Co1pus Christi, no writ) ("Promissory estoppel is applied when a party promises to sign an existing written contract that would satisfy the statute of frauds, but for the lack of a signature..

2010See Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898 .

2010See Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898 .

2008See JHC Ventures, L.P. v. Fast Trucking, Inc. , 94 S.W.3d 762, 774 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, no pet). (23) Finally, in their fifteenth issue, appellants complain that CITGO failed to segregate its attorney's fees among valid and invalid grounds of recovery.

2008See JHC Ventures, L.P. v. Fast Trucking, Inc. , 94 S.W.3d 762, 774 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, no pet.). (22) Finally, in their fifteenth issue, appellants complain that CITGO failed to segregate its attorney's fees among valid and invalid grounds of recovery.

2025Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. 2013).

2021The doctrine of promissory estoppel, however, “presumes no contract exists.” Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2002)); see also Pabla v. Myers, No. 13- 20-00292-CV, 2021 WL 3196965 , at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 29, 2021, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“Because there was no valid contract between the parties, promissory estoppel may apply to [the appellant’s] allegations.”).

2025Co., 568 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. Civ.

2024Co., 568 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“If the promise in question is a part of a valid contract, the promisee cannot disregard the contract and sue for reliance –13– damage under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”).

2025Corpus Christi Day Cruise, LLC v. Christus Spohn Health Sys., 398 S.W.3d 303, 315 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2012, pet. denied); Traco, 814 S.W.2d at 193 ; see also Turner v. NJN Cotton Co., 485 S.W.3d 513, 528 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2015, pet. denied) (noting weight of authority in Texas allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees for a promissory estoppel claim).

2021See Traco, Inc. v. Arrow Glass Co., 814 S.W.2d 186 , 193–94 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied).

2007This court held that Roberts could maintain a promissory estoppel claim even through Roberts and Geosource had expressly contracted that the employment would be at will. [7] Id. at 50 .

2007This court held that Roberts could maintain a promissory estoppel claim even through Roberts and Geosource had expressly contracted that the employment would be at will. 7 Id. at 50 .

2024Id.

2013See id. 30 Moreover, Exxon is not on point because there was no evidence of fub performance by the party seeking to enforce the agreement.

2024Griffith Truck & Equip., Inc. v. Flash Tank Servs., Inc., No. 14-21-00331-CV, 2022 WL 2920693 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Collins v. Walker, 341 S.W.3d 570, 573-74 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Boales v. Brighton Builders, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)).

2015Sales cases in general could not recover for civil conspiracy to Genuine issue of material fact existed commit fraud. as to whether developer and builder Ne:·:t Boales v. Brighton Builders, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 159 (2000) made certain misrepresentations to home purchaser that they intended purchasers JISI Release to rely upon and whether purchasers .·-~ Release of specific indebtedness or foreseeably relied on the representations, liability in general precluding summary judgment for builder Release executed by homeowners, by its and developer on purchasers' claim that, own language, concerned the b

2015It is not a distinct cause of action.” Garcia v. Lucero, 366 S.W.3d 275, 281 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2012, no pet.). 48 “[P]romissory estoppel becomes available to a claimant only in the absence of a valid and enforceable contract.” Doctors Hosp. 1997 L.P. v. Sambuca Houston L.P., 154 S.W.3d 634, 636 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. abated).

2013Id.