promissory estoppel claim in Utah

2024S6 misapprehends the law. ¶61 The Utah Supreme Court first cited the definition of promissory estoppel contained in section 90 in Tolboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984), a case raising a promissory estoppel claim in a situation involving a mistaken bid.

2024After quoting this definition, the Tolboe court articulated the elements of a promissory estoppel claim under Utah law. 682 P.2d at 845– 46.

2022Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ward’s complaint. 20200724-CA 12 2022 UT App 62

2022Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ward’s complaint. 20200724-CA 12 2022 UT App 62

2019Promissory estoppel is a doctrine of equitable relief, which presents "mixed questions of fact and law." Richards v. Brown , 2009 UT App 315 , ¶ 11, 222 P.3d 69 (quotation simplified).

2019Promissory estoppel is a doctrine of equitable relief, which presents "mixed questions of fact and law." Richards v. Brown , 2009 UT App 315 , ¶ 11, 222 P.3d 69 (quotation simplified).

2025Smart Tech, therefore, was not required to allege any damages to proceed with this claim. ¶30 Count two is a claim for breach of contract, which states that the “breach has damaged plaintiffs,” referring to both Monson and Smart Tech “in an amount to be proven at trial.” 20230622-CA 16 2025 UT App 18 Smart Tech Development v. Pink Water ¶31 Count three is a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which—making no mention of Monson—contends that “Smart Tech has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.” ¶32 Count four is a promissory estoppel claim seeking

2025With regard to unjust enrichment, the court concluded that “HuKui ha[d] failed to present evidence rising above mere speculation regarding the 20231131-CA 6 2025 UT App 74 Co-Diagnostics v. HuKui Technology amount CoDx ha[d] been unjustly enriched.” Finally, the court determined that HuKui had “failed to present evidence regarding improper means” on its intentional interference claim.

2024We accordingly agree with the district court that “the doctrine of promissory estoppel as applied in Utah requires a reasonably certain and definite promise.” 20220977-CA 27 2024 UT App 105 S6 v. Wing Enterprises B.

2024Because we affirm the district court’s ruling on other grounds, we need not reach this issue. 20210415-CA 6 2024 UT App 21 In re Estate of Berrey concluded the promissory estoppel claim failed “because [Son] did not carry his burden of proof in meeting the elements of the claim.” We see no clear error in the district court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence of detrimental reliance.

2023We disagree. ¶49 “Promissory estoppel is an equitable claim for relief that compensates a party who has detrimentally relied on another’s promise.” E & H Land, Ltd. v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ¶ 29 , 336 P.3d 1077 (quotation simplified).

2023We disagree. ¶49 “Promissory estoppel is an equitable claim for relief that compensates a party who has detrimentally relied on another’s promise.” E & H Land, Ltd. v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ¶ 29 , 336 P.3d 1077 (quotation simplified).

2023Instead, as discussed, Domo did nothing more than conditionally say that it would not enforce the provision unless Sciabacucchi was appealed and overruled, which is precisely what then happened. 20210399-CA 20 2023 UT App 25 Volonte v. Domo, Inc. P.3d 793 (holding that the “promise must be reasonably certain and definite, and a claimant’s subjective understanding of the promisor’s statement cannot, without more, support a promissory estoppel claim” (quotation simplified)); Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co., 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 53 , 373 P.3d 189 (holding that “promissory estoppel involves a clear and de

2022Co., 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956). 39 Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Tr., 2004 UT 85, ¶ 14 , 100 P.3d 1200 (―[T]o establish the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds, [t]he acts and conduct of the promissor must so clearly manifest an intention that he will not assert the statute that to permit him to do so would be to work a fraud upon the other party.‖ (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 40See Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 22 , (noting that the difference between a void contract and a voidable contract is whether the contract ―could bec

2022Co., 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956). 39 Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Tr., 2004 UT 85, ¶ 14 , 100 P.3d 1200 (―[T]o establish the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds, [t]he acts and conduct of the promissor must so clearly manifest an intention that he will not assert the statute that to permit him to do so would be to work a fraud upon the other party.‖ (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 40See Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 22 , (noting that the difference between a void contract and a voidable contract is whether the contract ―could bec

2019ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶14 We address two of the issues Westgate raises on appeal. 5 First, Westgate *798 argues the Association does not have standing to seek enforcement of the 2009 Budget Methodology because the court determined "that the owners, not the Association, relied upon Westgate's promise and ratified Westgate's conduct." "Whether a party has standing is primarily a question of law, which we review for correctness." Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer , 2009 UT App 185 , ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 120 . ¶15 Second, it contends the facts of the case preclude the district court fr

2019ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶14 We address two of the issues Westgate raises on appeal. 5 First, Westgate *798 argues the Association does not have standing to seek enforcement of the 2009 Budget Methodology because the court determined "that the owners, not the Association, relied upon Westgate's promise and ratified Westgate's conduct." "Whether a party has standing is primarily a question of law, which we review for correctness." Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer , 2009 UT App 185 , ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 120 . ¶15 Second, it contends the facts of the case preclude the district court fr

2019Promissory Estoppel ¶23 Westgate contends the district court erred when it "concluded that the Association was entitled to a declaration that the terms of the 2009 Budget Methodology are enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel." ¶24 Promissory estoppel is "employed where injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise." Hess v. Johnston , 2007 UT App 213 , ¶ 22, 163 P.3d 747 .

2019Promissory Estoppel ¶23 Westgate contends the district court erred when it "concluded that the Association was entitled to a declaration that the terms of the 2009 Budget Methodology are enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel." ¶24 Promissory estoppel is "employed where injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise." Hess v. Johnston , 2007 UT App 213 , ¶ 22, 163 P.3d 747 .

2016Although rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has been amended since the time the district court granted summary judgment in this case, those changes are not relevant to our analysis. 20140113-CA 22 2016 UT App 88 Mitchell v. ReconTrust Company weighed the evidence against them in concluding that they could not show the existence of a definite and certain promise to support a promissory estoppel claim. ¶50 In particular, the Mitchells contend that the “court never determined whether defendants met their initial burdens” and that the Mitchells “therefore were not even under any obligati

2016Although rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has been amended since the time the district court granted summary judgment in this case, those changes are not relevant to our analysis. 20140113-CA 22 2016 UT App 88 Mitchell v. ReconTrust Company weighed the evidence against them in concluding that they could not show the existence of a definite and certain promise to support a promissory estoppel claim. ¶50 In particular, the Mitchells contend that the “court never determined whether defendants met their initial burdens” and that the Mitchells “therefore were not even under any obligati

1953The general principle of promissory estop-pel is embodied in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, *568 Sec. 90, under the heading of “Informal Contracts Without Assent or Consideration,” as follows: “A promise which the promissor should, reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.” Promissory estoppel is historically rooted as a substitute for consideration, Allegheny College v. National Cha

1953The general principle of promissory estop-pel is embodied in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, *568 Sec. 90, under the heading of “Informal Contracts Without Assent or Consideration,” as follows: “A promise which the promissor should, reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.” Promissory estoppel is historically rooted as a substitute for consideration, Allegheny College v. National Cha