7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Slate v. Saxon, Marquoit, Bertoni & Toddgreen2 sentences2013We recognize that allowing a prospective employee to bring a promissory estoppel claim raises practical concerns that the Court of Appeals articulated in Slate: “It would serve the interests of no one — least of all new professional persons in search of work — to discourage putative employers from discharging them earlier rather than later, under circumstances where there is no possibility that an actual employment relationship will ever exist.” 166 Or App at 5-6 . 2013We recognize that allowing a prospective employee to bring a promissory estoppel claim raises practical concerns that the Court of Appeals articulated in Slate: “It would serve the interests of no one—least of all new professional persons in search of work—to discourage putative employers from discharging them earlier rather than later, under circumstances where there is no possibility that an actual employment relationship will ever exist.” 166 Or App at 5-6 . | 2 | 2 |
Schafer v. Fraser Et Uxgreen2 sentences1995App. 195, 199-200 , 619 P.2d 895 (1980), we described the elements of promissory estoppel as "(1) a promise "(2) which the promisor, as a reasonable person, could foresee would induce conduct of the kind which occurred, "(3) actual reliance on the promise, *704 "(4) resulting in a substantial change in position." We noted in Bixler that the promissory estoppel doctrine, as embodied in Restatement of Contracts § 90, (1956), had been "adopted" by the Supreme Court in Schafer et al. v. Fraser et ux, 206 Or. 446 , 290 P.2d 190 , 294 P.2d 609 (1956). 1995App. 195, 199-200 , 619 P.2d 895 (1980), we described the elements of promissory estoppel as "(1) a promise "(2) which the promisor, as a reasonable person, could foresee would induce conduct of the kind which occurred, "(3) actual reliance on the promise, *704 "(4) resulting in a substantial change in position." We noted in Bixler that the promissory estoppel doctrine, as embodied in Restatement of Contracts § 90, (1956), had been "adopted" by the Supreme Court in Schafer et al. v. Fraser et ux, 206 Or. 446 , 290 P.2d 190 , 294 P.2d 609 (1956). | 1 | 2 |
Sheets v. Knightgreen2 sentences2000See Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or 220 , 779 P2d 1000 (1989) (stating analogous conclusion with respect to party’s reliance on implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as theory of recovery in connection with termination of at will employment contract). 2000See Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or 220 , 779 P2d 1000 (1989) (stating analogous conclusion with respect to party’s reliance on implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as theory of recovery in connection with termination of at will employment contract). | 1 | 1 |
Kiely v. St. Germaingreen1 sentence1995Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1983), the court further explained why the promissory estoppel doctrine should apply to indefinite or incomplete promises: "The doctrine of promissory estoppel encourages fair dealing in business relationships and discourages conduct which unreasonably causes foreseeable economic loss because of action or inaction induced by a specific promise. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bixler v. First Nat. Bank of Oregon
green
2 sentences1995App. 195, 199-200 , 619 P.2d 895 (1980), we described the elements of promissory estoppel as "(1) a promise "(2) which the promisor, as a reasonable person, could foresee would induce conduct of the kind which occurred, "(3) actual reliance on the promise, *704 "(4) resulting in a substantial change in position." We noted in Bixler that the promissory estoppel doctrine, as embodied in Restatement of Contracts § 90, (1956), had been "adopted" by the Supreme Court in Schafer et al. v. Fraser et ux, 206 Or. 446 , 290 P.2d 190 , 294 P.2d 609 (1956). 1995In Bixler v. First National Bank, 49 Or App 195, 199-200 , 619 P2d 895 (1980), we described the elements of promissory estoppel as “(1) a promise “(2) which the promisor, as a reasonable person, could foresee would induce conduct of the kind which occurred, “(3) actual reliance on the promise, “(4) resulting in a substantial change in position. ’ ’ We noted in Bixler that the promissory estoppel doctrine, as embodied in Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1956), had been “adopted” by the Supreme Court in Schafer et al v. Fraser et ux, 206 Or 446 , 290 P2d 190 , 294 P2d 609 (1956). | 2 | 1990–1995 |
Kleikamp v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2010Vacated and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment declaring that defendants’ actions do not violate the constitutional provisions concerning separation of powers and that plaintiffs do not have a common law vested right to complete and continue the use as provided in the Measure 37 waivers; otherwise affirmed. 1 In Kleikamp v. Board of County Commissioners, 240 Or App 57, 59-60 , 246 P3d 56 (2010), we explained the relationship between Measure 37 and Measure 49: “Ballot Measure 37 (2004) * * * was enacted through the initiative process and codified as former ORS 197.352 (2005), amende 2010Vacated and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment declaring that defendants’ actions do not violate the constitutional provisions concerning separation of powers and that plaintiffs do not have a common law vested right to complete and continue the use as provided in the Measure 37 waivers; otherwise affirmed. 1 In Kleikamp v. Board of County Commissioners, 240 Or App 57, 59-60 , 246 P3d 56 (2010), we explained the relationship between Measure 37 and Measure 49: “Ballot Measure 37 (2004) * * * was enacted through the initiative process and codified as former ORS 197.352 (2005), amende | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Blackburn v. MALONEY
neutral
2 sentences1956More recently this court, in Blackburn v. Maloney, 189 Or 76 , 218 P2d 459 , ruled: “If Blackburn orally consented to an extension, and the party to the contract acted upon such consent, then, upon the principle of estoppel, Blackburn could not thereafter, prior to the expiration of the agreed period of extension, hold the agreement of extension void because not in writing, and treat the contract as if the right of the other contracting party had been forfeited by the expiration of the time originally fixed.” The foregoing review indicates that this court is committed to the principles which u 1956More recently this court, in Blackburn v. Maloney, 189 Or 76 , 218 P2d 459 , ruled: “If Blackburn orally consented to an extension, and the party to the contract acted upon such consent, then, upon the principle of estoppel, Blackburn could not thereafter, prior to the expiration of the agreed period of extension, hold the agreement of extension void because not in writing, and treat the contract as if the right of the other contracting party had been forfeited by the expiration of the time originally fixed.” The foregoing review indicates that this court is committed to the principles which u | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Small v. Paulson
green
2 sentences1956Small v. Paulson, 187 Or 76 , 209 P2d 779 , took notice of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but ruled that it did not apply to the facts of that case because the promise had not induced action of a definite and substantial character. 1956Small v. Paulson, 187 Or 76 , 209 P2d 779 , took notice of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but ruled that it did not apply to the facts of that case because the promise had not induced action of a definite and substantial character. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.