promissory estoppel doctrine in Nebraska

2019Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action - 822 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports IN RE ESTATE OF RYAN Cite as 302 Neb. 821 or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce- ment of the promise. 9.

2019Recovery on a theory of promissory estoppel is based upon the principle that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of a prom- ise.27 Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.28 23 Annot., 38 A.L.R. 868 , 869 (1925). 24 Id. at 869 . 25 See In re Estate of Griswold, supra note 18 . 26 See 38 A.L.R., supra note 23. 27 Blinn v. Beatrice Community Hosp. & Health Ctr., supra note 13. 28 Id. - 831 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance She

2014Id.

2014Id.

1990In determining that promissory *750 estoppel could not be used to circumvent the protection provided by the statute of frauds, we stated in Farmland, supra at 544-45 , 244 N.W.2d at 90 : Traditionally, the promissory estoppel claim has been used to supply the element of consideration where to refuse enforcement of a promise unsupported by a consideration would work an injustice to the party who relied to his detriment on the promise---- . . . [W]e determine section 90 of Restatement, Contracts 2d, Tent.

1989Farmland Service Coop, Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538 , 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976).

1999Compare, Filcek v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 156 Mich. App. 80 , 401 N.W.2d 318 (1986); Hackett v Foodmaker, Inc, 69 Mich. App. 591 , 245 N.W.2d 140 (1976).

1999Compare, Filcek v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 156 Mich. App. 80 , 401 N.W.2d 318 (1986); Hackett v Foodmaker, Inc, 69 Mich. App. 591 , 245 N.W.2d 140 (1976).

1994Group, 6 F.3d 131 , 137 (3d Cir.1993); cf. Restatement, Second, Contracts Sec. 90 (common law doctrine of promissory estoppel).

1994We have stated that “ ‘there is no requirement of “definiteness” in an action based upon promissory estoppel.’ ” Id. at 979 , 485 N.W.2d at 582 , quoting Rosnick, supra. However, the general rule regarding the doctrine of promissory estoppel is that “ ‘[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. . . .’ ” Rosnick, 235 Neb. at 748 , 457 N.W.2d at 799 , quoting the Restatement (Second)

1994We have stated that “ ‘there is no requirement of “definiteness” in an action based upon promissory estoppel.’ ” Id. at 979 , 485 N.W.2d at 582 , quoting Rosnick, supra. However, the general rule regarding the doctrine of promissory estoppel is that “ ‘[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. . . .’ ” Rosnick, 235 Neb. at 748 , 457 N.W.2d at 799 , quoting the Restatement (Second)

1990As stated in Hoffman, supra, the doctrine of promissory estoppel “does not impose the requirement that the promise giving rise to the cause of action must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee.” Id. at 698 , 133 N.W.2d at 275 .

1989Plaintiff, in support of its claim that the defendant Overland is liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, has directed our attention to the case of Johnston v. State Bank, 195 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1972), in which the Iowa court held that a bank would be liable to a builder where the bank had written a letter to the builder advising of a loan commitment to the owner of the property involved for a building if built pursuant to submitted plans and specifications and to the bank having a first lien thereon.