promissory estoppel doctrine in Missouri

2003Express, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 696, 704 (Mo.App.

1998Because promissory estoppel serves as an equitable remedy where an express contract does not exist, the court must only apply the doctrine in those situations where an unjust decision would otherwise result. [4] See e.g., Geisinger v. A & *107 B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Mo.App. 1991), and Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Express, 892 S.W.2d 696, 703 (Mo.App.1994).

1994Footwear Unlimited, Inc. v. Katzenberg, 683 S.W.2d 291, 296 [8] (Mo.App.1984). 10 Regarding the second assertion, we recognize the possible relevance of evidence of a “confidential or special relationship” to certain aspects of the promissory estoppel doctrine such as the foreseeability by the promi-sor of the promisee’s reliance, the reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance, or the injustice that might occur absent enforcement of the promise.

1992Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981); Southern Missouri Bank v. Fogle, 738 S.W.2d 153, 157-58 (Mo.App. 1987); Footwear Unlimited, Inc. v. Katzenberg, 683 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo.App. 1984).

2024Chesus v. Watts, 967 S.W.2d 97, 107 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). “[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel should be used with caution, sparingly and only in extreme cases.” Id. at 106 .

2001The trial court relied extensively on the opinion of Chesus v.. Watts, 967 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.App.1998) when it determined in its judgment, through use of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that Respondents were entitled to construct, use, and maintain a boat dock and slips on Lot 14.

2000Mayer, 660 S.W.2d at 749 ; Geisinger v. A & B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 98-100 (Mo.App.1991) (recognizing that there might be some room for remedies based on promissory estoppel as discussed in the portion of this opinion dealing with Count II).

2000Mayer, 660 S.W.2d at 749 ; Geisinger v. A & B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 98-100 (Mo. App.1991) (recognizing that there might be some room for remedies based on promissory estoppel as discussed in the portion of this opinion dealing with Count II).

2000Mayer, 660 S.W.2d at 749 ; Geisinger v. A & B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 98-100 (Mo.App.1991) (recognizing that there might be some room for remedies based on promissory estoppel as discussed in the portion of this opinion dealing with Count II).

2000See Mayer v. King Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Mo.App.1983) and cases cited therein. *158 Our cases clearly hold that a contract otherwise unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds cannot be made into a fully enforceable contract through any doctrine of promissory estoppel.

1995The doctrine of promissory estoppel is stated in the following terms: “The doctrine of promissory estoppel provides that when a promise is made which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance, the promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only by performance of the promise.” Southern Missouri Bank v. Fogle, 738 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Mo.App.S.D.1987); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1); Central Prod.

1992Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981); Southern Missouri Bank v. Fogle, 738 S.W.2d 153, 157-58 (Mo.App. 1987); Footwear Unlimited, Inc. v. Katzenberg, 683 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo.App. 1984).

2025See Midwest Energy, Inc. v. Orion Food Sys., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (“Our cases clearly hold that 13 a contract otherwise unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds cannot be made into a fully enforceable contract through any doctrine of promissory estoppel.”).

2003Courts are to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel “with caution, sparingly and only in extreme cases to avoid unjust results.” Midwest Energy, Inc. v. Orion Food Sys., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 154 , 165 *147 (Mo.App.2000).

2021Id. 17 We note that the damages at law that remain pending against Carthage as a result of our ruling today are identical to those claimed against BMI in the promissory estoppel count, rendering the promissory estoppel claim, in effect, an alternative to the breach of contract claim against Carthage should it be determined that St.

2013Agency, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Mo. banc 2007) (“The promise giving rise to [a promissory estoppel claim] must be definite, and the promise must be made in a contractual sense.”) The allegations contained in the petition relating to the RFP are insufficient as a matter of law to allege a promise by Orf to Jamison.

1986Mayer v. King Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Mo.App.1983); Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Mo.App.1980).

1984This court fully explained the doctrine of promissory estoppel in Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo.App.1980).

2003Under the First Restatement, in order to prevail on a claim of promissory estoppel, a party had to establish four elements: “(1) a promise; (2) promisee detrimentally relies on the promise; (3) promisor could reasonably foresee the precise action the promisee took in reliance; and (4) injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise.” Halls Ferry Invs., Inc. v. Smith, 985 S.W.2d 848, 853 (Mo.App.1998), Chesus v. Watts, 967 S.W.2d 97, 107 (Mo.App.1998).

2003See Shumate v. Dugan, 934 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Mo.App.

2001As a general rule, "[a]bsent proof of fraud, accident, mistake, or express contractual provision holding open a condition, none of which were alleged or proved here, the rights of parties to a real estate contract are merged in the subsequent deed.” Penrod v. Henry, 706 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Mo.App.1986).

1995Credit Ass’n v. Reed, 805 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Mo.App.S.D.1991).

1995Id. at 1004 [3].

1995See, e.g., Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Express, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 696, 704 (Mo.App.W.D.1994); Davis v. Nelson, 880 S.W.2d 658, 666 (Mo.App.E.D.1994).

1988The promissory estoppel principle is “not predicated on misstatement of fact but rather rests upon a promise on which a party relies.” Mark Twain Plaza Bank, supra, at 863; Corbin, Contracts § 140 at 607-08.